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 ABSTRACT 
 
THE PECULIARITIES OF THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY 
IN THE 1930s: THE ÜLKÜ VERSION OF KEMALISM, 1933-1936 
 
AYDIN, ERTAN 
 
P.D. Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre 
September, 2003 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes a specific version of Turkish revolutionary 
ideology in the 1930s, the Ülkü version of Kemalism by means of textual 
interpretation of Ülkü, the official journal of the Peoples Houses, between 
February 1933 and August 1936. The Ülkü journal was published by a 
particular faction of the Kemalists, the Ülkü group, who competed with  
conservative modernist Kemalism and Kadrocu Kemalism for political and 
intellectual supremacy within the regime. Ülkü elites solidarist, radical 
secularist, and anti-liberal alternatives to the state power enabled them to 
present a more appealing version of Kemalism for the context of the 1930s, 
which was the most authoritarian and radical phase of the Turkish Republic.  
This study employs new methodological perspective for understanding the 
nature of Kemalist ideology, which would provide a key to understand the 
temporal and flexible nature of Kemalism. In fact, this is part and parcel of a 
general approach to revolutions that highlights politics, political language, 
and symbolic politics as the basic unit of analysis.  
When the Turkish ruling elite encountered an ideological crisis owing to 
the world economic depression and the failed Free Party experience, prominent 
figures of Ülkü attempted to form the content of the revolutionary ideology by 
way of employing solidarist ideological assumptions. Solidarism became an 
important means to establish secular, rational and social foundations of ethics 
as a substitute for religion, which was said to prepare the Turkish society to 
meet requirements of democracy. The solidarist line of argumentation not 
only created tension between democracy and secularism but also provided 
justification for postponing democracy to an uncertain stage of time when the 
democratic eligibility of the people would be proven by the true 
representatives of the national will (milli irade). Ülküs solidarism gave way to 
an understanding of democracy that was truly embedded, if not confined to, in 
the restrictions of a peculiar consideration of morality which the Ülkü elite 
called revolutionary ethics (inkõlap ahlakiyatõ) or secular morality (laik 
ahlak). 
 
Keywords: Ülkü, solidarism, secularism, secular morality, democracy, 
Turkish revolution, revolutionary ideology    
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
TÜRK DEVRİM İDEOLOJİSİNİN 1930LU YILLARDAKİ ÖZELLİKLERİ: 
KEMALİZMİN ÜLKÜ VERSİYONU, 1933-1936 
 
AYDIN, ERTAN 
 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ümit Cizre 
Eylül, 2003 
 
 
Bu tez Türk devrim ideolojisinin 1930lu yõllarda ortaya çõkan 
türlerinden birini, Kemalizmin Ülkü versiyonunu, Halkevleri resmi yayõn 
organõ olan Ülkü dergisinin Şubat 1933 ile Ağustos 1936 yõllarõ arasõndaki 
sayõlarõnõ incelemek suretiyle çözümlemektedir. Ülkü dergisi, temel olarak, 
Kemalist elit içerisinde bu tezin Ülkü grubu diye tanõmladõğõ muayyen bir ekip 
tarafõndan çõkarõlmõştõr. Ülkü grubu başlõca rakipleri muhafazakar 
modernist ve Kadrocu Kemalist gruplarla rejim içerisinde siyasal ve 
entelektüel hâkimiyeti ele geçirmek hususunda bir mücadele içerisinde 
olmuşlardõr. Ülkü elitinin solidarist, radikal laik ve anti-liberal yaklaşõmlarõ 
Cumhuriyet tarihinin en otoriter ve radikal dönemi olan 1930lar bağlamõnda 
Kemalizmin en cazip versiyonu olarak kabul görmüştür. 
Bu çalõşma Kemalist ideolojinin zamana bağlõ esnek ve değişken tabiatõnõ 
çözümlemeye yardõmcõ olacak yeni bir metodolojik bakõş açõsõ getirmektedir. 
Esasõnda, bu bakõş açõsõ devrimleri anlamada genel bir yaklaşõm sunan ve 
siyaset, siyaset dili ve sembolik siyaseti bir çözümleme birimi olarak öne 
çõkaran metodolojinin bir parçasõ olarak geliştirilmiştir.  
Türkiye devlet seçkini, dünya ekonomi krizi ve Serbest Fõrka hadisesi 
tecrübesini müteakiben ciddi bir ideolojik kriz ile karşõ karşõya kaldõklarõnda, 
Ülkü eliti Fransõz solidarizmini bir ideolojik alternatif olarak sunmuşlardõr. 
Solidarizm dini ahlakõn yerini alacak laik, rasyonel ve toplumsal temellere sahip 
bir ahlak anlayõşõnõ yerleştirmenin bir aracõ olarak yorumlanmakla beraber 
Türk toplumunu demokrasinin ihtiyaçlarõna cevap verecek bir düzeye 
hazõrlayacak yeni bir siyasal gramer olarak algõlanmõştõr. Dahasõ, solidarizm 
laiklik ile demokrasi arasõndaki gerilimin giderilme aracõ olarak sunulmuştur. 
Bu teze göre, solidarizm, bu gerilimin aşõlmasõnõn aracõ olmaktan çok 
demokrasinin halkõn demokratik yetkinliklerinin kazandõğõna dair milli 
iradenin hakiki temsilcilerinin onay verecekleri belirsiz bir vakte kadar 
ertelenmesini haklõlaştõran ideolojik bir gerekçe sunmasõ.açõsõndan önemlidir. 
Ülkünün solidarizmi demokrasiyi belirli bir laik ahlak telakkisine koşullu 
olarak formüle ederek bu ahlak anlayõşõnõ demokrasinin olmazsa olmaz bir 
unsuru olarak benimsemiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ülkü, solidarizm, laiklik, laik ahlak, demokrasi, 
Türk devrimi, Kemalizm 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Kemalism is a topic as relevant and controversial as political Islam, and often 
the two are depicted as alternatives for the future of Middle Eastern politics.1 Like 
political Islam, the definition and historical experience of Kemalism are not 
monolithic or closed to diverse interpretations. However, its different facets have not 
been studied adequately. This dissertation analyzes a specific version of Kemalist 
ideology, the Ülkü version2, which became the official ideology of the Turkish 
Republic during the mid-1930s. The Ülkü version of Kemalism enables us to 
understand both the historical experience of Kemalism during the turbulent decade of 
1930s and its legacy for today. 
This dissertation analyzes the Ülkü version of Kemalism as a specific variant of 
the Turkish revolutionary ideology in the 1930s by means of textual interpretation of 
Ülkü, the official journal of the Peoples Houses, between February 1933 and August 
                                                
1 There is no consensus over the definition of Kemalism among social scientists. 
However, it can be argued, that the set of ideas and ideals which together formed 
Kemalizm (Kemalism) or Atatürkçülük (Ataturkism) as it came to be called in the 
1930s, evolved gradually The basic principles of Kemalism were laid down in the 
party programme of 1931. They were: republicanism; secularism; nationalism; 
populism; statism; and revolutionism. See Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey, A Modern 
History, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1997), p.189 
2  There were three notable versions of Kemalism in the 1930s. These are Ülkü, 
Kadro, and Conservative Kemalism. In this thesis the adjectives version, movement, 
strand, representation, interpretation and variegation will be used interchangeably to 
denote the different versions of Kemalism.  
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1936. The Ülkü journal was published by a particular faction of the Kemalists, the 
Ülkü group,3 who competed with  conservative modernist Kemalism4 and Kadrocu 
Kemalism5 for political and intellectual supremacy within the regime. Ülkü elites 
solidarist, radical secularist, and anti-liberal alternatives to the state power enabled 
them to present a more appealing version of Kemalism for the context of the 1930s, 
which was the most authoritarian and radical phase of the Turkish Republic. The 
main representatives of this group, Recep Peker, Necib Ali Küçüka, Nusret Köymen, 
Mehmet Saffet, Kazõm Nami Duru, Ahmet Nesimi, Ferit Celal, and Behçet Kemal 
Çağlar, were at the same time the prominent figures of both the Republican Peoples 
Party (RPP- Cumhuriyet Halk Fõrkasõ) and the Peoples Houses (Halkevleri) project. 
Their policy suggestions and conceptual alternatives had a considerable impact on 
the political life of Turkey. 
This study is important for three reasons. First, despite the central role of the 
Ülkü journal in the formation of official Kemalism of the 1930s, there has almost 
never been an over-all study on Ülkü in the literature of Turkish politics.6 Thus, this 
                                                
3 Tekeli and İlkin also contended that Ülkü was issued by a specific political elite of 
the RPP to support the ideological pillars of the party to compete with other parallel 
attempts, namely the Kadro movement. See İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, 
Türkiyede Bir Aydõn Hareketi: Kadro, Toplum ve Bilim, 24, (Winter, 1984): 35-
67, p. 40 
4  This classification belongs to Nazõm İrem. See his  Turkish Conservative 
Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 34, No. 1, (2002), 87-112 
5 A group of the intellectual elite aspired to form the ideology of the revolution by 
way of founding a monthly journal, Kadro in 1931.  
6 In a considerably short article, Şerif Mardin analyzed the symbols used in the Ülkü 
journal in terms of content analysis. However, he was mainly concerned with the 
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study will contribute to theory-making efforts of Turkish politics by describing the 
crucial role the Ülkü group played in shaping the political culture of the period. 
Second, this study helps provide new perspectives for understanding the nature 
of Kemalist ideology, which is a continuous issue of controversy in Turkish politics 
till this day.7 It can be claimed that the Kemalist experience of the 1930s has deeply 
affected later decades in many ways and is of great relevance for understanding 
contemporary Turkish politics. This thesis argues that Ülkü was a response to the 
crisis within Kemalist thought during the 1930s, and that it carried the global and 
national waves of thought at that time. Yet, once solidified as a set of ideological 
doctrines, it continued to be perceived as the model experience of Kemalism by 
both its adherents and critics. 
Moreover, this dissertation employs a new methodological approach to the 
Turkish Revolution as well, which would provide a key to understand the temporal 
and flexible nature of Kemalism. In fact, this is part and parcel of a general approach 
                                                                                                                                     
question wheather content analysis would be an efficient tool in analyzing the studies 
of the history of political thought. See, Siyasi Fikir Tarihi Çalõşmalarõnda Muhteva 
Analizi, in Siyasal ve Sosyal Bilimler, Mümtazer Türköne and Tuncay Önder (ed.), 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayõnlarõ, 1992), 9-24. While his study is not specifically on Ülkü, 
M. Asõm Karaömerlioğlu has also analyzed the journal in terms of its approach to the 
issue of peasants and the peasant ideology. He does not make a periodization. See his 
The Peoples Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey. Middle Eastern 
Studies. 34/4 (1998), 67-91. 
7  The controversies around Kemalism still occupy a central place even in the 
European Parliament. In the first draft of the latest report on Turkey by EU, it was 
asserted that Kemalism is one of the great obstacles in front of Turkeys entry to the 
EU. Certain Kemalist intellectual figures opposed this idea and severely criticized 
Arie Ooslander, the EU parliamentarian who prepared the report. 
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to revolutions that highlights politics, political language, and symbolic politics 
as the basic unit of analysis. 
Third, from the standpoint of the analysis of Ülkü, this thesis will show how 
solidarism, or its Turkish version, populism, became a major ideological pillar of the 
Republic in the 1930s. Furthermore, it will discuss, how solidarism, as formulated 
within the French political philosophy, and as an artifact of the French revolutionary 
heritage, was articulated within the domestic context of a Muslim country that was 
being exposed to high-flown modernization and secularization in the 1930s. 
Moreover, this study will exhibit the means through which solidarism was 
appropriated and further utilized by the Turkish radical revolutionaries, or re-
constructivist revolutionaries, to find a safe ground for their peculiar conceptions of 
secularism and democracy. The analysis of the ideas of the Ülkü authors helps better 
explain the relationship between secularism and democracy in Turkey. Their 
solidarist line of argumentation gave way to an understanding of democracy that was 
truly embedded, if not confined to, in the restrictions of a peculiar consideration of 
morality which the Ülkü elite called revolutionary ethics (inkõlap ahlakiyatõ)8 or 
secular morality (laik ahlak)9.   
When the Turkish ruling elite encountered an ideological crisis owing to the 
world economic depression and the failed Free Party experience, prominent figures 
of Ülkü attempted to form the content of the revolutionary ideology by way of 
                                                
8 Ali Sami, Güzel Sanatlarõ İnkõlaba Nasõl Maledebiliriz, (How Can We Allocate 
Arts for the Service of Revolution), Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 1934), p. 361 
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employing solidarist ideological assumptions. Solidarism became an important 
means to establish secular, rational and social foundations of ethics as a substitute for 
religion, which was said to prepare the Turkish society to meet requirements of 
democracy. Solidarism, at the same time, became the ideological expression of 
tension between secularism and democracy, which has left a long-lasting legacy for 
later generations. What is more, their solidarist preoccupation with secularism and 
secular morality for the preparation of society to an ideal democracy paradoxically 
became the basic obstacle in front of the Turkish democratic consolidation. The 
Solidarist line of argumentation not only created tension between democracy and 
secularism but also provided justification for postponing democracy to an uncertain 
stage of time when the democratic eligibility of the people would be proven by the 
true representatives of the national will (milli irade).  
1.1. Ülkü as an Historical and Intellectual Variant of Kemalism  
It is important to note at the outset that the seeming incoherence and disunity of 
divergent versions of Kemalism paradoxically increased the flexibility of official 
Kemalism and its seeming coherence. Kemalism was able to unite several competing 
versions of itself under the over-all aim of cultural regeneration based on the 
submergence of tradition and thrust for modernity. There has always been a semiotic 
struggle over the definition and content of Kemalist ideology. In this sense, this 
thesis will attempt to demonstrate how these competing elite groups, who 
appropriated different ideological as well as philosophical strands of Europe, 
                                                                                                                                     
9  Nusret Kemal, Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi, (A Peasantism Project 
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bolstered Kemalist political legitimacy, while simultaneously attempting to establish 
their own authority as public experts. The ideological route of the Republic became a 
contested site, an object of struggle amongst competing political actors and 
intellectual groups. 
It would be wise to delineate the context from which the variegated forms of 
Kemalism sprang. With the beginning of the 1930s, the Turkish revolutionary elite 
was primarily preoccupied with the entrenchment of the ideology of state and 
reconstruction of the state-society relations. The beginning of the 1930s was a very 
significant historical episode in Turkish politics, because certain internal and external 
developments brought the Turkish republican elite to a very critical point. In internal 
politics, there were the unsuccessful results of the Free Party experience. For the first 
time, the state elite could experience the potential of the opposition. They realized 
that the principles of the Revolution had not yet been fully inculcated in the people. 
Outside of the country, there began an economic crisis that caused elites questioning 
the prosperity promised by liberalism and more specifically liberal economy all 
around the world. Instead of liberal politics and economy, the state elite opted for 
more anti-liberal and etatist solutions. In their minds, rising totalitarian regimes 
especially in certain leading European countries increased the negative image of 
liberalism, and further discredited the liberal democratic ideas. The demand for 
defining the ideology of the Turkish Revolution developed within this specific 
historical context. 
                                                                                                                                     
Experience), Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 119 
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Kemalism became a recurrent and pervasive theme among the revolutionary 
elite to denote the overall ideology of the Republic in the 1930s. In its philosophical 
manifestations, the Turkish revolutionary ideology represented a blend of precepts 
drawn from positivist, rationalist, nationalist, solidarist, and laicist sources.10 That is, 
as Zürcher puts, it comprised many attitudes and points of view.11 But a common 
denominator did exist. It was the desire to reduce the influence of tradition as well as 
religion and to modernize and laicize Turkish life as rapidly as possible. In other 
words, the central project of Kemalism was to attain a cultural regeneration and 
conversion of society through the secular quest for modern Republican creeds that 
would cut off people from their previous attachments and alignments mostly 
grounded in a traditional and religious symbolic universe. The backbone of this 
project was the belief that the scholastic mentality could never be brought into 
harmony with the values and needs of modern scientific mentality.12 According to 
this mainstream project of Kemalism, it was necessary to free the Turkish nation 
from all remaining vestiges of scholasticism and obscurantism. It was contended 
that the social backwardness and fatalism of Turkish society could to a considerable 
extent be ascribed to the influence that the traditional mind still exerted upon the 
masses. For the revolutionary ideology of the Republic in general, a revolutionary 
system had to eradicate residual values of the old society and had to promote elite-
sponsored values among the masses with the practical intent of helping to accelerate 
                                                
10 Ali Kazancõgil, The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism, in Atatürk: Founder 
of a Modern Turkey, ed. Ali Kazancõgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst, 
1981), p. 37  
11 Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 189 
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the nation's macro-development towards democracy. This system takes the entire 
population as its target that was expected to internalize and practice the new ideology. 
So, there was a need for the cultural regeneration of society through employing 
modern and scientific techniques and new symbolic codes to reach the level of 
contemporary civilization. That quest for establishing new symbolic codes for 
cultural regeneration to prepare the people for the future democracy finds its true 
expression in the words of Mustafa Kemal:  
Turkey is going to build up a perfect democracy. How can there be a perfect 
democracy with half the country in bondage? In two years from now, every 
woman must be freed from this useless tyranny. Every man will wear a hat 
instead of a fez and every woman will have her face uncovered; womans 
help is absolutely necessary and she must have full freedom in order to take 
her share of her countrys burden.13 
Several ideological strands attempted to redefine the common denominator of 
this mainstream revolutionary project to free people from the tyranny of tradition 
and establish a perfect democracy. The Ülkü group no doubt exemplifies one of 
these attempts. It refers to the activities and aims of an organized elite group that 
sought to advance the project of cultural regeneration by way of using solidarist 
assumptions to establish a secular moral order or a scientific morality14 to attain a 
                                                                                                                                     
12 Mehmet Saffet, Köycülük Nedir, Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 6: pp. 422-430, p. 425 
13 Cited in Grace Ellison, Turkey To-Day (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1929), p. 
8. 
14 Ahmet Nesimi, İnanç ve Us, (Belief and Reason), Ülkü, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 
1935), pp. 403-407, p. 405 
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democratic ideal15. It should be noted that in terms of its radical and anti-clerical 
nature, the project of this strand of Kemalism resembles the Jacobin side of the 
French Revolution or the neo-Jacobin group of the Third Republic, which grounded 
its political project on solidarité.16  This analysis focuses, in part, on how the radical 
revolutionaries politics of secularization, by separating morality from traditional 
religious and cultural foundations, constituted the basis of the concept and practices 
of mass education which the Peoples Houses took up to make the mass eligible 
for the anticipated ideal of democracy. The dissertation also shows that this sort of 
formulation of secular morality as a precondition of democracy created tension 
between secularism and democracy.  
1.2. The Ülkü Group and Solidarism 
The Ülkü group had a great share of solidarism in its broader sense. I take the 
concept solidarism or its Turkish version populism 17  as a form of ideological 
eclecticism containing a whole array of connotations regarding the entrenchment of 
Turkish nationalism, construction of a classless, homogenous and amalgamated 
                                                
15 Nusret Kemal (Köymen), Halkçõlõk, (Populism), Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 3, (April, 
1933), pp. 185-190 
16  John A. Scott categorizes solidarité as the expression of neo-Jacobin 
predominance in French political and intellectual life in the Third Republic. See, 
John A. Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 158  
17 For Paul Dumont, populism was a Turkish version of the solidarist ideas outlined 
by the French radical politician Léon Bourgeois and the sociologist Emile 
Durkheim. The origins of Kemalist Ideology, in Ataturk and the Modernization of 
Turkey, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 31  
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(kütleleşmiş) mass, cultural regeneration of society, and all-encompassing project of 
secular morality politics. The terms solidarity (tesanüt), social solidarity (içtimai 
tesanüt) and populism (halkçõlõk) were ideals constantly reiterated by the authors of 
Ülkü as the founding bricks of the ideology of the Turkish Revolution. These terms 
implied a social and cultural regeneration project attached to the idea of democracy 
and a militant intellectual activity aimed at leading the people on the road to 
progress 18  by way of mass education based on a new morality consideration, 
captured mainly by the concepts of secular morality (laik ahlak), 19  scientific 
morality, (ilmi ahlak) 20 and revolutionary ethics (inkõlap ahlakiyatõ) 21. In this 
sense, the Ülkü group considered the inculcation of secular morality to the people as 
sine qua non for a safe milieu for democracy. In sum, in the journal Ülkü, solidarism 
was the outstanding ideological intake transfused into other chief or corollary ideas. 
Although the word solidarity (tesanüt) was used more often than solidarism 
(tesanütçülük), the latter as a word was rarely utilized by the authors. It was mostly 
used interchangeably with populism (halkçõlõk). 
The term solidarité was originally conceptualized in the Third French Republic, 
by Alfred Fouillée as a democratic ethicsto find a middle course between the 
                                                
18 Paul Dumont, The origins of Kemalist Ideology, p. 31 
19  Nusret Kemal, Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi, (A Peasantism Project 
Experience), Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 119 
20 Ahmet Nesimi, İnanç ve Us, Ülkü, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935), pp. 403-407, p. 
405 
21 Ali Sami, Güzel Sanatlarõ İnkõlaba Nasõl Maledebiliriz, p. 361 
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competing extremes of idealism and scientism, and of liberalism and socialism22 
and later by Léon Bourgeois as a political philosophy to defuse class struggle and 
all potential revolutionary threats to the existing social order. 23 In his formulation, 
the quest for national solidarity would serve as the antidote to class conflict.24 
Furthermore, Léon Bourgeois maintained an ideology that involved rejection of 
liberal individualism and economism, Marxist collectivism, religious clericalism and 
anarchist syndicalism, though having something in common with all of them.25 
Solidarism indicates a quest for classless, homogenous and organic social order 
based on an idea of social duty and debt, in which every man is born as a debtor to 
society. 26  Moreover, for the French representatives of the solidarist ideology, 
solidarism became an important means to establish secular, rational and objective 
foundations of ethics as a substitute for religious morality.  
For Emile Durkheim solidarism signifyied a construct of secular morality that 
had to curb a persons natural instincts and give to everyone a sense of 
                                                
22 Kristin A. Sheradin, Reforming the Republic: Solidarism and the Making of the 
French Welfare System, 1871-1914, (Rochester, New York: University of Rochester, 
2000), Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 6. 
23  Karen Offen,  Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siecle 
France, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 89, No. 3. (June 1984), 648-676, 
664.  
24 Ibid. 
25 J. E. S. Hayward, 1961, 20. 
26 Charles Gide, 1970, 30. 
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responsibility and duty, and a set of common values.27 It is worth noting that 
despite their bitterly anticlerical stance, many of the radical republicans of solidarist 
persuasion were particularly interested in propagating a new morality.28 Having 
argued that morale must be scientific 29  French solidarist figures held that 
solidarism met the need of a doctrine for laicism.30 They advocated a wedding of 
science with ethics under the banner of solidarity:31 In this sense, the attempt of the 
solidarist philosophy to dominate the ethical field began to shape the content of fin 
de siecle French laicism.  By breaking the links between morality and religion, their 
work is evidently part of the task undertaken by democracy to laicise ethics 
themselves.32 In short, French solidarism assigns secular ethics a place at the center 
of the democratic order. The Turkish revolutionary ideology in the 1930s as it 
appeared in Ülkü testifies to the vital importance of this understanding of religion 
underpinned by a solidarist foundation of ethics.  
Being in friendly terms with French solidarism, the Ülkü elite aimed at the 
elimination and further assimilation of all forms of moral, ethnic and class interests 
                                                
27 Geoffrey Walford and W.S.F. Pickering (eds.), Durkheim and Moral Education 
(London: Routledge, 1998),  6-7. 
28  Karen Offen, Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siecle 
France, 665. 
29 Linda L. Clark, Social Darwinism in France, The Journal of Modern History, 
Vol. 58, No. 1, (March 1981), D1025-D1044 (On Demand Supplement), D1035. 
30 Joseph Charmont, Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy. Modern French 
Legal Philosophy (Modern Legal Philosophy Series, VII, Boston, 1916), 85-86. 
31 Cited in Ibid., 87. 
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and erection of new arrangements based on solidarity. It is worthwhile to stress that 
the Ülkü group came to be the eminent representatives of solidarism after Ziya 
Gokalp. Having been mainly inspired by the ideas of Emile Durkheim, Gökalp was 
the first intellectual figure who developed the Turkish version of solidarism, 
tesanütçülük. According to Gökalp, the anticipated results of populist ideology 
would fall within the context of solidarist thought. For him solidarism (tesanütçülük) 
was the most appropriate ideological system for the Turks. 33  
Taking some cues from Gökalps ideas of solidarism, the Ülkü elite even 
extended solidarism to a more radical and re-constructivist intonation, which 
highlighted the notions of secular morality and amalgamation (kütleleştirme) of 
people.34 On the first anniversary of the Peoples Houses, Necip Ali, the general 
director of the Houses, wrote that the Houses had been established as hearths of duty 
(vazife ocaklarõ), to carry out social debts and solidarist duties: in his view, as part of 
his understanding of social solidarity (içtimai tesanüt), every citizen was born as a 
debtor not only to the state but also to society. For the Ülkü authors, in general, every 
conscious citizen had its own duty and obligation in the way of executing the 
revolution. Accordingly, The citizen who does not carry out his own duty is a 
                                                                                                                                     
32  Célestin Bouglé, cited in John A. Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liberal 
Tradition in France 1870-1914, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 178. 
33 Ziya Gokalp, 1959, p. 312 
34  It is striking that there was almost no reference to Gokalp in Ülkü between 
February 1933 and August 1936 due to his preoccupation with the idea of culture 
involving traditional and religious elements. Even, Gokalp was criticized on the 
accusation that his ideas were defunct, not able to be tailored to the needs of the time. 
See Hüseyin Namõk, Türk Edebiyatõna Toplu Bir Bakõş, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 13, 
(March, 1934): 71-73 
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useless element in the trough of revolution (inkõlap teknesi). 35 In this sense, for 
Necip Ali, the Houses were the embodiments of the citizens social obligation and 
their solidarity. He examines the concept of solidarism in terms of its significance for 
the Turkish Revolution. His writings were almost the direct translation of Léon 
Bourgeois work, La Solidarité36:   
As we are distancing from individualism through accepting the idea of unity, 
in such a way we are departing from socialism by approving personality. 
We want to be an amassment within our national entity, and we want to 
walk to the goal in the cleanest air of solidarity. For us, a nation is a 
social organism (uzuvlanma). Everyone has a role and duty in this organism. 
Today, everyone owes to his/her ancestors or contemporaries for what 
he/she owns. 37 
The impact and weight of Ülkü group on Republican politics especially 
manifests itself in the Fourth Congress of the Republican Peoples Party in 1935. The 
definition of the principle of populism was in conformity with the solidarist 
assumptions of the Ülkü authors:  
                                                
35 Ali Sami, Güzel Sanatlarõ İnkõlaba Nasõl Maledebiliriz, p. 359 
36 It is interesting that the famous pamphlet of Léon Bourgeois entitled La Solidarité 
was translated by an Ülkü author, Kazõm Nami Duru, into Turkish in a book prepared 
as a preparatory sourcebook for High School students. See, Kazõm Nami Duru (trans. 
and ed.), Sosyolojinin Unsurlarõ: Seçilmiş ve Sõralanmõş Metinler, Lise Felsefe 
Dersleri Yardõmcõ Kitaplarõ No. 11, (İstanbul: Devlet Basõmevi, 1936). In this sense, 
it is possible to say that the Ülkü authors were mainly acquainted with the solidarist 
ideology from its original sources. However, in their writings, the Ülkü authors 
generally tend not to give reference to these original sources. For the only direct 
reference to Léon Bourgeois in Ülkü, see Ahmet Nesimi, Islahatçõ İçtimaiyat 
Bakõmõndan Sosyalizm, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 16, (June, 1934), pp. 241-252, p. 241. 
However, there are several references to Fouillée, Comte and Durkheim.  
37 Necip Ali (Küçüka), 19 Şubat in Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Mart, 1933), pp. 4-5 
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 It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish 
Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided 
into various professions according to the requirements of the division of 
labor for the individual and social life of the Turkish people The aims of 
our Party are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, 
and to establish harmony of interests. The benefits are to be proportionate to 
the aptitude, to the amount of work.38 
The Ülkü elite was also the prominent architect of the idea of the Peoples 
Houses that were designed as sites of converting people into the values of the 
Turkish revolution so as to equip them with the revolutionary culture. The essence of 
politics of secularism in the 1930s led by the radical revolutionaries lies in the 
transfer of sacrality 39  from the religious domain that had for centuries been 
associated with the Ottoman way of life into a secular domain identified by 
revolutionary elites with a new type of morality, secular morality (laik ahlak). This 
form of secularism in question used the will to democracy as a justifiable end of 
the overall project. That is, reaching good democracy at the end is used as a pretext 
to validate the revolutionary practices. Making the discourse created by the 
revolution dominant, the radical revolutionary elite elicited the disintegration of 
peripheral cultural elements and then absorbed them into the revolutionary formation.  
One of the main questions in the journal was if  religion should be given a 
place in the inculcation of moral principles or ideals, or will all morality and ideals 
                                                
38  Cited in Ergun Özbudun, The Nature of the Kemalist Regime in Atatürk: 
Founder of a Modern State, p. 88 
39  This term belongs originally to Mona Ozouf who employed it to analyze the 
secularist politics of the French Revolution. See her Festivals and the French 
Revolution, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).  
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be based on secular foundations?40 The Ülkü authors responded to this question by 
defining morality completely outside the religious and traditional realms. They 
considered the emancipation of morality from religion as the chief factor for the 
laicization of state and society. 41 The gradual erosion of the Turkish revolutionaries 
faith in the viability of traditional and religious culture to sustain the fundamental 
restructuring of the new Turkish polity led the Ülkü group to try to enlighten and 
secularly purify the people and uproot the vestiges of traditional authority which was 
regarded as hindering Turkish societys adjustment to the modern, democratic, and 
civilized way of life. 
1.3. Ülküs Understanding of Democracy 
The Ülkü authors alternative was mainly grounded on the populist or 
solidarist democracy, which they saw as the most appropriate form of democracy 
for Turkey.42 Theoretically, people continue to be the source of supreme authority. 
In practice, however, they become the subjects of intensive indoctrination, and total 
commitment to the purposes of state. It can be maintained that the radical 
revolutionaries were not interested in the representation of the existing structure of 
society, but in the representation of an imaginary people, which they intended to 
construct in the future. This kind of understanding of democracy led the radical 
                                                
40 Nusret Kemal, Köycülük Programõna Giriş, Ülkü, Vol. 5, No. 26, (April 1935), 
132-141, 139. 
41 Necmeddin Sadõk, Layik Ne Demektir? (What Does Laique Mean), Ülkü, Vol. 
2, No. 11, (December, 1933): 370-377, p. 374 
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revolutionaries to consider politics in a messianic fashion. They, generally, felt 
themselves responsible for maturing and ascending the spiritual quality of the 
people so that they could attain a position whereby they can be represented. Of 
course, this postponed representation of society, or this sense of understanding of 
belated democracy refracted the elites march to democracy in such a way that it 
turned out to be serious obstacle to democracy.  
The Ülkü elite aimed at the conversion of society in line with revolutionary 
religion. For this aim, they even appropriated religious terminology to embark on a 
revolutionary mission to democratize society. This is indicative of how the Ülkü 
elite utilized a symbolic discourse by appropriating pre-revolutionary symbolic 
resources. It used religious terms and notions interchangeably with revolutionary 
symbols. The Peoples Houses were identified as the Temples of Ideal (Ülkü 
Mabetleri)43; the apostles (havari)44 of revolution were called to be recruited for a 
village mission (köy misyonerliği)45; the spiritual revolution (manevi inkõlap)46 
was said to be disseminated by the zealous efforts of the saintly (nurlu)47 devotees 
                                                                                                                                     
42 Nusret Kemal, Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi, (A Village Project Experience), 
Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 123 
43 Necip Ali, Halkevleri Yõldönümünde Necip Ali Beyin Nutku, Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 
2, (March 1933),  104. 
44 Hamit Zübeyr, Halk Terbiyesi Vasõtalarõ, (The Means of People Education), 
Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 2, (March 1933), 152-9, 152. 
45 Nusret Köymen, Köy Misyonerliği, Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 7, (Sept., 1933), 150.  
46 Mehmet Saffet (1933) Kültür İnklabõmõz in Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 5, 351. 
47 Nusret Kemal, Halkçõlõk Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1933), 185-190, 190.  
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of Kemalism in the way to reach the Heaven of Atatürk (Atatürk Cenneti)48. The 
leader of the Republic was envisaged as a genius, superior to the prophets, 49 a 
secular preacher, a Great savior 50, and a sacred altar 51 of this secular religion. 
Even, Ataturks manifesto, Nutuk, was considered as the new holy book (mukaddes 
kitap) of the Turks. 52  
When the Ülkü group was in power during the mid-1930s, radical changes 
came about in the official ruling ideology. The revolutionary ideology, by denying 
traditional and religious establishments, began to function as a surrogate for religion. 
It determined a new identity marker for the Turks which was grounded mostly in 
non-religious connotations. This new secular creed was supposed to be a substitute 
for religion in satisfying the psychological and spiritual needs of people to free 
themselves from any kind of religious and traditional moral creeds.  The state tried to 
offer answers to the spiritual longings of the people and to give purpose to their life. 
This was a sort of divinization and sacralization of revolutionary politics, which 
implied a messianic stand postulating that the only correct standpoint leading to 
salvation was exactly the one promoted by the revolution, and that all other beliefs 
were wrong and leading to false conclusions. Moreover, all those who professed 
                                                
48 Kamuran Bozkõr, Halkevleri, Ülkü, Vol. 7, No. 37, (March 1936), 74-5, 75. 
49  Nusret Köymen, Kemalizm İnkõlabõnõn Hususiyetleri, (The Peculiarities of 
Kemalism), Ülkü, Vol. 7, No. 42, (August 1936), pp. 416-8, p. 418 
50 Saffet Arõkan, Yeni Fakültemizin Açõlõşõ, Ülkü, Vol. 6, No. 36, (Feb., 1936), pp. 
404-5 
51 Ferid C. Güven, Ona El Kalkar mõ?, Ülkü, Vol. 6, No. 32, (Oct., 1935), p. 162 
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other beliefs were to be liberated from their misconceptions, of which they were not 
even aware. However, to make up a religion out of the revolution was not an easy 
task for the radical revolutionary elite who advocated the discrediting of traditional 
religion once and for all. Even mentioning religion was considered harmful to the 
new secularizing policy of the regime: To not mention religion at all is to present 
the best education of secularism.53 In order to consolidate the new secular morality 
of the revolution, the Peoples Houses were mobilized as civilizing passages through 
which the traditional masses would have the necessary qualifications to be carried to 
a prosperous future. 
The Ülkü elites conceptualization of secularism and democracy, emphasizing 
national uniformity and secular morality, in fact assimilated both politics and ethics 
of various kinds. Having adopted the French notion of citizenship highlighting the 
assimilation of different ethnic and cultural entities, the radical revolutionaries 
further stressed that the assimilation of ethical domain of society was also essential. 
Unanimity on a desired moral portrait was deemed necessary to establish a real 
solidarity among society: It is the most sacred duty of state to try to bring the 
people up to a desired moral and cultural level at the soonest time possible with its 
own intervention and directive. 54  
                                                                                                                                     
52 Nusret Köymen, Canlõ Söz, (Lively Speech) Ülkü, Vol. 7, No. 38, (April, 1936), 
pp. 85-87 
53 Mehmet Saffet, İnkõlap Terbiyesi, Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 8, (September 1933), 105-
114, 114. 
54  Nusret Kemal, Danimarka Köylüsü Nasõl Uyandõ, in Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 18, 
(Aug., 1934), pp. 467-473, p. 467 
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In sum, in this dissertation, the analysis of the Radical Turkish Revolutionary 
political language in the 1930s shows that a revolutionary secular morality was 
regarded as the only way of preparing society for the future ideal democracy. That 
is, this study will show how this language as reflected in the Ülkü journal sought to 
instigate a kind of crusading zeal among the enlightened members of society, in 
order to smother the spiritual domination of tradition and prepare people for the 
anticipated ideal of democracy. The radical revolutionaries of the 1930s, who 
portrayed themselves as the apostles and missionaries in their saintly and sacred 
ideal to spiritually illuminate the Turkish population, called all the intellectuals 
missionary guides of the society, to disseminate the sacred ideals of the Revolution.  
The origins of this new secular faith should be sought not merely in the 
Ottoman modernization legacy dating back at least to the Tanzimat, or in socio-
economic factors. The majority of the society still was, in general, committed to the 
traditional and religious allegiances. Its origins lie closer to the imaginative 
appropriation of the French Jacobin revolutionary heritage together with the 
influence of the rising totalitarian regimes in the inter-war period. The Ülkü version 
of Kemalism attempted to create something that might be described as a new religion 
through assimilating Comtes late visionary hopes for a new religion of humanity. In 
this sense, the Ülkü elite and its coreligionists anticipated in their myths, rituals, and 
slogans many of the forms and procedures of the new secular faith which would 
eventually become institutionalized by the state agents. The ideas and practices of 
this specific elite group had left a relatively enduring legacy to Turkey.  
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The body of this thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter of this 
study will cover a methodology of studying revolutions in general by particularly 
departing from the recent historiography and methodological debates on the French 
Revolution. By doing so, this thesis will base its methodology on the revisionist and 
post-revisionist approaches on the French Revolution, which takes politics, 
political language, and symbolic politics as the principle way of analyzing 
revolutions as opposed to the methodologies grounded on social interpretation, and 
class-based analysis. In this sense, this study aims to develop a new 
methodological outlook at the Turkish Revolution. 
The second chapter will mainly focus on the peculiarities of the Turkish 
Revolution in the 1930s. Two important motives will be underscored as contributing 
to the genuine character of the period, which provides the descriptive framework for 
this analysis of the Turkish Revolution. These were the World Economic Crisis and 
the Free Party experiment. Three important ideological currents emerged to 
formulate the ideology of the Revolution: Conservative Kemalism, Kadrocu 
Kemalism, and the Ülkü version of Kemalism. The Ülkü version occupied the core 
by predominating the others until August 1936, by the dismissal of Recep Peker from 
his Secretary General post. This dissertation suggests that this period left the deepest 
imprints on the direction of the Turkish revolutionary ideology.  
The third chapter will be devoted to the close scrutiny of Ülküs representation 
of Kemalism. This will be done through the analysis of writings published in Ülkü so 
as to glean supportive clues to the argument above. In fact, Ülkü provides a large 
plethora of representative ideas all providing a springboard for the Republican 
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ideology. The analysis will show that French Third Republics ideology of 
solidarism or its Turkish version, populism, was the defining feature of this 
ideology. Solidarism was fed by two sources: a drive to establish secular ethics 
(secularism) and a will to forge a homogenous undifferentiated social order based 
on social solidarity (democracy). This study will then reveal that solidarism is an 
instrumental variable to relieve the tension between secularism and democracy. 
Ülküs solidarism proves its distinctiveness compared to the other solidarist 
approaches particularly shaped in fin-de-siécle France. The tension between 
secularism and democracy in the minds of the Ülkü authors is sharper than in the 
French case. The dissertations view of solidarism has something important to 
contribute to the literature of solidarism in general. 
The fourth chapter probes the first premise of solidarism i.e. secular ethics in 
terms of both its French origins and its manifestation in the journal. The Ülkü authors 
explicitly yearned for the construction of a new moral stance for the Republic that 
would totally cut off the traditional and religious ties. This rational and secular 
conceptualization of morality outside of religion was deemed essential to provide the 
infra-structural essence of democracy. As it will appear, it turned out to be ironic: 
while the sine qua non of democracy was considered to be secular morality, albeit 
qua secular morality, it created a bottleneck for democracy. That is, in the minds of 
the Ülkü elite, secular morality was formulated as a precondition for a healthy 
democracy. Unless it was firmly rooted in societal conscience, democracy would 
never fully take root on its own right. 
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The last chapter then will document how the Ülkü elite contemplated 
democracy. It is argued that their neo-Jacobin and solidarist understanding of 
democracy led them to perceive equivalence between the general will and its 
representation to establish a homogenous, undifferentiated society. In this sense, the 
Ülkü elite deliberately supported a one-party system, as it was the indispensable 
equipment of populist democracy. This contemplation found a base in actual 
practices of that era, particularly through the Peoples Houses. These Houses were 
the agents of preparing the conscience of people for democracy. It is clear that 
enormous efforts were made to educate the masses for the revolutionary cause and 
ideals to transform them into devout Republican electorates of the projected 
democracy. 
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CHAPTER II 
GENERAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONS 
 
2.1.  How the Turkish Revolution Has Been Studied: Historiography 
of the Turkish Revolution 
It is worth mentioning that there have been only a few attempts to develop a 
systematic approach to the Turkish Revolution. Students of Turkish politics, 
generally, have a tendency to analyze the Revolution without delineating a 
methodology that would develop a systematic outlook on the subject.  Until the 
1950s, as Şerif Mardin puts it, studies on the Turkish Revolution were mainly based 
on "praise-blame" (övme-yerme) approaches and they did not develop analytical 
methods for Turkish history.55 In those studies, the Revolution was justified against 
the so-called reactionary backdrop of an authoritarian, elitist, monarchical old 
regime.56 The Revolution was defended, as a mythologized, sanitized consensual 
                                                
55 Şerif Mardin. (1992) Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908, (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayõnlarõ, 1992), p.19 
56 See, for instance, Recep Peker, İnkõlap Ders Notlarõ, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayõnlarõ, 
1984), Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Ataturk ihtilali, Türk İnkõlap Tarihi Enstitüsü 
Derslerinden, (Istanbul: Burhaneddin Matbaasi, 1940); Munis Tekinalp, Kemalizm, 
(İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Gazete ve Matbaasõ, 1936), Yavuz Abadan, İnkõlap ve 
İnkõlapçõlõk, (İstanbul: Eminönü Halkevi, 1940), Şeref Aykut, Kamalizm: 
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phenomenon, almost as the Turkish equivalent of the French Revolution. From the 
outset, however, especially in the Anglophone account, there were dissenting 
approaches which considered the Turkish Revolution as the outcome of dictatorial 
attempts of a specific elite group originating from the Committee of Union and 
Progress. In these accounts, the Revolution and its aftermath were criticized as a part 
and parcel of a dictatorship and anti-liberal ideology rising all over the world.57 This 
rather negative treatment of the subject had no correspondence, at that time, in 
Turkey. Certainly, it was quite difficult to criticize the Revolution and its reforms at 
a time when respect for pluralism hardly existed. Whether critical or not, until the 
1950s, studies on the Turkish Revolution had lacked a considerable analytical and 
systematic perspective.  
                                                                                                                                     
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Programõnõn İzahõ, (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap 
Evi, 1936), Saffet Engin, Kemalizm İnkõlabõnõn Prensipleri, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet 
Matbaasõ, 1938)  
57 For the critical account of pre-1950 that classified Turkey under the banner of 
dictatorship see, Arnold Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey, (New York: 
Charles Scribners Sons, 1927); H. C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf  Mustafa Kemal: An 
Intimate Study of a Dictator, (London: Methuen, 1932); Diana Spearman, Modern 
Dictatorship, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); Hans Kohn, Ten 
Years of the Turkish Republic, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Oct., 1933): 141-
155; Thomas K. Ford, Kamalist Turkey,in Dictatorship in the Modern World, Guy 
Stanton Ford (ed.), (London: The University of Minnesota Press, 1939), Second 
Edition, pp. 126-153; Mildred Adams, Women under the Dictatorships, in 
Dictatorship in the Modern World, pp. 272-291; Sigmund Neumann, The Political 
Lieutenants in Modern Dictatorship, in Dictatorship in the Modern World, pp. 292-
309; Halide Edip Adivar, Turkey Faces West; A Turkish View of Recent Changes and 
their Origin, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930); H. E. Wortham, Mustafa 
Kemal of Turkey, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1931); Joseph C. Grew, 
Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, (London: 
Hammond, Hammond & Co. Ltd., 1953)  
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About a generation after the Revolution, especially with the beginning of the 
1950s, a crop of new historians and social scientists came to the fore. They were 
mainly academic professionals engaged in archival work, and committed to 
objective historiography. However, what is most significant is that the color of 
criticism shifted from negative to a relatively positive one especially in the 
Anglophone world just after the end of World War II. The emergence of 
modernization theories began to determine the contents of area studies. These 
academicians generally remained within the broad parameters of Revolutionary 
orthodoxy. They tended to accept the Revolution as a progressive, modern, 
nationalist movement directed against an exploitative old regime. Actually, they 
were not blind to the failings and negativities of the revolutionaries, but they were 
generally sympathetic to, rather than critical of, the revolutionary impulse. This is not 
because they sympathized with the current administrations, but their commitment to 
the modernization theories led these scholars to characterize the 1930s as a 
temporary deviation from the long-term evolution to liberal democracy. In those 
studies, every seeming contradictions and negativities were justified on behalf of 
passing from traditional ways to a modern style. For one of the prominent 
representatives of this account, Turkey signified the best hope for republican 
stability in the Middle East, 58 in the way of maintaining constitutional forms and 
improving democratic procedures. 59 According to another prominent representative 
of the modernization school, the Turkish Revolutionary elite prepared unconsciously 
                                                
58 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, 
(New York: The Free Press, 1958), p. viii  
59 Ibid.  
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its own eventual supersession by a more democratic form of government resting on 
a new social and economic order.60 It is generally argued that Mustafa Kemal opted 
for some degree of autocracy due partially to his Oriental character, but he had 
set up a democratic system by virtue of his commitment to the Occidental style.61  
Despite the assertions on dictatorship of the pre-1950 accounts, authors 
subscribing to the classical modernization studies highlighted development and 
progress. That is, the unilinear, teleological assumptions of classical modernization 
theory have implied that every society should undergo the same line of development 
and modifications in a progressive and evolutionary direction. The unequal 
developmental paths between the nation-states would be superseded by stages of the 
universal standards of development.62 Certainly, the West was taken putatively as the 
leading actor in that universal direction and the rest of the world were assumed to be 
the sequential components that are arrayed around this teleological route. For this 
                                                
60 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), The Second Edition, p. 485 
61 Lord Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, (Nicosia: K. Rustem&Brothers, 
1964), p. 392 
62  For Partha Chatterjee, these sorts of postulation signify a liberal-rationalist 
dilemma. Because, in Eastern societies the evidence shows that nationalism could 
also give rise to mindless chauvinism and xenophobia and serve as the justification 
of authoritarianism. According to the modernists views, the "Western" type 
manifests the good and normal side of nationalism and the Eastern (organic) type 
represents the evil and specific and even disturbing side of nationalism. Even so, 
when this illiberal special type of nationalism appears in the form of revivalist 
movements or oppressive regimes, it still represents an urge for progress and 
freedom. In sum, the Eastern backward societies would reach to the level of Western 
societies in terms of the stages of development in a teleological manner. See, Partha 
Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) , pp. 2-3 
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modernist account, the foundations of the nation lie deep in the economic, social 
and political processes of modernization since the French Revolution... and the 
nation partakes of the social and political benefits of modernity.63 Furthermore, the 
Turkish Revolution was also depicted as a modernizing attempt, predominantly anti-
clerical and anti-traditionalist in terms of both social composition and political 
agenda of its leadership, signifying a rupture in Turkish history with its strong 
nationalist, secular and progressive character.64  
Alongside these assumptions of the classical modernization account, there 
emerged different revisionist accounts after the 1960s that still occupy a 
considerable place in the literature on Turkish politics. Revisionism, as I take it, 
has nothing to do with pejorative connotations as in the writings of Eduard Bernstein 
on social democracy. This is a new historical approach to the study of revolutions 
originating in the scholarly efforts of certain figures such as Alfred Cobban, Richard 
Cobb and George V. Taylor, who brought a neutral label for a historiographical 
current. Revisionist approaches to the study of revolutions emerged with the novel 
book of Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution in 1964. 
He mainly criticized the Marxist or social interpretation of the Revolution by 
proposing the political interpretation as a new alternative. Actually, Cobbans book 
                                                
63 Anthony D. Smith, Gastronomy and Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the 
Reconstruction of Nations, ASEN, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1995, 8 
64  See especially Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 
(Montreal: McGill Univ. Press, 1964) 
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became so influential that it has almost swept the field.65 Almost two decades 
later, thanks to the scholarly efforts of François Furet, the revisionist account gained 
a new explanatory paradigm based on an analysis of belief systems or political 
languages.66 Although there have been various versions of revisionist reading of 
revolutions, we can present the interpretative ideal types of revisionism as 
classified by Alan Knight: 
1. A critical stance vis-à-vis the Revolution and its claims, political and 
historiographical, to be a popular, progressive and egalitarian movement. 
2. A depiction of elites as the true makers of revolution, and of the 
masses as indifferent spectators, malleable clients or miserable victims. 
3. An emphasis on the Revolutions corrupt, self-serving, Machiavellian, 
power-hungry, even totalitarian character, evident, for example, in its 
manipulative agrarian reform and its arrogant, unpopular anticlericalism. 
4. A stress, therefore, on the Revolution as a political undertaking rather 
than a social transformation. 
                                                
65 Vivian R. Gruder, Wither Revisionism? Political Perspectives on the Ancien 
Regime, French Historical Studies, Vol. 20, Is. 2, (Spring, 1997): 245-295, p. 245. 
Although the arguments of Cobban together with the approaches of other 
revisionist figures such as Richard Cobb, Robert Foster and George V. Taylor 
were able to undermine the classic interpretation of Marxists represented by 
Lefebvre, they failed to replace it with a new social explanation or an alternative 
political account. In this sense, until recently, revisionism connoted attack more 
than reconstruction. Jack Censer, The French Revolution after two hundred years, 
in The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution, ed. Joseph Klaits & Michael 
H. Haltzel, (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University 
Press, 1994): 7-25, p. 10 
66 Jack Censer, The French Revolution after two hundred years, p. 11 
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5. An insistence that the Revolution was not, in consequence, a genuine 
social revolution, and that its claims to social transformation are 
blather  
6. A consequent stress on historical continuity over historical rupture 
7. A rehabilitation of the old regime67 
 It is instructive to assert that different researchers tend to stress different 
elements of this revisionist ensemble. 68  In this sense, the revisionist figures 
writing on the Turkish Revolution underlined certain points drawn above. In the 
existent revisionist account on Turkey, it is commonly acknowledged that relying 
on the legacy of strong-state tradition 69 , the Turkish Revolution is a political 
revolution70 from above based on a relatively broad elite consensus71. Similarly, 
others emphasized the strong military-bureaucratic-intellectual elite character in 
                                                
67 Alan Knight, Revisionism and Revolution: Mexico Compared to England and 
France, in Past & Present, No. 134, (Feb., 1992): 159-199, pp. 166-168  
68 Alan Knight, Revisionism and Revolution p. 168  
69 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, (London: The Eothen Press, 1985), 
and his Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democray in Turkey 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, (1992), 169-194 
70  Ergun Özbudun, Established Revolution Versus Unfinished Revolution: 
Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey, in S. P. Huntington 
and Clement H. Moore (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The 
Dynamics of Established One-Party States, (New York: Basic Books, 1970): 380-
405, p. 387 
71 Donald Webster argued, The effective majority... [of] the educated portions of 
Turkish society... is vocally and sincerely in support of the Kemalist regime and its 
head. The Turkey of Atatürk (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 1939), p. 287. For the support of elite to the Revolution see also 
Fredrick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1965) 
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alliance with the local notables, aiming to establish a secular nation-state by means 
of redefining the political community corresponding to the major ideological 
parameter of the new collectivity.72 Moreover, besides the economic factors, they 
refocused on various interacting cultural, social and personal factors in their re-
assessments of the Turkish case. 73  In this sense, the revisionist genre generally 
criticized the Marxist analyses of the Revolution which defined the characteristics of 
the Revolution in terms of economic factors and social classes. For the revisionists, 
these were rudimentary for the understanding of the Revolutionary process.74 In the 
words of Kemal Karpat, Marxist analyses generally failed to pay attention to the 
basic fact that class formation in Turkey, with its interest motives, vies with a sense 
of community, deep attachment to social hierarchies, and deference to elites and 
authority, which intermingle and often produce unexpected results.75  
                                                
72 S. N. Eisenstadt, The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective, in Ali 
Kazancõgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, 
(London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981): 127-142 
73 Kemal Karpat, Turkeys Politics, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 
p. vii 
74  The prominent works of this account are Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in 
Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development, (London: Verso, 1987); Korkut Boratav, 
Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayõnlarõ, 1989), Yalçõn Küçük, 
Türkiye Üzerine Tezler-5, 1830-1980, (İstanbul: Tekin Yayõnlarõ, 1988)   
75  Kemal Karpat, The American Historical Review, 1990, p. 1596 Feroz Ahmad 
should be assessed as one of the prominent figures of these efforts based on the 
analysis of economic classes. Having mainly contoured by a Marxist perspective, 
Ahmads studies generally analyze the Turkish Revolution as the direct outcome of 
class structures determined by the Young Turk Revolution, and in this sense, he 
depicts the character of the Young Turk Era in order to decipher the infrastructure of 
the Kemalist Revolution. See Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 
(London: Routledge, 1993).  
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Generally the revisionist interpretations focused on the study of continuity 
between the Ottoman and Turkish modernization. To them, Turkish revolution was 
not a rupture in Turkish history, but it was a radical outcome of the preceding 
modernization attempts initiated with the Tanzimat script. Its radical side mainly 
stemmed from its broader scope of the reforms than those attempted by the Ottoman 
predecessors. In other words, the Turkish Revolution is evaluated by this genre as a 
radical socio-political reorganization of a political unit on the remaining territory of 
the Ottoman Empire.76  
Actually, the focal point of the existent Turkish revisionist historiography is 
mainly on the history of Turkish democratic consolidation rather than on developing 
a methodological conceptual tool to analyze the Turkish revolution. In those writings, 
the Turkish revolution signifies one of the important turning points of political 
modernization of Turkey. However, though the Turkish revolution was essential for 
the development of Turkish democracy, it had several perils and maladies creating 
certain obstacles for Turkish democratic consolidation. For Heper, for instance, the 
single-party conceptualization of democracy as a rational democracy postulates a 
strong elitist and utopian viewpoint highlighting the preparation of the masses to that 
specified understanding of democracy to guarantee the maintenance of the 
Republican regime: 
The elites thought this would be possible to achieve by creating a new kind 
of Turk who would think logically. A new set of elites socialized in 
Republican values was to be raised. In turn, this elite would help the people 
                                                
76  See for instance, Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, (London: The 
Eothen Press, 1985) 
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attain a higher level of rationality through education. Thus, first in 1930 and 
then in 1945, the governing Republican elite partially opened up the regime 
in order to foster debate among the knowledgeable. Through intelligent 
debate, the political class was to find the one best way while safeguarding 
the Republican reforms against the masses who had not yet attained a 
higher level of rationality.77 
According to the revisionist approach Heper undertakes, this kind of 
apprehension about democracy by the state elite of the Turkish revolution gave rise 
to great problems that delegitimated further possible revisions and reappraisals of 
democracy by the political elite. Because, for the state elite who acted as guardians 
of the secular-democratic state and believed in rational democracy, the Republic 
came first and democracy second. On the other hand, for the political elite, who 
tried to render the Republican modernization project more palatable to the masses, 
the opposite is true. 78  For the aims of this dissertation, though he does not 
specifically refer to the 1930s, these arguments of Heper give important clues to 
understand the democratic vision of the radical revolutionaries of the 1930s. Hepers 
analysis clarifies the elitist efforts of the Turkish revolutionaries to draw on the 
symbolic recourses of society and to manipulate them in the form of cultural politics. 
This sort of politics was deployed as a justification ground for legitimation of power 
in the hands of the revolutionary elite. The regular outcome of this style would 
normally be the springing of various competing circles in order to make each others 
dominancy positions in terms of the definitions of true meanings of cultural 
symbols. Unraveling one set of symbolic meanings in relation to others in a 
                                                
77  Metin Heper, The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics, Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 54, No.  1, (Fall 2000), p. 69 
78 Ibid, p. 70 
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competition to raise to the status of official Kemalism and in providing the content of 
Kemalism is the backbone of the revisionist approach to the Turkish Revolution.  
Revisionist studies, which assert the cultural and symbolic traits of the Turkish 
Revolution occupy a distinctive place in the literature, thanks to the scholarly efforts 
of Şerif Mardin.79 Having mainly argued that the Turkish Republic developed a new 
value system different from the value universe of the periphery80, Mardin held that 
the Turkish Revolutionary leaders took the symbolic system of society; culture as 
a target than the social structure itself81 Similar to the revisionist accounts on the 
origins of the French Revolution, Mardin explained the origins of the Turkish 
Revolution by stressing the importance of values:  
The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented 
bourgeoisie, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the 
social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal 
                                                
79 See Mardins Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution, IJMES, Vol. 2, 
(1971): 197-211, Religion in Modern Turkey,International Social Science Journal, 
Vol. 29, (1977): 279-297, Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey, in Islam in the 
Political Process, ed. James P. Piscatori, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983): 138-159, Religion and Secularism in Turkey in Ali Kazancgil & Ergun 
Özbudun (ed.) Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, (London: Hurst & Company, 
1981). It would be worthwhile to stress that Nur Yalman is the first social scientist 
who highlighted the cultural side of the Turkish Revolution, see his Some 
Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey, Daedalus, 
102 (1973), pp. 139-67. 
80 See for example, Şerif Mardin, Just and the Unjust, Daedalus, 120 (1990): 113-
129 
81 Şerif Mardin, Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution. In International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.2, 1971: 197-211, p. 202 
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privileges, but it did take as a target the values of the Ottoman ancien 
régime.82  
Notwithstanding its extensive impact on the students of the Turkish politics, 
this aspect has not been extensively developed and even elaborated on. The existent 
literature on the Turkish Revolution is, to a large extent, does not fully depict the 
nature of the diverse elite composition, its role in shaping Revolutionary politics and 
the new revolutionary symbolic discourse of the early Turkish Republic. This study 
aims to make an analysis of the value system and the political language of Ülkü 
strand of Kemalist Revolution between the years 1933-1936 by exploring the 
methodological suggestions of the Turkish revisionist accounts in further detail. To a 
certain extent, the analyses and pioneering suggestions of Mardin together with other 
accounts made by Heper, Özbudun, Karpat, and Zürcher are utilized. Nonetheless, 
this dissertation mainly departs from the existent revisionist and post-revisionist 
accounts on the French Revolution, which undertakes by the analysis of the 
Revolution by focusing on politics of culture and symbolic politics. That is to 
say, this thesis mainly employs an outlook deriving from the revisionist account on 
the French Revolution that takes the politics of culture and politics of 
revolutionary language as the basic units of analysis.  
It is significant to note that the relative heterogeneity of the Turkish 
Revolutionary elite does not allow us to draw a holistic and generalizing approach 
relegating all the competing elite visions to a single account. Without assessing the 
role and place of the political contest among the elite to dominate the politics of 
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revolutionary language and symbolic discourse, it might be difficult to evaluate the 
complicated features of the Turkish Revolution. That the so-called Kemalist elite was 
not a unitary and homogenous block is one of the main arguments of this dissertation. 
All encompassing approaches downgrading the value of differences and blind to 
significant fragmentations with respect to cultural and symbolic resources have 
certain limitations bringing about misleading analyses of the Turkish Revolution.       
Recent debates and controversies about the French Revolution and its causes 
and outcomes contributed greatly to the literature not only of 1789, but also to the 
revolution studies in general. While the methods of states cultural engineering in 
Turkish Revolution were often strikingly similar to the ones exercised by the French 
counterparts  for example, the stress on nationalism, solidarism and republicanism; 
the reliance on the laic national education; civic rituals and festivals, icons, songs, 
and textbooks and the like  the content was not necessarily similar. The Turkish 
project, especially that of the 1930s, with its anti-liberal emphasis, its preference for 
the single-party, and its overt étatism, was more radical than its French counterpart. 
Still, the Turkish Revolutionary style was indebted much to the French one. In that 
sense, a considerable degree of affinity can be discerned between these two 
revolutions, which can be used as an analytical tool to examine the Turkish 
revolution.  
The reason behind this affinity does not originate from similar historical 
episodes. Rather, the Turkish Revolutionary leaders, in general, appropriated the 
French historical legacy and adapted it to their own context. They, generally, 
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appreciated the ideas and ideals of the French Revolution as their final goal.83 The 
Turkish Revolutionaries also considered the French model a blueprint and did not 
conceive it to be a historical product of particular and unique circumstances. They 
did not approach French history as historians but as politicians. They manipulated 
and molded the French Revolution to their own ends. Reinhard Bendix pointed to 
this idea when he wrote that the French Revolution is one of the best examples of an 
ahistorical event with demonstration effect. Bendix argued that, regardless of the 
prehistory of the French Revolution and the unique combination of factors in France 
that led to its outbreak, once the French Revolution had occurred, other countries 
could not and did not recapitulate that prehistory; they reacted to the revolution itself 
instead.84 The appropriation of the French Revolutionary legacy had not started with 
the Turkish Revolution. Even several decades before the Revolution, certain 
Ottoman intellectual circles struggled for the dissemination of the French 
Revolutionary heritage. In the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution (1908) and in 
the heat of the day-do-day power struggles with the old regime, Tanin, the official 
organ of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) analyzed the French 
Revolution, whose lessons were thought to be guiding light for the Young Turks 
missions. However, the profusion of translations and analyses of the history of the 
French Revolution in the post-revolutionary setting of Turkey was a grave contrast to 
                                                
83 Kemal Karpat, Turkeys Politics, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 
p. viii 
84  Reinhard Bendix, Force, Fate, and Freedom: On Historical Sociology, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 114-116 
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the situation under Hamidian censorship, during which a passing reference to the 
regime of 1789 in a journal brought its suppression for a few weeks in 1901.85 
Considering the fact that the French Revolution and its political style created a 
model of inspiration for the Turkish Revolutionary elite, certain theoretical 
approaches to the French Revolution would shed light to our inquiry of the Turkish 
Revolution. Thus, the exegesis of the French case provides for this dissertation an 
analytical framework to understand the Turkish case.  
2.2. Political Culture and Symbolic Politics in Understanding 
Revolutions: Recent Historiography of the French Revolution  
Studying the French Revolution has been a controversial issue among the 
social scientists and historians. There are three broad approaches to the French 
Revolution. The first one is the Marxist approach that mainly focuses on class 
struggles86: the Revolution was mainly based on the separate actions of four distinct 
social groups: the nobility, the bourgeoisie, the urban working class, and the 
peasants,87 which produced the conflict between the progressive capitalist-oriented 
                                                
85 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 192-193 and pp. 195-96 
86 The prominent representative of this account is George Lefebvre. See his The 
French Revolution, Two Volumes, Vol. 1: From Its Origins to 1793, trans. Elizabeth 
Moss Evanson, Vol. II: From 1793 to 1799, trans. John H. Stewart and James 
Friguglietti (New York, 1962-64). 
87  Jack R. Censer, Commencing the Third Century of Debate, The American 
Historical Review, Volume 94, Issue 5 (Dec., 1989), 1309-1325, p. 1309 
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classes and the retrograde aristocratic classes88. Moreover, the Revolution fostered 
the development of capitalism by means of eliminating the feudal domination on 
production, and it enabled the bourgeoisie to be organized as a class to power.89 In 
short, its primary outcome was the triumph of the alliance among bourgeoisie. 
According to Lefebvre, after the people of Paris revolted in defense of the 
bourgeoisie, it would be possible for the bourgeoisie to eliminate Old Regime 
privileges, an effort exemplified by passage of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen. Then, before 1789 ended, the class struggle between the bourgeoisie 
and the urban workers (especially the sans-culottes) began to replace the initial 
alliance that made the revolution. In the summer of 1793, the alliance of the sans-
culottes with the middle-class Jacobins took control of the Assembly. 90  The 
revolutionary experience was considered in the light of this general outlook. The 
ideas and experiences of the revolutionaries, in that sense, had meaning in so far as 
they served the general scenario. Interpretation of the events of 1789-1799 was 
heavily influenced by the Marxists who dominated the study of the national 
revolutionary past especially after World War II. But in the following two decades, 
                                                
88 Colin Lucas, Nobles, Bourgeois, and the Origins of the French Revolution in 
The French Revolution and Intellectual History, Jack R. Censer (ed.) (Chicago: The 
Dorsey Press, 1989) 
89  Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, (Berkeley: 
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The Marxist interpretation began to lose its hegemony91 with increasing challenges 
especially from outside France.  
The second is the revisionist approach that attempted to challenge the 
Marxist outlook. The revisionist account was mainly developed in the Anglophone 
world as an alternative reading of the Revolution. For the revisionist account of 
which the prominent representatives were Alfred Cobban, Richard Cobb and George 
Taylor, the Marxist explanation of the Revolution or what Cobban called the social 
interpretation has failed to analyze the Revolution. It was not the triumph of 
bourgeoisie, but rather the venal officeholders and professionals whose interests were 
declining at the time of monarchy who were the agents of change. This situation 
provided advantages to landowners in general, and later promoted the development 
of the Revolutionary action. Unlike the Marxist interpretation, Cobban held that the 
experience of revolution actually retarded the development of capitalism in France. 
In that sense, for Cobban, Marxists have totally failed in evaluating the real origins 
and the outcomes of the revolution.92 However, revisionists like Cobban and Cobb 
                                                
91  In recent decades there has been new efforts to revive the Marxist approach. 
William Sewell and Colin Jones criticized the interpretations of French Revolution 
that ignore the economic aspect. Though Sewell, for instance, accepts much of the 
critiques of François Furet and Keith Baker about the Marxist orthodoxy, he, 
nevertheless, sees the economic aspect as the key to understand the revolution.  
Hence, for both Sewell and Colin, the French Revolution was a bourgeois revolution. 
See William H. Sewell, Jr., A rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution in The French 
Revolution; Recent Debates and New Controversies, ed. by Gary Kates, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), pp. 143-156 and Colin Jones, Bourgeois Revolution Revivified, 
1789 and Social Change, in The French Revolution; Recent Debates and New 
Controversies, pp. 157-191 
92 Lynn  Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, p. 5. For a 
detailed account of the critique of the Marxist account see Alfred Cobban, The Social 
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could not develop a challenging approach to Marxist hegemony.93 Their initial aim 
was to weaken the Marxist perspective. This aim slowed down their efforts to 
acquire an accomplished account of the French Revolution.  Although the Marxist 
and revisionist historians and social scientists studied the Revolutionaries and their 
ideas, in their view, these were not the determiners of the formation or origins of the 
Revolution.  
The third account94, postrevisionism,95 is mainly based on the analysis of 
political culture and was a real challenge to the Marxist hegemony in the literature 
on the French Revolution. The research and studies undertaken by the revisionists 
enabled historians and social scientists to develop a more sophisticated account that 
can be labeled as third way. I will take this approach as my point of departure while 
analyzing the Turkish Revolution. 
François Furet, Mona Ozouf and Keith Michael Baker, the chief 
representatives of the third account, attempted to make a radically different reading 
of the Revolution that is mainly based on an analysis of the role of the ideas and the 
                                                                                                                                     
Interpretation of the French Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1964). 
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revolutionary discourse in shaping political culture. Furet seeks to understand the 
Revolution from its most obvious dimension, namely the political one. 
Furthermore, he tries to show how politics had become a mechanism in legitimating 
and representing historical action.96 In a remarkable series of books, Furet destroyed 
what he himself called the "revolutionary catechism": the Marxist and neo-Marxist 
account of French revolution as the model and forerunner of bourgeois revolutions 
everywhere, based on an interpretation of the years 1789-1794 as the classical 
instance of class conflict.97 He argued that the Revolution was above all a radical 
shift in the balance of philosophical and political power, not of economic class 
interests. Furet acknowledges his debt to Tocqueville, and his studies would be 
evaluated as a continuation of Tocqueville's study of the changing basis of 
legitimation for regimes of the eighteenth century. Furet appreciated that the men of 
the Revolutionary era, especially the theorists and spokesmen of the first revolution 
from 1789 to 1791  Antoine Barnave, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes, Jean-Joseph 
Mounier  were engaged in something dramatically new. Because they needed to 
justify and legitimize not only the overthrow of an established authority but also their 
own claim to replace it, they were obliged to imagine, exploit, and remake a new 
version of the French past, the French state, and the French people, infusing each of 
these with characteristics appropriate to the ambitions of the new political class that 
had taken power in France. In short, they had to invent modern politics. According 
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to Furet, then, the French Revolution became a struggle between competing and 
often incompatible philosophical assertions and political arguments. In this struggle, 
the French failure by 1792 to secure and agree on a new form of institutional 
legitimacy gave birth not only to the unstable and intense radicalism of the Jacobin 
years, but also to the cycle of dictatorship, counterrevolution, authoritarianism, 
restoration, revolution, and reaction that would characterize French history in the 
nineteenth century and divide the nation for almost two centuries.  
For Furet, the most outstanding difference between monarchy and 
revolutionary period is that the latter created a language of equality. The rhetoric 
of equality together with the Rousseauian democratic idea of general will 
constituted a hegemonic position in French politics. Politicians competed between 
themselves to represent the dominant symbolic position, the peoples will 98 . 
Actually, their purpose was not only to interpret popular demands, but also to 
exercise power. Furthermore, this language of equality provided a compelling 
morality that no politician was able to challenge. The end result of this process was 
the emergence of the Terror of 1793-94, when the general will and the government 
(representation) were completely intertwined and even equalized. In this sense, the 
concept of democracy that especially the Jacobin Revolutionary elite appropriated 
was quite different from what we understand today. In this account, democracy does 
not mean governing by consent or respecting individual rights. Rather, it denotes a 
radical ideology of popular sovereignty with which any abuse of power could be 
excused so long as it was achieved in the name of the people. Moreover, 
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democracy meant the power of a national state to defeat those who opposed its 
will.99  
The logic of this sort of Revolutionary politics was legitimized by the notion of 
direct democracy or pure democracy. With this sort of consideration of 
democracy, the Revolutionaries thought that the French people were an undivided 
whole (comme un bloc) in which any intra-social powers or any peculiar social 
interest had been considered as barriers to the General Will. This pure democracy 
postulated the idea of a unitary political body where each contracting member 
recovered his equal share of sovereignty through a unitary representation, identical 
for all.100 Direct democracy was, actually, an unworkable abstraction. This situation 
gave rise to a possibility for particular groups of people to claim to represent or 
incarnate the sovereign popular will with more justice, or greater effectiveness, than 
others.101 In the hands of the Revolutionary leaders, politics turned out to be a 
matter of competition over who represented the people, or equality, or the nation: 
victory was in the hands of those who were capable of occupying and keeping that 
symbolic position. In that sense, conflict of interests for power was replaced with a 
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competition of discourses for the appropriation of legitimacy around some ideals like 
democracy which was given priority. In sum, Furet argued, the French Revolution 
was the set of new practices that added a new layer of symbolic meanings to 
politics. 102  For George Mosse, this new political style signified a shift from 
written to iconographical political liturgy that articulated itself through festivals, 
rites and symbols, adopting traditional religious liturgy to the needs of modern 
politics.103 
Certainly, Furet was not alone in advocating these ideas about the significance 
of symbolic meanings of politics. Having considered language as the ultimate 
constituent of reality104, Keith Baker thought that the power of the revolutionary 
actions derives from a set of symbolic representations and cultural meanings that 
constituted the significance of their behavior and gave it explosive force.105 Not 
unlike Furet, Keith Baker argues that politics in a society mainly depends on cultural 
representations, which express the relationship between political actors. He goes on 
to claim that the  
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 political actors deploy symbolic resources held in common by members 
of the political society, thereby refining and redefining the implications of 
these resources for the changing purposes of political practices. Political 
contestation therefore takes the form of competing efforts to mobilize and 
control the possibilities of political and social discourse, efforts through 
which that discourse is extended, recast, and  on occasion  even radically 
transformed.106 
Thus, certain ideological and symbolic resources had been utilized by the 
revolutionary leaders in their political contestation to obtain power just like in the 
Turkish case. With the increasing effect of this new outlook on the French 
Revolution, instead of idealization of the Revolution as a victory of humanity, much 
scholarly energy has been spent to develop a critical stand. That is, the so-called 
Ancien Régime or monarchy began to be questioned in a different context. The pre-
Revolutionary period was no more evaluated as a retrograde and antithetical to 
progress. That is, while, on the one hand historians embracing the third approach 
problematized the class-based analysis, on the other hand, they sought to understand 
the impact and even contributions of the Old Regime to the revolutionary 
environment. It was commonly argued that the social, political and intellectual 
legacy of the Old Regime had been modified, transformed and at times turned inside-
out by the revolutionaries.107  
For Furet, there was a strong centralization before the Revolution at the time of 
Lois XIV. He systematically closed the channels of communication (such as Estates 
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General, parlements, the municipalities and the town councils) between society and 
the state. Under this strict centralizing monarchy, society was deprived of any 
political role. The use of power belonged the king. With the abdication of the 
authority by the king, after Lois XIV died, there became a great vacuum in politics.  
The language of equality, public opinion and the notion of volonté générale began to 
fill the vacuum. At least, theoretically, every member of society was transmuted from 
subject of an absolute monarchy to citizen of a state.  
Although the Revolutionary elite had in common with the ideas of philosophes 
and the Enlightenment, the Revolution was not simply the direct product of the 
contestation and practices of the new politics of Enlightenment. Yet, during the 
crisis of the monarchy in the late 1780s, the premises, strategies and languages of 
that political culture provided the elements for the revolutionary discourse.108 Even 
until 1791, the revolutionary elite did not consider a direct rupture between the old 
regime and the new. The term regime connoted an order of something. They saw the 
regime before 1789 as an order of abuse, which had now been reformed. With the 
beginning of the 1790s, perception of the old regime began to be transmuted. The 
expression ancien régime became a general name of corrupt and abusive order that 
had to be revolutionized totally. All the evils and inferiorities were attributed to it.109 
While until 1792, the old regime was not named monarchy, only after the Revolution 
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became anti-monarchical the ancien régime began to be denoted as monarchical.110  
In fact, discourse began to employ legitimacy as the new regime in rejection of the 
immediate past.  
In theory, Rousseaus ideal about the transformation of the absolute 
sovereignty of Kings into the absolute sovereignty of the people came true. Once this 
was achieved, politicians (Revolutionaries) competed to represent the broadest 
section of the public opinion. Revolutionary politics gained importance at this 
juncture. Actually, in Furets terminology, politics has, almost wholly, ideological 
and linguistic connotations. Revolutionary politics, furthermore, was formed by a 
semiotic struggle over who would represent the will of the people and who would 
control revolutionary language and ideology. 111  Although Rousseau proposed his 
famous concept of a volonté générale to designate a rule of a people in a republic not 
by its representatives, but by itself,112 for the early leader cadre of the Revolution, 
representation and acting on behalf of the nation was the dominant theme. They 
imagined a political order in which public service would be performed by an 
enlightened and public-spirited elite on behalf of the Nation.113 Since power was 
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representation, this performance could only be possible in terms of handling the 
control of representation. 
2.3 Creating a New Man as a Revolutionary Goal: The French and 
Turkish Ways  
So, we can glean from the discussion above that representation became a 
contested terrain within which the revolutionary elite competed to gain power, and 
adopt some significant analytical standpoints to understand the Turkish case. 
Although everyone was speaking in the name of the general will, there was almost 
minimum consensus over its nature. No one even had the authority to establish that 
consensus. At this juncture, the ideas and acts of the revolutionary elite are of great 
significance to analyze the revolutionary process. Lynn Hunt argues that it is  
essential to examine both the politics of revolution and the people who practiced 
them114 to understand the logic of revolutionary action. Although there were several 
affinities between the Revolutionaries, it is necessary to consider the divergences and 
variations. Not unlike the Revolutionary leaders of Turkey, the Revolutionary cadre 
of France was neither a unified nor a harmonious group that acted and thought in a 
similar fashion. They had the ideal to produce a new man as a common principle. 
However, the means and instruments to achieve that ideal varied in conformity with 
the ideational background they had.  
Mona Ozouf held that among the Revolutionary elites there were two 
fundamental approaches seeking to realize the creation of the new man. According 
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to the first one, Revolution is to be understood as the act of regeneration, which 
produced the new people. Revolution is able to create him; it did not need to be 
formed by any external effect; it was an instantaneous happening demanding little 
prescription from the revolutionary legislator. The second approach, however, 
asserted that the remnants of the old regime, by the very fact of their past, were 
potential dangers to the Revolution. The advocates of the old regime are more 
inclined to resist regeneration and rebirth. For that very reason, man had to be 
remade and reshaped on the soil of the Revolution. In doing so, it should combat the 
guardians of the old regime, especially priests. Accordingly, whereas the partisans 
of the first view were essentially confident of the outcome, the latter feared failure or 
regression. They needed, thus, to create a whole environment to train, protect and 
sustain new man. Hence, they were intrusive, dirigiste, and intolerant of discord.115 
These two groups can also be classified under constructivist and re-constructivist 
labels. 116  Though the first one has been concerned with the reproduction of a 
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political culture through education, the other one sought to redress the failings of 
present generations by re-educating future citizens. The political philosophers of the 
reconstructive style, of whom Rousseau is the prominent figure, have looked to 
education for redress, for the means to rectify the failings of past and present 
generations of adults and produce `new' persons, transforming their priorities and 
ways of understanding of the world.117  Therefore, in the Revolutionary process, 
some people and groups were more active than the others to reshape society. In this 
thesis, I would argue that the thought and action of a specific Revolutionary group in 
Turkey fits the re-constructivist category. 
The French re-constructivism has strong relevance to the Turkish Revolution in 
the 1930s. The following sketch elucidates re-constructivist attempt to shape the 
ideology of the French revolution. During the early years of the French Revolution, 
the Revolutionaries who shared this category of ideas were more dominant than the 
constructivist ones. These people wanted to form a political culture in which 
symbolic practices and rituals, such as language, imagery, festivals and figures were 
invented to reconstitute society and social relations. By means of disentangling 
society completely from the past, they aimed at arranging the basis for a national 
community in line with the requirements of modernity. Government, for the 
Revolutionary leaders of this approach, signified an institution with which the 
lhomme nouveau (new man) had to be created. They shared Rousseaus assertion on 
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the significance of politics, which was to shape a government capable of forming a 
people that is the most virtuous, the most enlightened, the wisest, in short the best, 
taking this word in its broadest sense.118 Lynn Hunt argues that the re-constructivist 
Revolutionaries expanded and changed the shape of Rousseaus idea of politics. In 
order to make the government more enlightened and suitable to mold the ignorant 
people, they felt themselves obliged to define a common good representing the entire 
French society. People could avoid anarchy and disorder in so far as they were 
committed to that common good.119  
At this juncture, the analysis of Jacobin ideology will give significant insights 
to understand the new re-constructivist political style that the Revolution created. 
After the inauguration of the First Republic on September 22, 1792, there began a 
strong competition with the Girondists120 and Jacobins in the Assembly over the 
representation of public opinion and the general will. There was no important 
difference between them in the sense of the basic principles they advocated.121 At 
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least verbally, both accepted property rights and were against state intervention in 
economic life. They all had the same ideal to create lhomme nouveau for the new 
order. However, from a tactical point, the Jacobins diverge from Girondists in the 
sense of utilizing every means necessary to protect the Republic from its external and 
internal enemies. Under war with the Prussians, the Girondists were not able to take 
the measures required for mobilizing society. They were unenthusiastic about the 
prosecution of the war. The Jacobins accused the Girondins of being disloyal to the 
Republican values and incompetence that gave rise to the long series of defeats of 
France after the victories of 1792. By utilizing every means to mobilize society for 
their aims, the Jacobin leaders became successful in overthrowing the Girondist rule.  
After coming to power, the Jacobins began to be mainly in favor of the 
collectivist and anti-individualist visions. In their view, for the ultimate goals of the 
Republic, the body of the nation would subdue the individual who had no existence 
outside the domain of the nation. In 1794, Barere declared, the Republic must 
penetrate the souls of citizens through all the senses. 122 In Jacobin understanding, 
human nature was a raw material in need of purification and careful molding. One of 
the primary characteristics that the Jacobin mind displayed was its reformulation and 
reconceptualization of Rousseaus notion of a general will: 
Under the shadow of Rousseaus notion of a General Will that can never 
be wrong and always reflects the true interest of the nation as a whole, it 
was inevitable that those who could know that General Will and truth 
would see it their duty  and their right  to impose it on France. Those 
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who did not see the General Will would be taught; those who refused to 
accept after the teaching would be commanded; and those who resisted 
would perish, because only The Enemy would oppose.123  
For the idea of representation that, particularly, the Jacobins assumed, the 
people and its representation was almost to be fused. Just before the declaration of 
gouvernement révolutionnaire in 19 vendémiare year II (10 October 1793), Saint-
Just made a speech that exactly sums up the Jacobin idea of democracy:  
You can hope for no prosperity as long as the last enemy of liberty breathes. 
You have to punish not only the traitors but even those who are neutral; you 
have to punish whoever inactive in the republic and does nothing for it: 
because, since the French people has declared its will, everyone who is 
opposed to it is outside the sovereign body; and everyone who is outside the 
sovereign body is an enemy.124  
Furthermore, the Jacobins as advocates of direct democracy, began to consider 
elections with political parties as harming the direct representation between people 
and their representatives. Because, elections would weaken representation, divide the 
nation, and endanger the Revolution. Moreover, elections may be useful in 
establishing the identity between representation and people, but once this identity has 
been established, further elections can only be redundant, or even harmful.125 In 
effect, this kind of logic rendered elections the moral equivalent of insurrection. In 
short, for the Jacobins, especially with the reign of Terror, elections were 
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unnecessary under a condition of direct democracy.  In their effort to protect 
Revolutionary order against its domestic and foreign enemies, the Jacobins 
contributed to the construction of a centralized state and to the elaboration of an 
ideology in which the state assumed the task and received the credit for convincing, 
guiding, and enforcing the general interest. The Jacobins thus adopted and handed 
down to their jacobin descendants institutional and mental habits they had 
themselves acquired from the Old Regime.126 Though Jacobins, at the beginning, 
advocated liberal principles127, subsequently, they came to the idea that until people 
had been taught what was good for them a society in the process of moral 
regeneration could therefore not be conducted on the liberal principles.128  This 
moral regeneration could only be possible by means of eliminating moral legacy of 
the ancién regime, and further constructing a new morality through a secular 
education. In this sense, the subordination of religious institutions and establishing a 
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national, centralized education were of utmost importance for the re-constructivist 
Revolutionary elite. 
This short account of the French Revolutionary politics from a revisionist 
standpoint gives fresh insights into the analysis of the Turkish Revolutionary 
ideology especially in the 1930s. The consideration of Ülkü group as re-
constructivist group with their full array of revolutionary ideas and practices, 
employing symbolic resources and modifying and even instrumentally utilizing them 
as a new political style to define the borders of the center is a novel approach in the 
study of Turkish politics.  
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CHAPTER III 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE TURKISH REVOLUTIONARY 
IDEOLOGY IN THE 1930s 
3.1.  The Specificity of the 1930s  
In order to understand and explain the conceptualization of the Turkish 
Revolution along the reconstructivist approach of the French Revolution, one must 
start with the account of the specific domestic and international conditions in the 
1930s and connect them with the Ülkü circle. The Ülkü group emerged in a milieu 
that disavowed any diachronic connections with the Ottoman past. Of course, the 
Ottoman legacy was one of the variables that caused a specific turn in 1930s, but in 
forming continuities between the emergence of re-constructivist style of politics and 
the Ottoman modernization history, one must appreciate the specifities of the new 
context as well: the world economic depression, discrediting of liberalism and liberal 
economy all over the world, the rising totalitarian regimes in Europe and east Asia, 
the failed Free Party experience, the Menemen incidents and the like all had impacts 
on the formation of the Turkish re-constructivist revolutionary style. 
The radical and re-constructivist political style of Stalinism, Italian Fascism, 
German Nazism, Japanese Imperial ideology, and other parallel movements in the 
world in the 1930s share certain similarities. It is significant that the Turkish 
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revolutionary ideology in the 1930s embodied a collection of ideas that was being 
put together at about the same time period when several world leaders searched for 
an ideological formula with which they might regenerate their countries. The roots of 
Turkish radical revolutionary ideology and its political philosophy are not deep in 
history. It conjoined many philosophical aspects of Western enlightenment and 
modernity in a quite eclectic and pragmatic sense. The Turkish radical Revolutionary 
elite felt it necessary to renovate and regenerate the cultural and social fabric of the 
nation through substantial institutional and social changes.  
The search for a third way, as an alternative to liberalism and communism, 
occupied many Turkish intellectuals after the world economic crisis. Whatever the 
alternatives presented by the intellectuals, the underlying basis of their formulations 
was always within the realm of Western enlightenment legacy. Even the conservative 
alternatives grounded themselves in that legacy. How then was the Turkish 
alternative to come about and what were to be the principles of its ideology?  
Actually, one of the successes of Kemalism was to unite a considerable number 
of intellectuals around the critique of traditional and religious structure. In this vein, 
intellectuals from different circles like İsmayõl Hakkõ Baltacõoglu, Peyami Safa, 
Recep Peker, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir could come together 
under the critique of the old. It should be noted that certain intellectuals129 that would 
break this unity were discredited during the first decade of the Republic.    
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These intellectuals from different persuasions held that scholastic mentalities 
and the remnants of the dark past had to be discarded and the Turkish nation would 
have to follow the principles of enlightenment. While the post-war alternatives to 
liberalism and communism in Europe emerged as reactions to the contemporary 
modern, liberal and rationalist ideas particularly in Germany130 and Italy131 , the 
Turkish revolutionary elite developed an alternative model, which heavily rested on 
the undisputed primacy of modernist considerations. Their minds were also occupied 
with the task of formulating a new metaphysics and spirituality for the newly 
established republic like the German and Italian fascist intellectuals. However, the 
Turkish Revolutionary elite had no problem with modernity. Rather, they were 
mainly disturbed with the traditional and religious mentality, which they saw as the 
sole reason for the nations backwardness and discontents. Even conservative 
Kemalists like İsmayõl Hakkõ Baltacõoğlu, Şekip Tunç and Hilmi Ziya Ülken sought 
to ground their conservative ideas in the Western metaphysical philosophy such as 
that of Bergson. The re-constructivist Kemalists like the Ülkü elite, on the other hand, 
attempted to form an authentic moral and spiritual philosophy that would at the 
same time negate the existent traditional morality. Accordingly, the source of 
Turkish cultural or divine revolution132  was an idea that the nation should be 
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rescued from the so-called spiritual oppression (ruhi tahakküm) 133 of religious as 
well as traditional domain. More concisely, the strong Turkish commitment to the 
values of Western positivism and rationalism represented an idealism134 that claõmed 
to replace the previous traditional moral precepts by means of laiklik.  
Various strains of thought in the 1930s arose out of one great common 
problem: how to determine and define the values and goals of the new republican era. 
This effort was necessitated by the relative crisis especially after the Free Party 
experience. This unsuccessful attempt showed the Republican elite that the values 
and principles of the Revolution had not yet been laid out to the wider segments of 
the Turkish society. Debates or even conflicts of opinion began to develop over 
fundamental problems such as the relationship between the elite and mass, the 
significance of the peasants, the characteristics of the ideology of Kemalism, the 
doctrines of liberalism, socialism and fascism. Verbally, all these discussions were 
attempts at the ideological refurbishment of the Republic. Nevertheless, these 
discussions could not be undertaken in a sophisticated and highly intellectual level. 
All were argued in relatively pragmatic manner aspiring to obtain a key position at 
the center. The desertion of individualism, espousal of social solidarity and 
construction of a secular republican morality came to the fore as a new path to 
Republics salvation. The same decade also witnessed the disillusionment of some of 
the elites with Western liberalism and their subsequent acceptance of solidarism and 
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etatism. However, this disillusionment did not give rise to communism or fascism as 
in the case of several countries such as China, Vietnam or the Eastern European 
countries. Turkish elite might be evaluated as successful in balancing between 
liberalism and socialism as well as fascism.  
Hence, the period covering 1930 was unique as a distinctive factor that shaped, 
by and large, the direction of the Turkish Revolution. Attempts at trial and error of 
that period determined the Turkish revolutionary conduct. Two important identifying 
events of 1930 help better understand the orientations of the period and the Ülküs 
specific role and importance. First was the World Economic Crisis and secondly the 
Free Party (Serbest Fõrka) Experiment.  
3.2. The World Economic Crisis  
In the winter of 1929-1930 Turkey was stricken by the effects of the world 
economic crisis, which reached its first peak after the collapse of the New York stock 
exchange at the end of October 1929. The direct economic consequences of the 
depression were devastating enough all over the world that gave rise to disastrous 
psychological effects among populations.135 The sense of insecurity and despair the 
crisis gave rise to spread far beyond the economic realm. In political and social 
realms as well, people lived in a mood of expecting a catastrophe. Although initial 
consequences of this depression were experienced relatively mildly in Turkey in 
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comparison with the developed countries of the world such as the USA, Germany 
and Italy, it had enough impact on almost every domain of social, political and 
economic life. Moreover, fear of further effects of the crisis was a psychological 
factor that was not less strong than its real effects. The most important consequence 
of this depression for the aims of this dissertation was that the economic crisis of the 
world enabled the radicals to gain power in politics. That is, the atmosphere of crisis 
encouraged the re-constructivist revolutionary elite to carry on militant propaganda 
against liberalism and liberal economy. Anti-liberal, etatist and even more 
authoritarian solutions began to gain secure ground in an atmosphere of crisis, which 
triggered loss of confidence in worldwide liberal democracies and liberal 
economies. 136  Thus the world depression with its economic and psychological 
consequences propelled Turkey into a new political search mostly grounded in 
radical and anti-liberal ideas.   
Actually, this was not unlike the situation in most other countries, which 
suffered the depression as much as Turkey did. The interwar and particularly the 
post-economic crisis period signified a great sense of despair, disillusionment and 
pessimism not only among the intellectuals and state elite in Turkey but also in 
continental Europe, including France, Germany137, Italy and Spain. The negative 
results of modernity in social, political and economic realms, the declining strength 
of these countries in international arena led many intellectuals to a pessimistic mood. 
                                                
136 Kemal Karpat, Turkeys Politics: The Transition To A Multi-Party System, (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 68  
 -63- 
In fact, this was not unique for these countries. Also in Japan, India, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and Egypt this kind of despair was prevalent. It is worthwhile to stress that 
in Germany, Italy and Spain, interrogation of the existent modern condition and the 
search for more irrational, anti-materialist and moral alternative became widespread 
among the intellectual circles.  
However, in Turkey, during the same years, though the revolutionary elite 
discredited the option of liberalism and liberal economy, they attributed the sense of 
despair the crisis evoked to the old, anti-modern, irrational and traditional elements. 
The way out of the crisis was sought explicitly within the domain of modernity. Even, 
the more conservative intellectuals like İsmail Hakkõ Baltacõoglu and Peyami Safa 
saw the relative backwardness of the Turkish nation as a result of old, archaic and 
religious mentalities. Peyami Safa, for instance, argued that one of the big mistakes 
of the Turkish intellectuals is confusing western civilization with western 
imperialism.138 It was, then, quite wrong to direct our hatred of western imperialism 
towards western civilization. For Safa, the Turkish nation should be clearly separated 
from the primitive Asiatic peoples139: contrary to the arguments of Kadro that took 
Turkey within the domain of the East against Western imperialism, he argued,  
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Until recently, some journals and groups in their endeavors to explain 
Kemalism attempted to put us into the same category with the primitive and 
oppressed Asiatic nations. Taking into account that the Turkish nation is the 
least likely nation to resemble the Indians and the Chinese in terms of 
culture, history, religion and economics, the question of its liberation 
movement cannot be viewed in the same context with the struggle between 
those semi-colonized countries and imperialism.140  
In short, Peyami Safa held that there was no need to oppose Westernism that 
had been developed during in decline of the Ottoman Empire: It was possible to 
make Ottoman Turkism and Ottoman Westernism survive by amputating their 
gangrenous parts. This gangrenous zone in both of them was their Ottoman 
aspect.141 
Consequently, one of the significant factors that is vital to understand the 
peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary idea was the specific contextual character of 
interwar period all over the world. Without calculating the very specificity of that 
period and its effects on Turkish politics, it is almost impossible to interpret the 
features of the Turkish revolutionary style during the 1930s. The gradual decline of 
the image of liberalism; the rising etatist and communalist alternatives; the 
strengthening of totalitarian regimes; the lessening thrust for democratic governance; 
the quest for mass mobilization through eliminating intermediary bodies between the 
individual and state; and widening the scope of politics to embrace the whole of 
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human existence 142 were the characteristics of an era that influenced most of the 
states all around the world, including Turkey.  
In sum, it is significant to note the Turkish leadership was inevitably 
influenced by the world-wide collapse of capitalism in the early thirties.143 The 
world depression had challenged the conventional wisdom that the capitalist 
economy was basically self-regulatory, and that periodic down-swings in economic 
activity would soon be ironed out by free market forces.144 The population already 
discontented with the unsuccessful economic policies of the RPP, began to feel more 
discomfortable and insecure with the gradual effects of the world economic crisis. 
That is, widespread resentment among the population grew because of the 
authoritarian behavior of the RPP and of its regional and local representatives, the 
attendant favoritism and corruption, lack of civil liberties and also the reform policies 
of the government, had become more intense by the world economic depression.145 
Within this specific conjuncture, the ruling leaders began to search for new 
alternatives both in politics and economics.  
                                                
142 Jacob L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1960) 
143  William Hale, Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945, 
Bulletin (British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 7, Is. 2 (1980), 100-117, p. 
103 
144 Ibid. 
145 Eric J. Zürcher, Turkey, A Modern History, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 186 
 -66- 
3. 3.  Radicalization of Politics Paving Way to the Ülkü Movement: 
The Free Party Experience  
The year 1930 indicates a significant turning point in the history of the 
Republic. It can be argued that, at this point, Atatürks government faced its most 
serious crisis since the defeat of the Greek invaders in 1922.146 Considering the 
economic side, both peasants and merchants had been dealt a savage blow by the 
world depression. 147  The Revolutionaries encountered a deep ideological crisis 
owing to the immediate shifts in the ideological parameters of the world. 
Considerable sense of despair was prevalent even in the words of Atatürk. In the 
course of a provincial tour that he undertook in 1930 Atatürk explained his sense of 
discontentment about the country to his private secretary:  
I am utterly worn out, my boy, utterly depressed. You can see it with your 
own eyes, everywhere we go we listen continuously to complaints and 
grumbles. Everywhere there is destitution, moral and material collapse. 
How dreadful it is that this is the real state of the country.148 
Faced with a severe political as well as economic crisis, the ruling elite began 
to search for political and economic alternatives. Their most prominent initiative was 
the encouragement of the foundation of an opposition party, in the shape of the Free 
Republican Party. The US Ambassador of the time, Joseph Grew, appraises the 
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paradoxical situation the Turkish leaders faced, with an interesting diplomatic jargon. 
For him, Atatürk had begun to think the single party system as a sign of Turkeys 
inferiority in comparison with Europe and the West. American and European writers 
have in recent years devoted much space to the Turkish dictatorship which has often 
been described as Western in form but Oriental in fact. These descriptions have been 
brought to the Gazis attention and he has not been pleased149 
So, Atatürk attempted to create a loyal opposition as the culmination of his 
Revolution150, which was said to air the accumulated discontent and provide some 
control over the government both to correct its shortcomings, and to seek new 
ways of coping with the economic situation.151 This was the second serious attempt 
after the failed Progressive Republican Party project, which was suppressed in 1925 
due to the accusation that the party members were responsible for several rebellions 
that occurred in eastern Anatolia. This time, Fethi Okyar, prime minister of the 
Republic during 1924-1925, was invited to form a party that would contribute to the 
idea that the Republic was based on truly democratic tenets, and further discredit the 
accusations that Atatürk was a dictator.152 In the wake of forming the idea of an 
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opposition party, Atatürk explained his primary objectives to Ali Fethi Okyar as 
follows: 
 Our contemporary appearance is more or less a picture of dictatorship. 
Actually, a parliament exists, however, I am still considered as a dictator at 
home as well as abroadNevertheless I did not establish the Republic for 
my own personal benefit. We are all mortal. After my death, the inheritance 
will be an oppressive institution (istibdat müesesesi). I would not like to 
inherit an oppressive regime and to be recorded in history as a dictator 
The problem is that the Republic should become firmly established without 
depending upon the life of persons. You (Fethi) should undertake this task. 
Responded Fethi (Okyar), Your idea is so brilliant. It is true, while the 
existing regime is officially called a Republic; in reality it resembles a dictatorship 
However, the issue is quite tricky. Those who have been accustomed to do things by 
force would face certain difficulties in administrating the government through 
persuasion I am grateful for your confidence and for the duty you assigned, but I 
am aware of the difficulties of the duty Ill undertake153 At the moment, Kazõm 
(İnanç) Paşa, the leader of parliament, argued that though an opposition was essential 
for the country, it would be better to start it from within the party itself. Fethi Okyar 
agreed with Kazõm Paşa on account of the fact that it would be plausible to start the 
opposition from within the party instead of an artificial opposition supervised by the 
government. İsmet İnönü severely opposed this idea of forming an opposition group 
within the party. He maintained that this sort of attempt would give rise to anarchy, 
resulting in a division and fragmentation among the revolutionary elite: It is not 
correct to make opposition from within the party. Such an opposition would bring 
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about a formation of a clique (hizip). The previous detriments we faced due to the 
intra-party cliques are in everyones mind.154 Then, Atatürk resolved the discussion: 
We shouldnt create cliques (hizip yapmayalõm), we should directly establish an 
opposition party, as this would be the best. And, Fethi Bey should take the lead of 
this party.155 After taking on this task, Fethi Bey asked Atatürk not to intervene in 
the competition between these two parties, and remain impartial. Joseph Grew 
somewhat sarcastically reports the artificiality of the foundation process of the Free 
Party:  
Last summer he [Mustafa Kemal] approved, if he did not urge, the founding 
of Fethis Opposition Party. Why? Perhaps it was something as naïve as 
this: there are a lot of modern buildings in Ankara; Turkey is therefore a 
modern country; modern countries have Opposition Parties; Turkey must 
have an Opposition Party. It was the inferiority complex which explains so 
much in Turkey.156 
Having mainly admitted the principles of Republicanism, Nationalism and 
Secularism as its basic traits, the party set its program on some minor executive 
programs so as to resolve the existent economic and social problems and to satisfy 
the needs strongly felt by the population. Instead of incorporating broad theoretical 
and ideological issues, the party program was too short, pointing only several 
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shortages and failures of the existent RPP government in handling the problems of 
economic and social matters. Certainly, in the Free Party program, individual rights 
and freedoms were also markedly acknowledged. However, in many cases, there was 
almost no difference between the RPP and FP party programs. On foreign policy 
matters, for instance, the Free Partys program was nearly the same as the RPP.157  
The correspondence between Fethi Bey and Atatürk about the party program is 
important for the purpose of this dissertation. In his letter to Atatürk, Fethi Bey 
highlighted the issues of Republicanism and Secularism in the party program. 
Having defined himself as a lover of Republic (Cumhuriyetin aşõkõ) and as an 
entirely secular (bütün manasiyle laik) person, Fethi Bey argued that all his attempts 
to form an alternative party and carry out an opposition was to make the Republican 
regime eternal. In his reply, Atatürk held that except laicism and republicanism 
differences in the party programs and executions were not so essential: I see again 
with pleasure that we are together on the principle of secular republic (laik 
cumhuriyet). In any case, this is the ground I have always looked for and will always 
seek in the political life by taking side with it.158 Hence, for Atatürk, the two parties 
could freely compete with each other in so far as they were committed to the same 
secular republican principles. He, finally, stated that within the secular republican 
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domain, the new partys political activities of various kinds will never be hindered 
in any case.159      
On August 12, 1930, Fethi (Okyar) established the party, which was presented 
to the public as a genuine opposition party.160 Some of the founding members of the 
party were the ones who were hitherto the outstanding figures of the RPP, notably 
Nuri Conker, Reşit Galip, Mehmet Emin and Ağaoğlu Ahmet. 161  They were 
explicitly urged by Atatürk to join the party to provide a justification and 
legitimation of this new establishment. Atatürk even urged his own sister, Makbule, 
to join the new party. 162  In the wake of founding the party, Fethi Bey was 
interviewed by the newspaper Yarõn. He was asked what were the main criteria of 
recruiting into membership to the party. Fethi Bey replied,  I am occupied with not 
leaving the valley of ideas (fikir vadisi) out.  I want to draw the votes of the citizens 
who are republican and secular. Everyone is free to be a member of the party 
provided that they are republican and secular. I am not interested in the personalities 
much.163 
Fethi Okyars interest in ideas mainly rather than personalities was not 
matched by those who once wanted to keep the already established parameters of the 
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single party based on a Jacobin idea of exclusive representation. In fact, the main 
reason of its dissolution three months later was the personality factor rather than the 
ideas it advocated. Once established, the party began to attract enthusiastic followers, 
particularly expressing a traditional voice. Whatever the similarities and agreements 
on the essential matters of the Republic the two competing parties obtained, 
considerable segments of the society began to consider this new party as the base for 
their reaction to the existent regime. Although the party was allowed to open its 
offices only in certain big cities namely Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, various illegal 
party offices were founded particularly in cities of Eastern region.  
Among many incidents, the famous Izmir incident is worth mentioning to show 
the extent of popular appeal of the new party, and the popular reaction to the RPP. 
The Izmir incident of early September hinted at not only the first evidence that 
religious and political reactionaries were backing the Free Party,164 but also the 
beginning of the end of the multi-party initiative, which led to the partys death only 
a few weeks later, and shattered many illusions about Turkeys readiness for 
unrestricted multi-party politics if the Atatürk reforms were to survive.165  As a 
prerequisite to be a mass party to vie the RPP, Fethi Okyar decided to undertake a 
tour for organizing party activities. Primarily, the Aegean region was chosen as the 
new partys first venture in public due to the fact that this region was considered as 
one of the most prosperous and advanced regions of Turkey, which might have 
positively responded to the economic program of the party. Furthermore, according 
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to Atatürk, this region, with its nationalist and republican character, was the most 
secure and safest one in terms of its modern and civilized character, which had 
hitherto proved its loyalty to the new regime on several occasions. 
However, the venture ended up with several unintended results and caused 
anxiety to the revolutionary leaders. Just before Fethi Bey arrived in Izmir, a relative 
crowd of enthusiastic welcomers (estimated 30-40.000 by Cumhuriyet)166 gathered in 
front of the dock. When Fethi Bey got there, he was faced with big demonstrations of 
people supporting his party. They easily turned out to be demonstrations against the 
ruling RPP. Some demonstrators broke the windows of the newspaper, Anadolu, 
which had criticized and attacked the Free Party before. As Cumhuriyet newspaper 
reported, during the demonstrations, the police arrested about 300 people who were 
from the rabble (ayak takõmõndan) for they offended the police.167  The police, 
even opened fire over the crowd, several got wounded and even a fourteen year boy 
got killed168. The day after, Fethi Bey decided to deliver a speech at the balcony of 
the hotel. During the speech, a man embracing the dead body of his son loudly cried: 
This is the martyr in the way to freedom, save us (kurtar bizi)169  
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The RPP leaders began to get much troubled with the Izmir incident. The pro-
RPP newspapers like Anadolu and Hakimiyet-i Milliye further agitated the public 
even exaggeratedly. Hakimiyet-i Milliye pointed deliberately to the so-called mürteci 
(reactionary) and communist figures among the welcomers of Fethi Bey.170 Anadolu 
highlighted those figures that are tramps, drunkards, mercenaries, and rough 
rowdies (baldõrõ çõplaklar) longing for an opportunity to go back 171  The 
incidents were reported by the RPP agents to Atatürk and İnönü continuously via 
telegrams. Mahmut Esat, the Minister of Justice, who had come to Izmir for a 
regional meeting of legal representatives on September 3, reported to Atatürk that the 
speeches of Fethi Bey had to be cancelled. He, particularly, insisted that the 
forthcoming speech of Fethi Bey in Alsancak stadium should be cancelled due to the 
possible turmoil and worrisome incidents. However, Atatürk made the decision that 
Fethi Bey should go ahead with his speech. The speech was held anyway to a big 
crowd estimated at 50.000 according to the newspaper Cumhuriyet. During the 
speech, due to some technical and logistic difficulties172, the audience misunderstood 
the pro-republican and pro-secularist messages thinking that they were anti-
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republican messages. The pictures of İnönü and RPP flags were torn down. Many 
people took their hats off and threw them to the ground and trampled on them to 
protest the hat reform. The incidents could hardly be kept under control. The day 
after, fig and harbor workers of Izmir went on strike mostly about wages. For the 
RPP front, this event demonstrated a Communist connection of the Free Party. 
According to this perception, two great enemies of the regime, reactionaries and the 
communists were increasingly overwhelming the party. The following day, Fethi left 
Izmir and continued his party venture in Manisa, Aydõn and Balõkesir. He was 
welcomed in similar enthusiastic tone. Several demonstrations were held supporting 
the Free Party cause.  
All the reports of violent opposition and of the counter-revolutionary activities 
began to re-shape Atatürks mind about the plausibility of the multi-party experience. 
He sent an inspector, Assembly President Kazõm Paşa (Özalp), to Izmir, to make on-
the-spot investigations. He wrote several reports to Atatürk indicating the relative 
incapability of the RPP in having influence among the people. More than thirty years 
later, Kazõm Özalp interpreted the failures of the RPP in a newspaper as follows: In 
reality, the RPP melted away just after Fethi Bey had arrived in Izmir. And, while he 
was venturing from Izmir to Balõkesir, Fethi faded the influence of the RPP away 
wherever he went.173 Moreover, communist and reactionary factors in the Free Party 
ranks were also highlighted in the telegrams of Kazõm Paşa. Although the report was 
not threatening enough for Atatürk to authorize Fethi Bey to continue his tour, the 
Izmir events showed the necessity for policy change. Fethi Beys initiative was 
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supposed to be the reason behind the so-called counter-revolutionary activities, and 
opposition to the government sprung first in the Aegean area. Actually, there was no 
distrust in Fethi Bey as a person as such. But rather, the RPP leaders were haunted 
with the specter of the spread of an upheaval driven by Fethi Beys initiative all over 
the country and dissidence that would trigger the collapse of the revolutionary 
premises the RPP. Actually, Fethi Bey played the game within the legitimate borders 
of politics. However, he was relatively ignorant of the local realities. The US 
Ambassador explains this fact again in a somewhat sarcastic tone: 
Fethi made a mistake; as a result of his contact with the West he acted as a 
Western leader of an Opposition would act. He organized his party; he went 
about the country, he made speeches where they would count: Izmir, for 
instance. The Gazi was ignorant of Turkey because he lived at Ankara and 
Fethi was ignorant of Turkey because he had lived in Paris. Fethis 
reception at Izmir was the most significant event in Turkey since the 
hanging of Djavid. The second marked the zenith of the dictatorship; the 
first the initial crack. It disorganized the whole show. Complacency came to 
an abrupt end and uncertainty followed.174  
Shortly after the venture, the İzmir incident was fiercely debated in the 
Assembly. Fethi Bey was mainly criticized of causing anarchy and chaos in the 
country by carrying the reactionaries and communists into his party. Fethi Bey 
criticized the RPP of having a policy based only on fighting reaction while 
forgetting the economic and financial ills of the people, 175  and he denied the 
accusations that the followers of the Free Party were reactionists. He stated that the 
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program presented by İsmet İnönü had no concrete policy that would meet the needs 
of nation: The reality is that the people have economic and financial problems 
Forgetting the maladies which plunge people into deep economic and financial 
problems and concentrating merely on the reactionists (mürteciler) and with this 
consideration, precluding a normal life for the Republic is the most erroneous 
thing. 176  Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya responded that the extremists and 
reactionaries captured considerable power in the party and in the police dossiers, 
there were many records proving the reactionary background of the Free Party 
members. Furthermore, by opposing many of the key aspects of the governments 
policy Fethi Bey was in fact opposing the interests of the nation.177         
Gradually, the Free Party was approaching its tragic end as RPP leaders were 
relegating nearly all the problems and discontents of the country to the existence of 
the Free Party. Several pro-Free Party journalists were arrested and put in jail for 
their bitter criticisms of the government. It was in this context that the Free Party 
approached its next and thus far its most serious test178 as the municipal election 
of 1930 was actually the real test for the ruling cadre and the extent and dimension of 
the opposition at the local level. Although Fethi often declared his good faith in the 
governments promise that it would in no way tamper with the fairness of the voting, 
from the very outset of the elections, allegations of voter intimidation and 
interference of government and election officials on behalf of the RPP came from all 
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parts of the country.179 Certainly, these elections with many irregularities and frauds 
increased the tension between the Republicans and Liberals. There were several 
demonstrations and riots in various election regions against the unjust applications 
during the voting process. In the city of Mersin, the Free Party protested the elections 
on the grounds that the government made several interventions into the voting 
process and refused to take part in it. The only election province the government 
forces did not intervene was Samsun. The governor of Samsun, Kazõm İnanç was a 
relatively liberal and moderate person, who had witnessed the initial foundation 
process of the Free Party in Yalova. He did not permit any irregularity that might 
prevent the free voting of the citizens. Against 416 votes, the Free Party got 3312 
votes in Samsun. This result demonstrated the relative power and influence of the 
new party. The Free Party might have won the greater part of the votes, if the 
government would not intervene the election process in general.180  Although the 
RPP won the majority of the votes officially, that was not the case in reality.. Since 
almost everyone witnessed the irregularities and election frauds, Atatürk was well 
aware that the election results did not reflect the truth. When somebody showed him 
the election results and told him our party is winning, Atatürk became quite angry 
and replied, No, it is not our party which is winning, it is the administration, police, 
and the gendarmerie. There can be no good for the nation from this kind of 
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politics.181 However, even Atatürk himself was not able to thwart the antagonistic 
campaign against the Free Party from various fronts. Finally, the RPP elite 
persuaded Mustafa Kemal, who initially had professed neutrality with respect to 
both parties, to change his position to support the Republican Party.182 
Again, in the Assembly, several controversies were heated up about the 
elections between the representatives of the parties. Once more, the RPP leaders 
accused Fethi Bey of paving way for reactionism (irtica). Fethi replied these 
accusations with much anger and discontentment: How was the movement of so-
called irtica incarnated? Has anybody said, we dont want secular laws, or we 
want Caliph (Halife)? (Noises from the seats, do you wish to hear such demands). 
No my dear. Thousand times, no. But, what you mean by İrtica is nothing other than 
the will of people to make their preferences freely and to vote for whomever they 
choose. 183 He went on saying,  
Those who interpret the free will of the people to vote the Free Party as 
irtica, are the ones willing to monopolize the votes of people. The ideals of 
these monopolist persons have nothing in common with the ideas of 
republic and democracy. True republicans should turn their faces away from 
those pursuing their petty interests (menfaatperest) with certain ideals alien 
to the republican philosophy.184 
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These expressions are illustrative enough to show the semiotic struggle as in 
the French case over the definition of certain essential concepts. The RPP leaders 
generally utilized the term irtica for their opposition strategy to discredit the 
alternatives at least in a semiotic sense. On the other hand, Fethi Bey attempted to 
countermand the assumptions of the RPP leaders by defining irtica as the will of the 
people. Actually, this was the struggle between the moderate (constructivist) and 
radical (re-constructivist) revolutionaries. Undoubtedly, the 1930s heralded the 
victory of the latter thanks to the anti-liberal and totalitarian winds in all over the 
world. 
3.3.1. The Dissolution of the Free Party and its Implications for the 
Revolutionary Ideology 
After Atatürk explicitly changed his impartial position on behalf of the RPP, 
Fethi Bey made a speech in the Assembly stating that the FP was established 
unequivocally on Atatürks initiative and support. He went on saying that a political 
struggle against Mustafa Kemal was antithetical to the reason detre of the party. 
Then, he declared the dissolution of his party:  
With the encouragement and approval of the Great Gazi the Honorable 
Mustafa Kemal, I organized the Free Republican Party. I did not envisage 
that the party which I formed on this basis would enter into political struggle 
against the Gazi. At no time did it occur to me that I would become 
responsible for bringing into existence a political organization contrary to 
this premise. However, the development of our party and the trend of events 
has made it clear that we would soon be placed into a situation face to face 
with the Gazi in the political arena. I find this prospect intolerable for any 
political party of mine. For this reason, I have decided to dissolve the Free 
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Party, and am communicating this decision to the entire party 
organization.185 
Hence, the second multi-party attempt of Turkey had to be abandoned until 
the populace be further prepared for democratic behavior.186 Shortly after Ali Fethi 
had declared the dissolution of the Free Party, the so-called Menemen incident187 
happened on December 23, 1930. Although there was no direct evidence for the 
connection between the Free Party and any of the leading members of the Menemen 
outbreak, it was evaluated as the consequence of freedom granted through the 
establishment of the Liberal Party in 1930.188  Moreover, this incident provided 
sufficient evidence for the RPP to justify the abolition of the Free Party with an 
allegation that religious reactionaries used it as a cover for their own purposes.189 
The remarks of the US Ambassador Joseph Grew are instructive enough to have an 
insight into the matter:   
Intrinsically Menemen has no importance: a few people were killed, one of 
them apparently under circumstances of brutality. But as a symptom 
Menemen is of incalculable importance. It means that Westernization hasnt 
penetrated; that while the Ministry of Public Instruction at Ankara may sit at 
the feet of Professor John Dewey and talk about Teachers College at 
                                                
185 Cited in Walter Weiker, p. 136 
186  Donald E. Webster, State Control of Social Change in Republican Turkey, 
American Sociological Review, Volume 4, Issue 2 (Apr., 1939): 247-256, p. 256 
187 A group of dervishes of an outlawed religious order rebelled at Menemen near 
Izmir to protest the anti-clerical policies of the RPP. During the rebellion, the rebels 
killed an army officer, Kubilay. The rebellions leaders were then executed by the 
government.  
188 Kemal Karpat, Turkeys Politics, p. 278 
189 Ibid, p. 67 
 -82- 
Columbia and Bergson and Durkheim and all the rest, Sheikh Essat, leader 
of the reactionary Nakhshbendi sect, has the inside track. It is impressive to 
visit the Bacteriological Institute at Ankara and see Zeiss binocular 
microscopes and all the centrifuges that Paris manufacturers can produce, 
but muskas (amulates) are being used in all the villages around Ankara itself 
and a catalogue of muskas is at present of more practical value than a 
catalogue of Zeiss microscopes.190  
The RPP leaders began to utilize these types of reactions against the existent 
regime as the resource to legitimate their subsequent non-democratic practices. This 
can be argued as a kind of tutelage over people in terms of relegating these types of 
reactions into a realm that would be functional for the regime. Furthermore, they 
aimed to make the people barren of their reactionary capacity. Needless to say, the 
terms of reaction or what the reaction means were defined by the RPP leaders. This 
was a central problem. All the debates carried over the democracy problematique 
(whatever it is defined by the RPP leaders later, and used as seedbeds for 
revolutionary transformation through a series of institutionalized policies) took 
cognizance of such feverish and of course seemingly minor incidents. The Free Party 
and Menemen cases indicated an ensemble of incidents all made instrumental use of 
by the RPP cadres as their re-constructivist policies to be enacted upon firmly. That 
is, the regime used these incidents instrumentally. Furthermore, these incidents 
provided a proper ground for such institutions as the Peoples Houses which would 
be placed at the center as the instruments for enrooting re-constructivist thrusts. 
Furthermore, the RPP elites set a rationale for the dissolution of the Free Party, 
which was closely related to their strategy they raised so far. The apparent tone in 
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these pretexts appeared to be interspersed through the words of the elites; they 
underlined one thing throughout: If the society were mature enough, they would 
allow democratic multi-party experience. But due the nature of the society with its 
immanent quality that included reactionist elements (they, for the RPP leaders, would 
doubtlessly handicap the normal course of the democratic way), they legitimated the 
disbanding of the Free Party on the pretext that the Free Party followers deserved 
being suppressed as they permitted reactionist elements among the followers. 
After the Free Party experiment, the RPP leaders came upon to the idea that the 
Revolution was not as deeply rooted as they would like it to be. It led them to 
reconsider what went wrong and what should be done to consolidate the regime. 
Why did the regime seriously consider the Free Party and Menemen episodes as true 
threats? Behind the reasons of the demise of the Free Party democratic experiment, 
certain points can be underlined. First of all, the breakdown of the traditional 
organizational foundations of the society were not easily being replaced by efficient 
and effective institutions capable of satisfying the emotional needs of the society and 
even fulfilling the prevailing void.  The swift introduction of modern political 
institutions had some disappointing social consequences. It, on the one hand, created 
premises for the participation of the broad masses of the population in political life 
and included them (through the system of elections) in the process of political 
decision-making.  On the other hand, the strict control mechanisms over the political 
processes did not pave the way for the realization of democratic premises. That is to 
say that the Revolution brought about a form of democratization of politics in the 
sense of not installing a functioning liberal democracy, but rather of broadening 
political participation and forging links between governors and governed mainly 
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through elections. At the same time, the revolutionary regime aimed at social 
transformation, which in turn, implied a substantial degree of social engineering 
(cemiyet mühendisliği)191. The transformation of customs and cultural symbols were 
the outstanding elements of the social engineering project. It would not be wrong to 
contend that the ruling elite who saw themselves as the chief carriers of democracy 
to the masses was not (because of their limited historical experience) ready to accept 
truly democratic values in the form of freedom of choice and parliamentary 
democracy. Diana Spearman spells out this situation in 1939 as follows: 
It seems probable that it is really the intention of the Turkish Government to 
prepare their people for a kind of democracy, which would be modified 
indeed by the Turkish respect for discipline and the military virtues, but 
which would allow a certain measure of freedom.192 
Another problem that the Republic faced was the relative problem of 
legitimacy of the existing political regime. After the swift collapse of the Empire, 
there emerged a power vacuum, which could not be filled in a short time by the 
newly established regime. In place of the Ottoman principle of politics, whose 
legitimacy derived from the divine right to rule 193  and its correspondence with 
tradition came the Republican principle, which in practice led to the establishment of 
the secular authorization. William Hale concludes that, the Free Party was dissolved 
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in November 1930 primarily because it attracted support from those who opposed the 
basic principles of the secular Republic, rather than because of its economic 
policies.194  In fact, due to this insecurity about the safeguarding of the secular 
Republic, a proclaimed national sovereignty and democracy increasingly turned out 
to be a non-democratic control. And its principal characteristic made it much more 
powerful than the Empire because total control over society was made possible by a 
new technology of power based on the achievements of the Revolutionary cadre.  
Another contribution to the insecurity felt by the state elite as a result of FP 
experiment and Menemen incident was made by the specific nature of the process of 
modernization in peripheral regions, which found themselves faced with the 
necessity of overcoming backwardness within a brief period or of reforming 
traditional institutions to take care of new functions. This factor is closely related to 
the idea of being a latecomer and the striving to overcome this situation without 
delay. 
The experimentation with multiparty democracy through the formation of the 
Free Party and its consequences led the state elite to develop a strong conviction that 
the politics and culture of the Revolution could not be effectively implanted in the 
people. Considerable segments of population supported the Free Party in showing 
their discontent toward the RPP. With the dissolution of the Free Party after several 
months of its establishment, the ruling elite aspired a strong reconstruction of the 
state and the party. Mustafa Kemal decided to visit several cities and provinces of 
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Anatolia with a group of intellectual and bureaucratic elite to come into contact with 
the real people, listen to them and define the actual problems and reasons that 
caused relative failure of the RPP in the short multi-party period.195 Furthermore, he 
attempted to find a solution to the increasing weakness of the RPP by meeting the 
demands of the people. He took several notes when he noticed a problem, and wrote 
some telegrams to İsmet İnönü to make him aware about the problems to be 
resolved.196 In these notes, there are certain points that Atatürk saw very crucial for 
the restoration of state power. First, the need to define and determine the main 
ideological pillars of the regime was highlighted, for it is argued that Free Party 
received strong popular support because RPP could not deliver its messages to the 
masses clearly. In this vein, étatism and revolutionism was seriously considered to be 
included to the party program.  
Second, Atatürk decided to utilize more direct and top-down policies 
concerning the state-society relations until society would be persuaded of the 
ultimate ideals of the state. That is, he never thought to draw back or at least revise 
any of the previous reforms, but rather felt the need to strengthen the authority of 
state and the RPP through new reforms and designs. When the state elite realized that 
the relative success of the Free Party stemmed from its assertion of liberal and 
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pluralist themes197, this did not lead them to adopt liberal and pluralistic policies as a 
compromise, but it worked the other way around. Centralization became the chief 
concern. In that sense, the memoirs of Kõlõç Ali who was one of the best friends of 
Atatürk, are meaningful enough to show this intent:  
...During the Free Party demonstrations, some news was heard that Fethi 
Bey was welcomed with applauses and religious slogans in Balõkesir. Even, 
a cable was received informing that some merchants in Istanbul were 
manufacturing and stocking Fez (traditional Ottoman headgear). Atatürk 
was pleased with this news and said: So, it is now well clear that our 
revolution has not been consolidated yet, we had the operation on the wound 
just at the right time. Now, we have got to make this an opportunity. 
Having said this Atatürk started thinking about remedies to firm the 
revolution up more and more.198 
This case shows that, even opposition movements were used instrumentally for 
the revolution to be successful, particularly in the eyes of the revolutionaries. 
Doubtlessly, the hidden drive behind this type of attitude can be reasoned on the 
basis of entrenched revolutionary idea that the situation was not ripe for rousing the 
enlightenment and emancipatory potential of the people. This is even more striking 
when we consider the Free Party experience as a democratic thrust at least in 
procedural terms. Because, this thrust implied an appeal to the difference and 
diversity of voice. The Free Party experiment in democracy was to be frustrated so 
firmly, that it implies the revolutionaries were committed to the democratic ideal 
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only in words but not in deed. For the sake of revolutionary goals, even the simplest 
inclinations towards democracy at the procedural level were foregone.  
Atatürk and the elite group discussed the causes of the success of the Free 
Party during the Anatolian journey they took shortly after the dissolution of the party. 
They concurred that its assertion on freedom and liberal economy influenced the 
people who were suffering from economic problems. However, they generally came 
to an understanding that they could not accept liberalism in general and liberal 
economy in particular. For, liberalism had already become discredited all over the 
world. Instead, they reached the agreement that étatism, populism and revolutionism 
were the best options for the general purpose of the Revolution. Secondly, they 
thought that the Free Party became successful as it promoted the idea of freedom, 
particularly about religious issues. Questioning themselves whether they can give 
such a freedom, laicism outweighed freedom of belief in their minds. That is, they 
came to the agreement that laicism was the essential pillar of the Republic and it was 
impossible to go back on the existent policies of secularization.199  
 In short, after the Free Party experience, Republican leadership wanted to 
increase state authority to make people respect the policies of the state and revolution. 
In this sense, they interpreted the demonstrations and rallies of people that protested 
the government in several Anatolian districts as a threat to the survival of their power 
and revolutionary legacy. Thus, all the meetings during the multi-party experience in 
favor of the Free Party were considered as violation of the sacred persona of the 
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state (Hükümetin manevi şahsiyetine tecavüz). 200  For instance, Mustafa Kemal 
criticized the courts of İzmir, Balõkesir, Mersin, Silifke and Antalya because they 
tried only a small number of people that protested against the RPP during the multi-
party municipal elections. He argued that this kind of attitude of the courts mainly 
encouraged other similar violations. For him, this showed that the justice mechanism 
of the state were not sensitive to the power and security of the regime. Atatürk held 
that  
the lawyers seemed to protect people from the inspection of the government. 
In this sense, the lawyers also should be heavily punished together with the 
all magistrates (müstantikler). All the demonstrators had to be charged and 
imprisoned. For, they were reacting to the authority of the state. This was 
the prime offense that the courts should take into serious consideration. 201  
He further commanded İnönü that a special law has to be passed that would 
safeguard the Republic and the regime. Those who act, encourage to act, and induce 
with word and text against the Revolutionary principles should be heavily punished 
(agir ceza). 202 
It would be instructive to document the didactic terms of the US Ambassador 
that makes a significant comment on the Free Party experiment:  
Should one be pessimistic? Not necessarily. Turkey has learned a lot since 
August, 1930  chiefly that Westernization cannot be decreed from Ankara 
and that is not quite so simple and completely materialistic thing as was at 
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first imagined. Ankara isnt at all sure as to just what it wants to teach, but 
in view of the success of Sheikh Essat it is perfectly certain that something 
must be taught in a hurry. But how? This is the question that is now 
agitating Ankara. Will it be mass education with Russia and Italy as 
examples or will it be an attempt to educate individuals in the path of 
responsibility, initiative and the other qualities that have distinguished 
Anglo-Saxon countries? I fear the former. I hope for the latter203  
The presumptions of Joseph Grew about the pessimistic scenario on Turkey 
came, nearly, true. From that time on, the Turkish ruling elite opted for more 
authoritarian alternatives to make social and political conditions ripe for the future 
democratic days. What were the fundamental dynamics of the change necessary to 
perpetuate the ideals of the Republic? How was it possible to make conditions 
appropriate for a more secure and safe public order? The various incidents of 
collective action mentioned above led the Kemalist elite to take the problem of social 
control very seriously. Moreover, developments that began to challenge the Republic 
brought into the agenda the need for additional reforms if the new Turkey were to 
become a permanent creation...204 For this aim, Atatürk inaugurated fundamental 
changes in many aspects of educational and intellectual life.205 To the minds of the 
Republican leaders, the existing institutions such as Turkish Hearts (Türk Ocaklarõ) 
were no longer capable of homogenizing the nation in accordance with the values of 
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the spiritual revolution (manevi inklap)206. The question how to manage them or, 
even better, how to orient them in a direction that was desirable and not harmful? 
became crucial for the ruling cadre. The answer was convenient control of the state 
over social behavior through efficient institutions. In this vein, the ruling cadre of the 
Republic promulgated the great educational reforms in the 1930s. The Turkish 
Hearths and the Darülfünun (traditional university) were replaced with the Peoples 
Houses and a modern university respectively. These educational reforms were 
initiated to raise the level of the masses, close the elite-mass gap, and to create a 
modern, westernized elite that shared Atatürks philosophy.207   
3.4. The Abolition of the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocaklarõ) and the 
Establishment of the Peoples Houses (Halkevleri) 
When the Kemalist ruling cadre seriously began to handle the problem of 
social control, they sought a model with which they could realize their future ideals 
of social transformation. The existent institutions of education, primarily Turkish 
Hearths were gradually being discredited by the RPP leaders, especially by Recep 
Peker, with the rationale that these institutions were not adequate to meet the 
educational needs of the Republic. Furthermore, several alleged links between the 
Free Party and the Hearths were used as evidence for the inevitability of this 
institutions closure.  
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The Republican leaders did not abolish the Hearths until they saw them as 
obstacles to the dissemination of the Revolutionary ideal in 1930. The establishment 
of the Turkish Hearth went back to the early years of the 1910s. Until mid-1925, 
under the effect of young pioneers of Turkism, especially Ziya Gökalp, the Turkish 
Hearths had served as centers of refining and diffusing the ideals of Turkism. 
Attaching more importance to the need for such cultural organization, the rulers of 
the new regime supported this organization nation-wide and tried to give it a semi-
official status.208 Here the aim was to propagate the necessity and benefits of the 
reforms.209 At first sight, the Hearths targeted especially young people who were 
seen as more ready to accept new ideals. To this end, the Turkish Hearths used 
every device of the missionary technique - the school, the dispensary, the spoken 
and printed word, the talkie and the movie to convert the youth of the country to the 
new ways.210 By 1930, once the rulers realized that their cultural policies had failed 
in indoctrinating the new standards, a desire to make reforms within the Turkish 
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Hearths came to the fore.211 The Hearths began to be perceived as insufficient to 
meet the needs of the new conditions that is, to create a new revolutionary culture 
free from all particularisms. That is to say, the ruling elite believed that the Hearths 
failed to provide mass education and indoctrination on the basis of new ideas they 
reconsidered after the dissolution of the Free Party. Perhaps the most important 
rationale for this was that the influence of Ziya Gökalps formulation of culture was 
still dominant among the circles of this institution. Unlike the radical revolutionaries 
understanding of culture, which was manufactured as the domain of social 
engineering via state agencies, Gökalp gave special importance to the living values in 
the definition of authentic culture. Beside this ideological difference, with a semi- 
autonomous status, the Hearths continued to be the means of potential political 
opposition for the new regime during the Free Party election campaigns. It is 
commonly acknowledged by the RPP rulers that the Turkish Hearths had completed 
their task as an institution. Recep Peker insisted to merge the Hearths with the party 
in order to gather all the Revolutionary forces under the canopy of the RPP.212 In line 
with the ideas of Peker, Atatürk made a speech defending unification of the 
revolutionary forces: There emerged such occasions in the history of the nations 
that all the material and spiritual forces are to be gathered and directed to the same 
route so as to reach specific purposes. In recent times, our nation also conceived the 
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significant results of such gathering and unification experience.213 In another speech 
Atatürk justified the dissolution of the Hearths as follows:  
In order to protect the country and the Revolution against internal and 
external threats, all the national and Republican forces have to gather 
around a single place. I think proper the incorporation of the Turkish 
Hearths, which has been trying to disseminate the populist and nationalist 
ideas with sincerity and faith from the beginning, with my party, which 
certifies the same principles in the political and practical (ameli) field. This 
decision is the expression of my confidence regarding this national 
institution. The forces in same kind should be united for the sake of the 
common goal (müşterek gaye). 214   
The increasing radical tone of the post-1930 period can definitely be observed 
in the speech of Mustafa Kemal, which prompted Atatürk to generalize and broaden 
the reforms in order to assure the Republics survival.215  He also was not able to 
escape from the non-democratic character of the times, which pushed the state elite 
into creating a uniform and homogenous way of life. The closure of the Hearts was 
equally part and parcel of this non-democratic restructuring in Turkey.  Then in 1931 
the Hearths were compelled to close, and their property was transferred to the RPP. 
Alongside these concerns about the potential inadequacies of the existing 
education system and institutions including the Turkish Hearths, a new alternative 
institution was planned to function as the center for mass education. Leaders of the 
Republic sought to guarantee the loyalty of the citizens through continued civic 
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education, designed to counter the appeal of the wider segments of society. 
Furthermore, they instigated a far-reaching cultural transformation to substitute 
enlightened reasoning for Islamic dogma.216  Thus, in the 1931 RPP Congress, it 
was decided to found a new cultural institution of the Revolution, with a mission of 
transforming the masses into a more enlightened stage. Recep Peker, the Secretary 
General of the RPP, in the opening speech of the Peoples Houses, frankly expressed 
the rationale for establishing the Peoples Houses. For him, the Houses were founded 
to carry out peoples education and training beside regular schooling. This sort of 
education would make the nation a collective mass (kollektif kütle) sharing the same 
ideal. 217 Working as a cultural branch of the RPP the Houses came to be the centers 
of adult education, thought of in terms of halk terbiyesi (the peoples education).218 
The Peoples Houses were designed to replace any pre-existing cultural associations. 
That the Houses even used all the former buildings of Türk Ocaklarõ reveals the 
extent of the replacement.219 In the same vein, in a couple of years nearly all the 
relatively autonomous associations  except the sports clubs  like the Turkish 
Womens Association (Türk Kadõnlar Cemiyeti), Masonic lodges, Teachers 
Association (Muallimler Derneği), Scouts Association (İzciler Derneği) and Porters 
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Association (Hamallar Cemiyeti) were invited to dissolve themselves and join the 
Peoples Houses.220  
 
3.5. Competing Visions And Rival Representations Of Kemalism 
The 1930 incidents not only gave rise to a radical institutional reorganization of 
the Republic, but also to a need to redefine the basic contours of the revolutionary 
ideology. The dissolution of the Free Party marked the beginning of a period of 
reconstruction of the Republic to reshape the nation in a more effective way. The 
major challenge of the Free Party experiment for the newly established regime was 
the awareness that the Atatürk Revolution in its first seven years had penetrated 
only the surface of both the elite and mass of Turkish society.221 Moreover, the 
Turkish revolutionary elite came to the point that the principles and values of the 
Republic could not be disseminated or inculcated to the wider segments of the 
society. Particularly, the Menemen incident gave rise to a strong despair and anger 
among the revolutionary elite from all fractions that something very urgently had to 
be done for the perpetuation of the republican ideals. Even Ahmet Ağaoğlu, former 
deputy of the Free Party and a representative of liberal-conservative faction of 
Kemalism, was quite affected by the Menemen incident:  
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The Republic itself is principally a religion and faith. However, the bible of 
this religion has not yet been written. Its apostles who would consecrate 
their beings to the Republic and its geniuses who will enlighten and educate 
the people by penetrating into the dark segments of the masses have not yet 
appeared! We have left the Republic alone and we have been occupied with 
our own personal matters, occupations and interests. Naturally, this 
[Menemen] is the end result.222     
This quotation shows the increasing radical tone even among the most 
moderate figures of the Republic. The radicalization of politics came to the fore 
during the attempt to meet the needs of this specific conjuncture. For Weiker, the 
Republicans spent most of their energies in the direction of mass political education 
and indoctrination in the 1930s. One of the clearest lessons that the Republican elite 
draw from the Free Party experience was the need to establish far greater contact 
with the society both in depth and volume. For the RPP elite, the society had to be 
shaped in such a way as to be able to adapt to the conditions and norms of the new 
regime. 223  The inclination towards a more non-democratic form of politics was 
strengthened by the trends of the time when liberal democracy was being challenged, 
conceptually and physically, by the totalitarian systems of Communist and Fascist 
persuasion in the 1930s. 
In the wake of the dissolution of the Free Party, the Revolutionary elite, in 
general, began to interrogate the existent principles and conducts of the RPP. Yakup 
Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), for instance, complains about the indifference of the elite, 
considering it as the main reason of this failure. For him, certain questions had to be 
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asked to the Prime Minister (İsmet İnönü) about the very efficiency of the 
Revolutionary means:  
Pasha, His Excellency (Paşa Hazretleri)! After your seven-year rule, we see 
that you have spent almost no energy in establishing the principles of our 
party in the country. You could not put the people even a step forward in 
rescuing them from their ignorance and backwardness they inherited from 
the Ottoman Sultanate era. Considering the issues of revolutionism and 
laiklik, we have encountered a deep fanatic reaction (koyu taassup 
reaksiyonu) that even the army of Caliph could have not dared during the 
years of National Independence. The policies of étatism you have 
imperfectly applied paved the way to an economic and financial crisis 
No, no! Do not lay all your mistakes and irresponsibility on Fethi Bey or the 
Free Party. It is clear that all these maladies and troubles threatening the 
Republican regime did not come into being suddenly.224 
Furthermore, Yakup Kadri argued that no one had asked these kinds of 
questions after the dissolution of the Free Party. For him, Kadro was the first attempt 
that had begun to disseminate new ideas and opinions against conventional wisdom, 
which claimed that the revolutionary order was totally established and that it would 
not be destroyed.    
The sense of discontent and despair about the prospect of the Revolution 
became also prevalent among the ruling cadre. The ruling cadre decided to handle 
the problem of social control in a quite vigorous sense. Their primary objective was 
to introduce and support the ideology of the ruling government that would justify 
their programs and projects around which popular commitment and action was 
organized. Their ambition was to produce new generations of Kemalist and 
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nationalist citizens who were expected to realize that Turkey did not need another 
revolution. Furthermore, the revolutionary elite faced the task of creating awareness 
in each citizen of his/her individual capacity for effectiveness and directing their 
efforts and allegiances in conformity with the national ideology. Determining and 
articulating the national ideology was one of the prominent issues in their mind.  
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that there emerged several competing 
attempts among the ruling as well as intellectual elite aimed at formulating the 
national ideology of the regime. There was a consensus about the overall name of the 
ideology. It was Kemalism. However, there began a struggle over the content of it.   
Intellectuals played a substantial role in the construction of the Revolutionary 
ideology. In other words, there was a division of labor between political authorities 
and intellectuals, and their activities were coterminous in the construction of 
collective identity. Participation in the formation of institutionalized order is the 
basic characteristics of what Eisenstadt called secondary intellectuals. They, 
predominantly, serve as channels of institutionalization, and even as possible 
creators of new types of symbols of cultural orientations, of traditions, and of 
collective and cultural identity.225  Contrary to the common assumption that defines 
the basic character of the intellectual as standing critically against power holders and 
that presumes a certain amount of tension between intellectuals and political 
                                                
225 Their involvement in the revolution of values reflects the transformation of the 
primary intellectuals which is the ideal-typically constructed conception of 
intellectuals dominant in the Western literature into secondary intellectuals. As in 
the case of Turkish revolution, not only the secondary intellectuals did not withdraw 
into private activity of contemplation on ideas, but they also participated in 
 -100- 
authorities, the study of the role of intellectuals in the formation of the Turkish 
Revolutionary ideology shows that they were largely engaged in the 
institutionalization of the political order. The relationship between intellectuals and 
those who hold power is very significant in analyzing Turkish revolutionary politics. 
During the formation of the Turkish Revolutionary ideology, the Turkish 
intellectuals were, generally, subservient to the power holders in establishing a social 
control regime. Furthermore, they helped to strengthen the legitimacy of 
revolutionary cadres rather than taking a critical stance against them. It is important 
to underline that Kemalism became quite successful in convincing intellectuals about 
the very legitimacy of the regime, and about the unavoidability of the chosen 
direction.   
After the dissolution of the Free Party, intellectuals of the Republic began to 
debate the elementary principles and characteristics of the Revolution. What was the 
ideology of the Revolution? What would be its fundamental principles? How is it 
possible to make it an overall worldview for the later generations? In his well-known 
book, Tek Adam, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir argues that they are faced with the reality 
of revolution, but not yet with a theory of it. Therefore, for him, the Turkish 
Revolution had to be defined in terms of explaining its historical specificity and 
characteristics. His main problem was to provide a definite a answer to the question 
what is the ideology of the Revolution?226  
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There were basically three factions among the Revolutionary elite that this 
thesis would like to highlight. These were the Kadrocu Kemalists, Conservative 
Kemalists, and the re-constructivist Kemalists of the Ülkü group. Actually, this 
competition over the definition of the ideology of the revolution had much to do with 
the semiotic struggle over who would represent the will of the people and the 
struggle over who would control the revolutionary language and the political game. 
Even if we choose to believe that this power struggle is more a semiotic struggle or a 
political game than an ideological debate, it is worth noting that the widely accepted 
way to exercise power in this political game is through ideological debate. In this 
sense, it is important to understand the main underpinnings of this debate. 
3.5.1.  Conservative Kemalism  
Within the Kemalist power structure, there were certain intellectuals that 
attempted to articulate particular norms and values to the mainstream agenda of the 
Republic, which were based on relatively traditional and conservative arguments. 
The unifying factor in their ideas was that they commonly offered a mid-way 
between religious reactionism and modernist radicalism.227 They were, in general, 
part of the new Republican cultural elites and were known for their self-defined 
conservative stand on cultural matters and modernism in politics while being 
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ardent supporters of the formal principles of the Kemalist Republic. 228   The 
prominent figures of the conservative Kemalists were İsmail Hakkõ Baltacõoğlu, 
Peyami Safa, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Mustafa Şekip Tunç. 229  
Having been mainly inspired by the philosophy of Henri Bergson, these 
intellectuals attempted to articulate a new philosophical-political vocabulary in 
which genuine Kemalism was interpreted as a conservative force rather than as a 
rationalist dogma.230 For them, the radical revolutionaries, or in other words, the 
Unionist positivism had fallen short of responding to the nationalist claims of a 
moral order on the new principles of national creation. They maintained that 
positivism and religious scholasticism was represented negative poles. In order to 
foster the creative evolution of the nation, these poles should be abandoned and a 
new conception of Kemalism based essentially on a conservative force in action 
should be appropriated. This would symbolize the Turkish search for a unique 
national tradition. 231  In essence, however, conservative Kemalists shared the 
political considerations of the radical revolutionaries although they seemed to favor 
the cultural priorities of the Islamists. Their commonalities with Islamists and radical 
revolutionaries gave them the opportunity to undertake the reconciliation between 
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two extreme views of modernization by means of facilitating modernization without 
sacrificing cultural peculiarities. 
In their attempt at consolidating a modern secular moral order, conservative 
Kemalists predominantly detached themselves from similar attempts led by the 
radical revolutionaries, specifically Ülkü. In their philosophical vocabulary, religion, 
custom, tradition and language occupied a relatively higher place in the formation of 
secular moral order. 232  True, they aimed at replacing the traditional religious-
universalistic mores with secular-nationalist ones paralleling the goals of the 
Kemalist radicals. However, it was dubious whether the radical republican 
revolutionaries considered national values as the natural outcome of past experience. 
On the other hand, conservative Kemalists were generally opposed to questioning 
cultural values under the light of modernist assumptions, as culture was a matter of 
historical continuity and a cumulative outcome of the experiences that a society 
internalized in its unique history.233 Thus, contrary to the assumptions of the radical 
revolutionaries that assumed culture as the synonym for political re-education, or 
re-construction in the Jacobin sense, for the conservative revolutionaries culture 
was a sphere to be kept against alien inflences as much as possible. The conservative 
Kemalists also held that in order to maintain the legitimacy of culture, it should not 
be suffocated for the sake of progress. For them, the erosion of the cultural 
peculiarities also meant the weakening of the state legitimacy. In this sense, reforms 
could not take roots unless they were being supported by traditions.  
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The nation should be defined by its unique history and traditions, which 
exclusively included religious elements while the radical revolutionaries preferred to 
emphasize the collective will and to describe the nation in an abstract way that 
ignored the priorities of traditional society and to redefine it in the direction of their 
own considerations. Conservative Kemalists stipulated the celebration of customs as 
a different domain outside the politics but as a factor which reinforced the modern 
Turkish state. The state could not dispense with customs and traditions nor change 
them.    
The conservative revolutionaries, Baltacõoğlu, and Ağaoğlu for instance, 
rejected the accusation that their conservative ideas constitute a threat to the 
secularist paradigm of the regime. While they shared the political ideals of Kemalists, 
they were not eager to disregard the living traditions of society in the cultural 
sphere.234 Conservatives demanded to celebrate morality, customs and other cultural 
peculiarities besides Western civilization in the new Republican regime.  
In spite of the remarkable differences in their treatment of the role and 
importance of culture/tradition, radical and conservative Kemalists shared the 
assumption that Western civilization was a model to adopt to eliminate the corrupt 
state-religion relations. They both advocated that religion should be excluded from 
political affairs. Both shared the belief that as long as religion operated as an actor 
within the political arena, its spiritual power and its moral charm would be 
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diminished. Then what should be the boundary between religion and politics, 
tradition and ideals? Conservatives perceived religion as an inherently national and 
inalienable component of the historical national character. Religion could not be 
disregarded at all since religion and nationality bolstered each other. On the other 
hand, radical revolutionaries were suspicious about the meaning of religious bonds. 
Radical Kemalists conceived religious and traditional loyalties as hampering the 
cultivation of purely nationalist feeling. It is worthwhile to stress that conservative 
Kemalists, however, did not value religion for its own sake, but considered its 
instrumental potency in entrenching social harmony. They also tried to benefit from 
the power of religion in deepening individuals sense of collective identity.  
The conservatives assessed religion as one of the irreplaceable instrumens of 
the social harmony while radical revolutionaries tried to replace the religious 
components with secular/ political ideals. As David Apter puts, revolutionary ideals 
may be called a kind of political religion.  The projects of the new nation states, 
whose primary concerns focused on to create and integrate new roles for the 
individuals and redefine the customs in the direction of political ideals, could not be 
restrained within the political framework as they aimed not only to invigorate the 
state apparatuses but also to be the sole source of the meaning and purpose of the 
individual ideals.235 Radical revolutionaries were not contented only to dominate the 
milieu of politics. They irresistibly urged to intervene and reshape the cultural sphere 
in order to make reforms durable. Conservatives on the contrary agreed on the 
inevitability of Kemalist reforms on condition that it should not undermine its 
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genuine cultural identity. Reforms should not erase the essential nature of the culture 
rather it should facilitate the rehabilitation and invigoration of the political 
institutions. 
The conservative option had several disadvantages within the relatively radical 
atmosphere of the 1930. Their views had already been tested during the Free Party 
period, and due to the exclusionary efforts of the radical revolutionaries, they could 
hardly gain ground in the center. Their comparatively moderate (constructivist) ideas 
about the state-society relations and on the essential principles of the revolution 
made them irrelevant to state power in that intricate time of radicalism. However, the 
intellectual efforts of conservative modernists were able to add a new color within 
the broad spectrum of Kemalism.236        
3.5.2. Kadrocu Kemalism 
In the wake of the dissolution of the Free Party, the Revolutionary elite, in 
general, began to question the existing principles and practices of the RPP. Şevket 
Süreyya argues that until 1930, there was not a clear-cut, sophisticated formula of the 
revolutionary principles. For him, it was very difficult to talk about an ideology of 
the Revolution: There was only the study of Afet İnan, her famous Medeni Bilgiler. 
Six arrows had not yet been concluded. The formulas in Medeni Bilgiler were not 
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clear enough to draw certain concrete ideas.237 The Free Party experiment and its 
aftermath prompted the revolutionary elite in general to search for alternative 
formulas. Yakup Kadri, for instance, complained about the indifference of the elite 
considering the main reasons of this failure.238    
Several leading intellectuals of the time, namely Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, 
Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge and İsmail Hüsrev 
Tökin decided to publish a journal that would formulate and develop the ideology of 
the Revolution. Though Yakup Kadri came from a considerably different ideological 
background than that of the revolutionary Marxist backgrounds of the other members, 
he had a central position for the movement in terms of establishing the link between 
Kadro and Çankaya. At the onset, Yakup Kadri asked Atatürk to permit them to 
initiate a project of journal that would attempt to form and disseminate the ideology 
of the Turkish Revolution. Atatürk did not hesitate to give them the permission to 
publish a journal for the revolutionary purposes. On January 1932, they introduced 
the journal Kadro to the Turkish public. From that time onward, the authors of Kadro 
began to be identified as Kadrocus especially by their adversaries.  
It can be argued that the Kadrocu group was, undoubtedly, one of the 
outstanding elite groups who attempted to provide an ideological as well as 
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theoretical basis to Kemalism 239 . They were also the most organized and 
theoretically coherent group dedicated to the task of constructing an ideology that 
could respond to the ideological despair of the Republic suffering from a relative 
crisis by the upshots of both internal and external turmoil.  The social background of 
the members of the Kadro had been the major difficulty for the aims of the 
movement in persuading the RPP elite of its sincerity. That is, the communist 
reputation of Kadrocus had always been a question mark in administrative circles 
that attempted to hinder the Kadrocu efforts.   
Kadro authors, in general, held that Turkey was experiencing an ongoing 
revolution, yet its intellectual elements had not yet been organized to create a 
coherent ideology for the revolution. Additionally, the authors of Kadro argued that 
since the Turkish Revolution was the first successful national liberation movement in 
the world, it had a unique place and could be a guide for all the nations on the road to 
freedom. In its first issue, the journal justifies its raison d'être in the following 
statements:  
Turkey is in a state of revolution. This revolution has not yet ended The 
revolution is not an impartial order. Those who live in it, whether they 
support it or not, must participate and conform to it. Revolution means 
unconditional attachment of wills of the adversaries to the wills of those 
who support it. The will and interest of the revolution is represented by the 
wills of a conscious vanguard Kadro (cadre) who are a few but forefront 
that attend to the revolution and that marches it Turkey is in a state of 
revolution Nevertheless, it is not in a system of idea (fikriyat) that would 
constitute an IDEOLOGY for the Revolution240 
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They proposed a Kemalist strategy based on nationalist étatism. Accordingly, 
the state did not belong to any particular class, nor acted on behalf of any particular 
class. Rather, the state was composed of a conscious cadre who would act on behalf 
of the nation, and in the best interest of the whole nation. The authors of Kadro 
justified this seemingly authoritarian and re-constructivist formulation of 
apprehending the state-society relations as the natural outcome of the current 
conditions:  
No to multi-party regime! Yes to the single party Furthermore, we prefer 
national guidance to national sovereignty, that is, the dominance of Kadro, 
the dominance of a leader and an enlightened minority. Under the existent 
conditions of the time, it was not an exaggeration and surprising that Kadro 
adopted such ideas. That is what Atatürk also preferred. It is to say that for 
Atatürk single will, single chief, single party and authoritarian government 
was also essential. If you assemble those elements, then Kadro would arise. 
In fact, it was the natural outcome of the current conditions.241  
Moreover, the authors of Kadro explicitly denied classical democracy and 
democratic form of government, which they call oligarchic democracy.242 They 
advocated a new form of democracy based on more disciplined order. For instance, 
Yakup Kadri maintained that if a democratic election were held in the first National 
Assembly, Atatürk would not have won the elections, as the majority of the first 
Assembly consisted of Unionist members. So, in certain conditions, classical 
democracy would be an obstacle.    
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The authors of the Kadro claimed that they would formulate the ideology of 
Kemalism and fill a void. Yakup Kadri, initially, went to the office of Recep Peker, 
general secretary of the Republican Peoples Party, and said, I want to publish a 
journal propagating the principles of the RPP to the people and the deputies as 
well.243 When Peker asked what they were going to do with that journal, Yakup 
Kadri responded that That is, Kadro means an ideological cadre of a party, a 
vanguard cadre, to which Peker said, This duty is ours, I cant give it to you.244 
As it is clear, Peker became quite discontented about the Kadro movement and tried 
to prevent the project. He thought that there was no need to formulate the ideology of 
the Revolution outside the party. If there was a need, only the party could accomplish 
this task. Peker later showed his discontent about the articles in Kadro. He accused 
Kadrocus of being influenced by dangerous foreign ideologies, notably by 
Communism. Moreover, Peker made a complaint of Kadro to Atatürk. For Peker, the 
articles published in Kadro were not only endangering the economic developments of 
the country, but also unsettling the very basis of the regime.245 He requested Atatürk 
to stop the publication of the journal. It is important to note that Atatürk did not take 
sides in this competition and was very successful in reducing the tension between the 
elites.  Then, Recep Peker and his supporters could do nothing but publish their own 
journal, Ülkü, to shape the ideology of the regime.  
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Althogh it was publicly declared to be the official publication of the Peoples 
Houses, the idea to publish a journal entitled Ülkü was in fact a reaction against the 
so-called Kadrocu group, Ülkü began to be published in February 1933 as the official 
journal of the Peoples Houses. Although Kadro was closed in January 1935, the 
publication of Ülkü continued till 1950. Historians have explained the closure of 
Kadro by various reasons. According to the most credible account, it was closed due 
to the increasing pressures of the rival elite groups that pushed Atatürk to intervene 
to stop the activities of the Kadro. 246  For these rival elite groups, Kadro was 
propagating dangerous foreign ideologies that would harm the unity and harmony of 
the nation. Vedat Nedim Tör, the editor of Kadro, explains the reason of the closure 
as follows:  Unfortunately, we could not be successful in convincing the 
ideological administrators of RPP, namely Recep Peker and Necip Ali, that we were 
sincere in this new ideology.247 Necip Ali, the first editor of Ülkü and the general 
head of the Peoples Houses, explicitly blamed the authors of Kadro for distorting 
the very principles of Kemalism by misrepresenting it. He argued that Kadros 
definition of etatism places the state above the national will. This was the idea of 
German school. However, for Necip Ali, Kemalist understanding of etatism 
considers state as the outcome of the national will.248 That is, there is equivalence 
between national will and the state. The critiques of Recep Peker and Necip Ali 
                                                
246  For this account see Temuçin Faik Ertan, Kadrocular ve Kadro Hareketi, 
(Ankara: Kültür Bakanlõğõ Yay., 1994), pp. 65-73, Doğan Avcõoğlu, Türkiyenin 
Düzeni, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayõnlarõ, 1968), Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İnkõlap ve Kadro, 
(Ankara: Bilgi Yayõnlarõ, 1968)  
247 Vedat Nedim Tör, Yõllar Böyle Geçti, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayõnlarõ, 1976), p. 130 
248 Necip Ali, Başvekilin Dersi, Varlõk, No. 19, 15 April 1934, p. 289  
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together with the liberal conservative intellectuals like Ahmet Ağaoğlu249, became 
influential over the attitudes of Mustafa Kemal towards Kadro.  
It should be noted that beside the critiques and rumors of the elites mentioned, 
the reactions of the newly forming entrepreneurial group were also very influential 
over Atatürk in the closure of the journal. For the representatives of this so-called İş 
Bankasõ group, the etatist views of Kadro were in conformity with collectivism and 
even communism250. They saw the Kadrocu arguments challenging their positions. 
Celal Bayar, who had served as Director General of İş Bankasõ from the time of its 
foundation until 1932 when he became Minister of Economy (1932 and 1937) and 
Prime Minister (1937-38), disliked the etatist propaganda of Kadro as he considered 
it harmful to private entrepreneurship.251 Celal Bayar emphasized that the aim of 
etatism was to encourage, rather than to replace, indigenous capitalist development: 
... Our principle... is to guarantee ourselves, to encourage and support private 
enterprise. We wholeheartedly desire the development of private initiative in the 
industrial sphere, and we are continually investigating the best ways of achieving 
it.252 
                                                
249 For the critiques of Ahmet Ağaoğlu see especially his Devlet ve Fert (İstanbul, 
1933) 
250 It is important to note that almost all the authors of Kadro were engaged in 
communist activities in their previous life episodes. Because of that they were 
assessed with suspicion from the beginning of their journal life. In fact, they could 
not persuade the elites that they had no connection with communism and 
communistic activities anymore. 
251 Temuçin Faik Ertan, Kadrocular ve Kadro Hareketi, p. 67 
252 Cited in William Hale, Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-
1945, pp. 106-107 
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The technical views that Bayar maintained received intellectual elaboration and 
extension from Ahmed Ağaoğlu. In his Devlet ve Fert, Ağaoğlu mainly argued that 
the etatist and interventionist economic policies of the RPP stem from the current 
requirements of the country aiming at elimination of the contradictions among 
society. However, the problem is to set the limits to this intervention. Ağaoğlu went 
on saying that the involvement of the state in economic affairs is a form of 
suppression of the individual. Furthermore, he emphasized that desirable economic 
development could be achieved only in an environment where individual enterprises 
were allowed to use their free initiative. According to him, in Eastern countries in 
general, and particularly in Turkey, the state has an absolute and commanding power 
over individuals and society. This, he argued, repressed individual initiative, and 
frustrated the development of private entrepreneurship. In his view, European 
economic progress was directly linked to European institutions and in order to 
achieve the desired economic development in Turkey, internal restructuring was 
necessary. By internal restructuring, he meant parliamentary democracy and the 
freedom of individual initiative. 253  He argued that parliamentary democracy in 
Europe had been damaged by the emergence of Hitler and Mussolini, but he believed 
that it would sooner or later restore itself, because it was the only workable method 
which governments in European countries could follow. Contrary to the Kadrocu 
thesis about the vulnerability of parliamentary democracy, Ağaoğlu suggested that 
parliamentary democracy and individual freedom were, and should be, the major 
                                                
253 Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert, (İstanbul, 1933), pp. 64-67 
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goals for Turkey, at least in the long run.254 For Ağaoğlu, the primary goal of the 
Kemalist regime was to save the individual from destructive agencies. In order to 
discredit the Kadrocu assumptions of étatism in the eyes of the ruling elite he argued, 
I am of the opinion that the RPPs version of étatism is closer to my own ideas 
than the Kadro (groups) planned étatism, which hands capital over the state.255 
Ağaoğlu accepted that Kadro was not an advocate of socialism or fascism, but he 
condemned Kadro for advocating totalitarian and authoritarian notions similar to 
those of socialism in Soviet Russia, Pilsudskis regime in Poland, Nazism in 
Germany and fascism in Italy.256  
It is clear that there were divergent, competing and even conflicting attempts to 
form the content of Kemalist ideology. Every attempt aimed at placing itself at the 
center to get a legitimate ground. The specific conjuncture of the 1930s prepared a 
fertile ground for these efforts to define the principles of Kemalism. Undoubtedly, 
except Mustafa Kemal, no one had the competence to authorize the validity or 
legitimacy of these attempts. Even İsmet İnönü as the Prime Minister and as the 
second man had a relatively limited impact. He may also be considered as one of the 
competing figures endeavoring to transform the mainstream ideology of the regime 
in accordance with his image of perfection. For instance, İnönü published an article 
                                                
254 Ibid., pp. 73-76 
255 Cited in William Hale, Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-
1945, Bulletin (British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 7, Is. 2 (1980), 100-
117, p. 107 
256  Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert, pp. 52-55. Despite his allegation about the 
congruity between his ideas and the RPPs vision of étatism, Ağaoğlus arguments 
had never gain ground in the mainstream of RPP thinking in the 1930s. 
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entitled Fõrkamõzõn Devletçilik Vasfõ (The Etatist Character of Our Party)257 in 
Kadro where he articulated his interpretation of étatism. In this article, as pointed by 
Korkut Boratav, İnönü spelt out his interpretation of étatism as if he was the leader of 
an opposition party rather than the Prime Minister.258 Sometimes, his ideas as well as 
his post was utilized and even exploited by the competing elite groups in order to 
legitimize their projects. After İnönü published his article in Kadro, there began a 
fierce controversy between the Kadrocus and the other elite groups, including the 
Ülkü group. The authors of Kadro considered the article as the defense of Kadrocu 
arguments. For them, this article was signifying an approval of their ideas at the top 
of the government. If İsmet İnönü did not agree with Kadro, he would not have 
written an article for the journal. However, in his article Başvekilin Dersi, (The 
Lesson of the Prime Minister) Necip Ali, the first general director of Ülkü and the 
general head of the Peoples Houses, regarded İnönüs article as an explicit denial 
and critique of the ideas proclaimed by Kadro. For him, the authors of Kadro should 
draw certain lessons from that article. Necip Ali explicitly blamed the authors of 
Kadro of distorting the very principles of Kemalism.259 Actually, Necip Ali was 
relatively right in saying that there was an incongruity between Kadro and İnönü. 
They both rejected the assumption that the private sector does better than the state 
sector, and argued that the state should take up a leading role in the industrialization 
of Turkey. However, while İnönüs reason for giving priority to state investment in 
industry was the inability of the private sector to take up a leading role in Turkeys 
                                                
257 İsmet İnönü, Fõrkamõzõn Devletçilik Vasfõ, Kadro, (October, 1933), pp. 1-3 
258 Korkut Boratav, Türkiyede Devletçilik, (Ankara, 1982), p. 108 
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industrialization, Kadros reasoning was that one way or another, the private sector 
put its interests before the interests of the state, and could not be trusted in economic 
development. 
Eventually, all these reactions led Mustafa Kemal to appoint Yakup Kadri as 
ambassador to Albania: 
At the end, even Atatürk himself could not stand the critiques and rumors 
about Kadro. What was he able to do as the chief of the state? His party and 
government did not tolerate us. Because, they did not understand what we 
advocated. RPP thought that only it could do this task. For instance, Recep 
Peker gave seminars260 on the Revolution in order to silence our voice.261  
Actually the appointment of Yakup Kadri as an ambassador to Albania was the 
sign that Atatürk wanted the authors of Kadro to stop the activities of the journal. 
Vedat Nedim explains this situation as the result of the deliberate attempts of the 
competing elites:  
When those who felt themselves uncomfortable about the development of 
the Kadro Movement within the Kemalist ideological system, and those who 
assumed it as a source of danger to their private self-interests saw that their 
various rumors were not effective, they tried to cut our connection with 
Çankaya by making our director Yakup Kadri be appointed to Albania as an 
ambassador262  
                                                                                                                                     
259 Necip Ali, Başvekilin Dersi, in Varlõk, No. 19, 15 April 1934, p. 289  
260 Yakup Kadri meant the İnkõlap Dersleri of Recep Peker. 
261  Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, in Atatürkçülüğün Ekonomik ve Sosyal Yönü 
Semineri, p. 83 
262 Vedat Nedim Tör, op. cit., p. 136 
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Niyazi Berkes describes the competition between Kadro and Ülkü cliques 
among the members of the RPP as between that of Fascists and Marxists.263 In fact, 
once a member of the Ülkü group Necib Ali (Küçüka) asked young Niyazi Berkes to 
inspect the articles of Kadro whether they included certain Communist arguments or 
not by comparing the writings of Şevket Süreyya and Marxs Capital.264 This study 
will not categorize Recep Peker and his friends, namely the Ülkü group, under the 
banner of Fascism. Albeit sharing Fascist assumptions to some extent, the Ülkü 
group explicitly rejected Fascist arguments in general. In fact, some of the arguments 
of the Kadrocu group were closer to Fascist ideas than the Ülkü group. In fact, the 
Fascist International led by Italy officially invited the Kadro members to their 
organization, though Kadro rejected this invitation.265         
What were the main arguments that the authors of Kadro developed as 
ideological components of Kemalism? Furthermore, what was their potential 
challenge that disturbed the rival elites so much, although they advocated parallel 
ideas? The techniques of power they employed in Foucaultian sense in terms of 
having connections with Çankaya together with the ideas they advocated, were the 
crucial factors that determined their position vis a vis the rival groups. In this sense, 
the complaint of Vedat Nedim about the appointment of Yakup Kadri to Albania is 
meaningful. Çankaya benefited from all these competitions too. Those who 
developed better representations of Kemalism in line with the changing context and 
                                                
263  Niyazi Berkes, Unutulan Yõllar, (The Forgotten Years), ed., Ruşen Sezer, 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayõnlarõ, 1997), p. 74. 
264 Ibid., pp. 80-85.   
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time would gain the approval of Mustafa Kemal. Actually, this explains the strength 
and resilience of Kemalist ideology. Consequently, Kemalisms pretension to be a 
unitary and common ideology gets its power from all these competitions and 
conflicts within its legitimate boundary.  
3.5.3. Ülkü version of Kemalism    
Having been favored by Atatürk over the others (the Conservative and 
Kadrocu Kemalists) and driven by a feeling of being at the center, Recep Peker266 
and Necip Ali267 began to develop a new journal project that would help define the 
fundamental premises of the revolutionary ideology from within, or from the party 
                                                                                                                                     
265 See Vedat Nedim Tör, Yõllar Böyle Geçti, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayõnlarõ, 1976) 
266 The Deputy of Kütahya, Recep Peker had been appointed to the RPPs Secretary-
General post as part of the 1931 reorganization of the party. His organizational skills 
and dynamic personality qualities made him favorable in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal. 
As Weiker puts it, since assuming his post he had indeed been a leader in 
developing and interpreting Kemalist ideology, especially the doctrines of étatism 
and revolutionism, and had acquired a reputation as efficient, energetic, and an 
uncompromising demander of rapid results in all fields of development. It is likely 
that many of the political education and indoctrination measures were originated by 
Peker. Weiker, op. cit., 212.  
267 Deputy of Denizli between 1923-1938. He was also the General Director of the 
Peoples Houses.  Necip Ali was the famous Public Prosecutor (müddeiumumi) of the 
Independence Courts (İstiklal Mahkemeleri). He was known for his stern and radical 
attitudes towards opposition. He, at the same time, prepared the formal charges 
against the leaders of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet 
Fõrkasõ) on the accusation that they instigated the sequence to the events that finally 
culminated in the famous Izmir assassination attempt (İzmir Suikastõ). See Türk 
Parlamento Tarihi, TBMM-II. Dönem 1923-1927, Vol. II (Ankara: TBMM Vakfõ 
Yayõnlarõ, 1996), p.585.    
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organization itself. In February 1933, the journal Ülkü came to life.268 Ülkü was 
published from 1933 to 1950. However, this study will analyze the journal from 
February 1933 to August 1936. This period was selected due to the fact that the 
specific elite group, which I call the Ülkü elite, was politically dominant during this 
particular period.  From August 1936, the weight of the Ülkü elite in the journal 
gradually decreased.  This is mainly because of the dismissal of Recep Peker from 
his General Secretary post in June 1936. The increasing power of Peker in the party 
as a third figure apart from Atatürk and Inönü began to be felt as a threat especially 
by Atatürk.269  On June 1936, state control was further strengthened by the removal 
of the secretary general and the provincial party secretaries and the transference of 
their functions to the minister of the interior and the provincial governors 
respectively. Thus, the merger between state and party was established to eliminate 
the potential autonomy of party organizations that would challenge the very authority 
of state power.270 Recep Peker, who had to retire from his post, was the chief victim 
of this decision. This decision was also signifying the end of the Ülkü movement. 
From that time on, Fuat Köprülü became the general director of the Ülkü journal. 
Both the author cadre and the content of articles changed noticeably.  
                                                
268 The literal and figurative meaning of the word Ülkü is ideal in English. Atatürk 
named the journal Ülkü. In the first issue of the journal, Atatürk sent his 
congratulations stating, I am expecting from Ülkü auspicious products in 
disseminating our genuine ideal (öz ülkümüzü). It should be noted that one of 
Atatürks adopted daughters name was also Ülkü. 
269  Hasan Rõza Soyak, Atatürkten Hatõralar (İstanbul: Yapõ ve Kredi Bankasõ 
Yayõnlarõ, 1973), pp.487-492  
270  For details of this merger see especially Hilmi Uran, Hatõralarõm (Ankara: 
Ayyõldõz Matbaasõ, 1959), pp.295-296. 
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Although Ülkü introduced itself to reflect the official state view and declared 
that it would be the official journal of the Peoples Houses, it revealed the 
perspectives of a particular elite group within the RPP. When the author cadre is 
examined, it is most noteworthy that it comprised of those specific names that were 
within the close circle of Recep Peker. The general director of the journal was Necip 
Ali (Küçüka), while the owner was Nusret Kemal (Köymen), a young intellectual 
who had graduated from Columbia University in the United States. Recep Peker was 
the chief representative of the journal in the RPP. Together with the articles written 
by Recep Peker, Necip Ali and Nusret Kemal, the recurrent names were Mehmet 
Saffet (Engin), Behçet Kemal (Çağlar), Kazõm Nami (Duru), Ahmed Nesimi, Ferid 
Celal (Güven) and Aydoslu Sait.  
The articles of Ülkü were classified into fifteen sections as Literature and 
Language, Fine Arts, History, Sociology and Philosophy, Economy and Agriculture, 
People Education (Halk Terbiyesi), State Defense (Yurt Koruma), Woman (Kadõnlõk), 
Science, Peoples Health and Population, Sport and Recreation, Peasantism, 
Bibliography, News from the Peoples Houses, and News and Suggestions. 271 
Despite these different sections aiming to collect writings on specialized subjects, 
Ülkü was explicitly designed to create an ideology of the revolution, and to further 
the institutionalization of this ideology by and within the Peoples Houses. In the 
first article of the journal, Recep Peker describes the characteristics of the Ülkü 
authors as follows: In Ülkü, the articles of those people will be published, who 
believe the great cause (büyük dava), and make the Turkish society believe this, and 
                                                
271 Ülkünün Yazõ Bölümleri, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 1934): pp. 76-79 
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who want to take part and duty in the way of the service that expects the creation of a 
collective and excited national totality. 272  Furthermore, he stated that those 
intellectuals are welcomed who would enlighten, advance, enforce, and amalgamate 
(kütleleştirmek) people by rescuing them from individual life.273 Thus, this study will 
focus the articles highlighting the formation of the revolutionary ideology and 
reflecting the peculiar efforts of the Ülkü group to reveal their ideological viewpoint. 
At this juncture, it is instructive to look at the mission of the journal in its own 
words:  
Ülkü has assumed the task of gathering people for the ideological and moral 
institutionalization of the revolution. Accordingly, the primary role of the 
man of idea and art is to make the national and collective endeavor (maşeri 
ceht) understood, and direct it to the current and future requirements. 
Furthermore, Ülkü aims at creating a national revolutionary culture from 
this collective endeavor and at inculcating a collective solidarity (maşeri 
tesanüt) on the basis of this culture. In this sacred and hard task, Ülkü will 
be a moderator. 274  
The Ülkü elite preponderantly aimed at a cultural regeneration of the Turkish 
nation through the secular quest for new, revolutionary values by way of using the 
axial notion of solidarism. In this sense, by Ülkü group, I refer to an organized group 
of both state and intellectual elite that sought to advance this project of cultural 
regeneration of the society by way of employing solidarist assumptions, which take 
                                                
272 Recep (Peker), Ülkü Niçin Çõkõyor, Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 1 (February, 1933), p. 1 
273 Ibid., p. 2 
274 Ülkü İki Yaşõna Girerken Okuyanlar ve Yazanlarla Konuşma, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 
13, (March, 1934): pp. 74-75. 
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secular morality as sine qua non of a safe ambiance for democracy. This group 
represented the more anti-liberal and anti-clerical side of Kemalism.  
The relative failure of this group in gaining intellectual legitimacy was their 
inability to recruit a prominent intellectual figure. 275  In other words, the Ülkü 
movement could not recruit a respectable ideologue that would elaborate the vision 
of the group in a sophisticated formulation. However, though not sophisticated, their 
ideas were able to gain ground especially among the state elite. Furthermore, the 
absence of overwhelming ideological attachment to a single idea among the leaders 
made them prone to search for instrumental and pragmatic ideas.  
Actually, the Kemalist ideology alone represented a considerable variety of 
political viewpoints ranging from relatively liberal to the more authoritarian stance. 
It might be argued that Kemalism was generally fissured along several axes 
representing diverse interpretations and representations that aimed to fill its content. 
At this juncture, it can be argued that Kemal Atatürk was essential as the harmonizer 
of all conflicting impulses. The greatest success of Kemalism in gaining intellectual 
legitimacy was its allocation of ideational varieties around one key ingredient i.e. 
submitting to the absolute authority and charisma of Atatürk. Actually, the Kemalist 
idea of making a revolution and a new political culture for Turkey would have been 
much less convincing without the charisma of Mustafa Kemal.  
                                                
275 Niyazi Berkes narrates this issue in his diary. In his talks with Necip Ali, Necip 
Ali plainly stated that the main problem was the absence of a prominent ideologue. 
Then, he offers Berkes to be the ideologue of the group. However, Berkes kindly 
rejected this offer. See, Niyazi Berkes, Unutulan Yõllar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While Atatürk himself appropriated those various intellectuals understanding 
of the world, and even as he used some of them to legitimate his politics, he, at the 
same time, discredited many of them. Even more important than those differing 
intellectuals assistance in legitimating Kemalism was their role in providing 
Kemalism a cultural-practical orientation. It may be that Mustafa Kemal was, above 
all, a masterful political pragmatist and that Kemalism was essentially a pragmatic 
response to the inter-war period crisis of the world rather than a movement deeply 
rooted in an ideological tradition. Atatürk needed ideas, and, since he had few 
original ones himself, he attempted to utilize and assimilate nearly every philosophy 
to which he was exposed in line with the specific historical conjunctures: 
Nationalism, étatism, solidarism, liberalism and even conservatism. However, the 
poverty of speculative and philosophical ideas among Turkish intellectuals 276 
prevented Atatürk from appropriating a sophisticated ideology of state and society, 
which might have provided his regime a secure justification. He, usually, opted for 
pragmatic and eclectic proposals that would encompass a range of ideational 
components. After the Free Party experience, solidarist arguments the authors of 
Ülkü held corresponded to the general strategy of Atatürk. Furthermore, by 
solidarism, both Atatürk and the Ülkü authors were able to find a crucial source for a 
cultural regeneration that would transcend the relative supremacy of traditional and 
religious culture by infusing secular symbols, language, and myths into the society 
through educational institutions to democratize and civilize the country.  
                                                
276 Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayõnlarõ, 1992), 
p. 10 
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The outstanding tenets appeared in the writings of Ülkü can be outlined as 
such: (1) solidarism and populism, (2) secularism, anti-clericalism, and 
secular/revolutionary morality, (3) education (or inculcation- terbiye) and 
enlightenment of people and a peculiar conception of democracy. The following 
chapters will examine these tenets respectively. The next chapter will scrutinize 
solidarist and populist ideas of the Ülkü group in terms of analyzing the intellectual 
origins of solidarism both in France and Turkey and their reflections in the Ülkü 
journal.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SOLIDARISM AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR ÜLKÜ GROUP  
The Ülkü journal promoted solidarism or its Turkish version populism 
(halkçõlõk )277 as a form of eclectic ideology which included Turkish nationalism, 
the idea of a classless, homogenous and amalgamated (kütleleşmiş) mass, the cultural 
regeneration of society, and a politics of secular morality. Solidarity (tesanüt), social 
solidarity (içtimai tesanüt) and populism (halkçõlõk) were constantly reiterated ideals 
which the authors of Ülkü used as founding blocks of the ideology of the Turkish 
Revolution. These terms implied a social and cultural regeneration project by way of 
mass education which was based on a new morality, described by the corresponding 
concepts of secular morality (laik ahlak)278, scientific morality, (ilmi ahlak) 279 
and revolutionary ethics (inkõlap ahlakiyatõ) 280. In this sense, the Ülkü group saw 
the inculcation of secular morality to the people as a basic precondition for 
democracy. Hence, the Ülkü elite preponderantly aimed at a cultural regeneration of 
                                                
277 For Paul Dumont, populism was a Turkish version of the solidarist ideas outlined 
by the French radical politician Léon Bourgeois and the sociologist Emile 
Durkheim. The origins of Kemalist Ideology, in Ataturk and the Modernization of 
Turkey, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984),  31.  
278  Nusret Kemal, Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi, (A Peasantism Project 
Experience), Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 8, (September 1933), 118-125, 119. 
279 Ahmet Nesimi, İnanç ve Us, Ülkü, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935), 403-407, 405. 
280 Ali Sami, Güzel Sanatlarõ İnkõlaba Nasõl Maledebiliriz, (How Can We Ascribe 
Arts to the Service of Revolution), Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July 1934), 361. 
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the Turkish nation through the secular quest for new and revolutionary values by way 
of using the central notion of solidarism.  
The assertion above is supported by my findings that the term solidarity 
(tesanüt) or social solidarity (içtimai tesanüt) is one of the most reiterated terms in 
the journal texts, that the term solidarity is coined in the Turkish context as populism 
(halkçõlõk), which is also made frequent use of throughout articles as the underlying 
basis of the Turkish revolutionary ideology, and that solidarity and populism appear 
as pivotal concepts around which other facets of the Turkish Revolution are 
interwoven. Thus, the analysis of the terms solidarity and populism in Ülkü deserve 
considerable attention to understand the Ülkü version of Kemalism. 
The problematic on solidarism intersects with the main theoretical debates on 
Turkish Revolution, such as analyzing the phenomenon through nationalism, 
populism, positivism etc. However, none of these ideologies alone has been adequate 
to explain the overall nature of the Turkish Revolution. In this sense, this study will 
attempt to show that solidarism, as an eclectic ideology comprising various 
components of several ideologies, would be a better tool in conceptualizing the basic 
political ideas of the Turkish radical revolutionary elite in the 1930s. Solidarism was 
generally underemphasized in the literature of Turkish politics while evaluating the 
basic tenets of the Revolution. It is true, however, that there have been only a limited 
number of studies on solidarism in Turkey. While the works of Zafer Toprak 
widened the scope of Turkish version of solidarism, he nevertheless mainly 
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emphasized the economic side of it.281 Taha Parlas study on the corporatist and 
solidarist ideas of Ziya Gökalp provided a better outlook, which filled an important 
void. 282  Though mainly highlighting the economic interest groups sphere, 
Bianchis study of Gökalp and Atatürk in his book in terms of analyzing Turkish 
corporatism has also contributed to the existing body of knowledge on the 
characteristics of the Turkish corporatism and solidarism.283 Finally, Mardin has 
underlined several times the role of solidarism in shaping the main features of the 
Turkish Revolution. In my view, all of these studies, though providing an important 
body of knowledge on Turkish solidarism, commonly lack the overall theoretical 
agenda of solidarism in general. Moreover, the ideas of these writers on the Turkish 
version of solidarism are either non-systematic or one sided. In order to overcome 
the problem of defining the underlying political philosophy of the Turkish 
Revolution, this study will attempt to provide a systematic outlook for the intellectual 
history of the early Republic. Studying the Turkish version of solidarism will also 
contribute to the general theoretical structure of solidarism.  
The main objective of this chapter is to analyze and document the solidarist 
ideas of the Ülkü group and, in doing so, to show how solidarism became the 
prominent ideological basis of this strand of Kemalism. In order to analyze the 
                                                
281 See his  Aydõn, Ulus-Devlet ve Populizm, in Türk Aydõnõ ve Kimlik Sorunu, 
Sabahattin Şen, ed. (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayõnlarõ, 1995) and  II. Meşrutiyette 
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dynamics of the solidarist line of thinking among this elite group, I will examine the 
early origins of the concept, which was developed in France during the Third 
Republic. Solidarism was formulated as a political philosophy in France, which 
involved a rejection of liberal individualism and economy, Marxist collectivism, 
clericalism and anarchist syndicalism, though having something in common with all 
of them. Actually, it was mostly an eclectic formula, which invoked that association 
not competition was the predominant characteristics of all life. Solidarism, in France, 
developed into a logical, secular moral system of rights and duties underlying 
national cohesion and interdependence. Although French solidarism particularly 
aimed at reorganization of the socio-structural realm by paying attention to welfare 
and justice in society, Turkish solidarism was mostly inclined to homogenize the 
different parts and the groups of society and unite them under a single national 
community as well as under a national culture by constructing new symbolic values 
which were directly sponsored by the State. This study would take the Peoples 
Houses (Halkevleri) as the chief institutionalization of the solidarist ideology in 
Turkey. Though it was not profoundly developed, solidarism appeared to be the 
prominent ideology of the Ülkü group. It was basically utilized as an alternative way 
against both liberalism and communism. Solidarism has two important premises. The 
first one is to develop a moral consensus based on the secular notions of duty and 
debt with which social order was said to be possible. The second one is to establish a 
classless and undifferentiated social entity unified around common goals that was 
expected to prevent social conflicts and disorder in the way of progress and 
democracy.  
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4.1. THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF SOLIDARISM 
Towards the last decade of the nineteenth century, one word became a 
fundamental motto for the French Republican elite that melted the entire Republican 
legacy in a magical conceptual pot. This was solidarité. This was the concept with 
which the leaders of the Third Republic of the time were able to revive the Jacobin 
ideal to afford a classless, egalitarian, harmonious nation. Actually, John A. Scott 
categorizes solidarité as the expression of neo-Jacobin predominance in French 
political and intellectual life.284 Moreover, by the utilization of solidarist theory as 
the basis of a new moral system for the Third Republic,285 the French Republican 
elite initiated a new secular education reform aiming at inculcation of the scientific 
approach opposite of the theological and metaphysical approaches, which is 
capable of refurbishing the moral codes of society in line with rational, scientific and 
secular senses in order to put aside the potential dangers of democracy. 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in France, solidarity was a much 
used and manipulated term in the vocabulary of political leaders of all tendencies, 
from moderate to socialist. Almost everyone began to talk about solidarité. Georges 
Clemenceau, a radical republican leader of the Third Republic, for instance, hoped 
that political leaders would be able to strengthen the bonds of solidarity among men 
and thus overcome conflicting class interests by instilling a greater sense of altruism 
among people and by restricting the freedom of the strong to overpower the 
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weak. 286  The term solidarité was even regarded by Millerand, minister of 
commerce in 1900, as a new scientific revelation that embraces the secret for the 
material and moral grandeur of societies.287 Ferdinand Dreyfus, a candidate for 
election to the Senate in 1890, asserted the significance of republic with which 
democracy and human solidarity could best be achieved.288 Even the monarchist 
comte dHaussonville argued, Today, anyone wishes to receive a sympathetic 
hearing or even to obtain professional advancement must speak of solidarity.289 
Léon Bourgeois attempted to combine these diverse facets of solidarity into a 
broad but unified doctrine with specific objectives which would get support from all 
classes and all political groups favorable to social progress. In order to attain this 
objective, he offered a synthesis of the two ideologies, idealism and materialism, 
which his generation inherited and formed the two poles of division on social 
problems of his age. Undoubtedly, he was not the first figure in this attempt. 
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Drawing upon an eclectic reconciliation of Rousseauian philosophy with that of 
Auguste Comte, Alfred Fouillée290 was the founder of the solidarist philosophy.291 
4.1.1. Alfred Fouilleé: The Founding Father of Solidarism 
It was Alfred Fouillée who was able to reconcile idealism and materialism: 
The problem which we have now to solve is to find an effective and observable 
bond of union between idealism and naturalism, such that the ideal may descend into 
nature itself, transform it to its own image, and lift it up to itself.292 Having had the 
logical and profound eclecticism, Fouillée attempted to reconcile in sociology 
naturalism with idealism, the theory which makes society an organism, with that of 
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the social contract. 293  He drew from these diverse philosophies a thoroughly 
coherent system that mainly contributed to the later formation of the solidarist 
ideology. It can be argued he was the first man to bring together and discuss 
exhaustively the principle elements out of which later developed the mature doctrine 
of Solidarité.294  
By the mid-1880s, Fouillée had developed the basic tenets of the solidarist 
social philosophy for the later generation among which the politician and writer Léon 
Bourgeois determined solidarism as the official ideology of the French Republic in 
1895. Through the theory of idées-forces Fouillée had reconciled the scientific 
ambitions of his era with the idealism of republicanism. He formulated the correct 
conception of social solidarity as a motivating idea-force which was utilized by 
Fouillée as the basis of his social contactualism and social organicism. His ideas 
provided a scientific ground for French republicanism that made French 
republicanism conform more closely to the scientific demands of late nineteenth 
century scienticism developed by Auguste Comte. It should be argued that French 
republicanism took the shape of solidarism towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
and this link between republicanism and solidarism can also be detected in the 
Turkish Republic, particularly in the mid-1930s.  
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For Fouillée, in general and on the whole, science tends to transform natural 
and intellectual solidarity into voluntary solidarism.295 Most importantly, Fouillée 
had demonstrated that a scientific assessment of humans and their society led 
logically to democratic politics.296 In his formula, solidarity among society based on 
a democratic ethics would become the guiding principle for the needed social 
reforms of the French Republic. 297 This solidarist assumption of democratic ethics 
involved the hypothetical ideal of the mutual limitation of wills which took the form 
of justice, restrictive of egoism persuasive of altruism. 298  His redefinition of 
republicanism amounts to find a middle course between the competing extremes of 
idealism and scientism, and of liberalism and socialism. Moreover, he endeavored 
to synthesize the ideas of the naturalistic and moralistic pioneer solidarists, the social 
organicists and the social contractualists, the statists and the associationists, the 
socialists and the individualists.299   In that sense, he mainly paved the way for the 
late nineteenth-century solidarism as an eclectic political philosophy. Moreover, he 
developed the concepts, social debt and social quasi-contract as the basis of his 
philosophy of solidarity and his solidarist theory of reparative justice300, to which 
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the later representatives of solidarism were indebted much. For the solidarist 
epistemology of Alfred Fouillée, the state has a considerable role in regulating and 
arbitrating solidarity among the masses:  
The more civilization develops, the more are contrasts accentuated and 
frictions increased, the more complicated the relations between persons and 
things become, the more contractual and organic reciprocities appear, the 
more essential it is for the State, in enforcing the supremacy of the law, to 
intervene as a third party in social relations as arbiter, justiciar and 
redresser.301 
It can be argued that the reformist social engineering302 project of Fouillée 
assigned the state a role of creating a just social order based on solidarity 
independent of different class interests. Actually, his project used a kind of 
democratic vision as a pretext to validate his solidarist epistemology. For him, a 
democratic vision excepting solidarist ethical prescriptions would degenerate into a 
clash of egoisms each seeking their own immediate interests. In order to overcome 
the crisis of democracy in France, he argued that the people should be equipped with 
the necessary instruction to exercise their rights and propose a higher ideal for 
themselves.303 He maintained that only an enlightened minority which he called a 
moral elite could raise the ethics of the masses for the realization of a perfect 
democracy and for the regeneration of the society: True progress in a democracy 
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consists in the universal ascent of a nation behind its intellectual and moral elite.304 
Thus, according to his democratic elitism, the onward march of the best or a 
democratic aristocracy would promote the solidarity and progress of society in the 
way of democracy. Therefore, he was pessimistic about the masses that he saw them 
unable to rise above their personal interests and prejudices to recognize the greater 
needs of both France and humanity in general. 305 For that reason, Fouillée spent 
most of his energy to ensure the existence of a moral elite to guide the French 
Republic, rather than to raise the masses to their new responsibilities. In his book on 
democracy, he argued that only a minority could see the more general, universal 
concerns of the nation and could raise the morality of the people: It is not from 
below, but from above that the movement of regeneration and the first effort against 
the evils from which la patrie suffers could come. The most important task thus fell 
on the most enlightened minorities.306 As it is seen, he attempted to overcome the 
dilemmas of democracy by circumventing the democratic logic itself. He deemed 
that the universal education essential for the fundamentals of his elitist understanding 
of democracy: It was a duty of reparative justice on the part of the State to provide 
this education freely, so as to make equally available to all the social heritage.307 
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 One other significant characteristics of Fouillées solidarist epistemology was 
its stark criticism of liberalism and liberal economy. He thought that orthodox 
liberalism was inadequate to develop a sound solution to the existing social problems 
of France. Considering the fact that liberalism was incompetent to handle moral and 
social issues, which he saw the preconditions of a just application of economic 
principles, Fouillée maintained that liberalism gave way to the disastrous effects of 
the rampant egoism of homo-economicus. 308 As a solution, he offered a twofold 
model based on the solidarist associationism and State intervention. According 
to him, individualism and collectivism were equally inadequate doctrines, half-
truths that required synthesis. 309   
4.1.2. Léon Bourgeois: The Political Triumph of Solidarism 
The philosophical attempts of Fouillée to formulate solidarism were not part of 
a state policy or official ideology until the end of the nineteenth century when the 
socio-political conjuncture of the time enabled the state elite to adopt solidarism as 
an official doctrine of France. The state elite needed an organizing concept not 
only to provide an objective basis for social ties310, but also to manipulate the social 
and economic problems of the state, which would bring a permanent restructuring of 
French politics that might ensure the Republicans continued control regardless of 
electoral results and further prevent the potential dangers of democracy. The political 
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triumph of the concept came in 1895 when the leader of the Radical Party, Léon 
Bourgeois, became Prime Minister of the Third Republic. With Bourgeois, 
solidarism became the official doctrine of the Third Republic. In his well-known 
book, La Solidarité, Bourgeois formulated Solidarism as a political philosophy that 
was hoped to defuse class struggle and all potential revolutionary threats to the 
existing social order.311 For this formula, the quest for national solidarity would 
serve as the answer to class conflict. Furthermore, Bourgeois maintained an ideology, 
which involved a rejection of liberal individualism and liberal economy, Marxist 
collectivism, religious clericalism and anarchist syndicalism, though having 
something in common with all of them312. Actually, it was mostly an eclectic 
formula which invoked that association not competition was the predominant 
characteristics of all life. 313  Turkish Revolutionary ideology in the 1930s also 
manifested this eclectic formulation.  
Moreover, solidarism as an official ideology of the French Third Republic 
became an important means to establish secular, rational and objective foundations 
of ethics as a substitute for religion that was seen as outdated, to lay the basic 
preconditions of democracy. The question, How shall we give to our democracies 
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the moral doctrine which is necessary to their existence?314, was at the center of the 
solidarist preoccupation of seeking alternative foundations of morality independent 
of religious sense. The Turkish Revolution in the 1930s also promoted this 
perception of democracy underpinned by solidarist foundation of ethics. There had 
been several attempts to find a place for the idea of solidarity in the realm of ethics. 
Among these attempts, the works of Henry Marion, Charles Gide, Léon Bourgeois 
and Emile Durkheim were of utmost importance. For instance, Gide mainly 
highlighted the moral aspects of the idea of solidarity in the economic domain.315 He 
asserted the feeling of mutual dependence and relief for the progress of society. The 
motto, each for all and all for each became a governing principle for the solidarist 
ethics. The key words of the epoch were progress and solidarity. Progress signified 
the dynamic need to go beyond the limits of an outdated social structure, whereas 
solidarity stressed the will to reorganize the idea of progress on a sound and just 
basis.316  
It is worth noting that despite their bitterly anticlerical stance, many of the 
radical republicans of solidarist persuasion were particularly interested in 
propagating a new morality, a morality that insisted on the functions and obligations 
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of men and women in the name of the nation and on the family, not the individual, as 
the basic social and political unit of the nation.317 Having argued that morale must 
be scientific, Bourgeois defined the solidarist ethics as the union for life, instead 
of the struggle for life.318 Actually, with Léon Bourgeois, the idea of solidarity was 
given a new impulse. Under his leadership, solidarity seemed destined to become 
the moral viaticum of a great party, which was to draw from that idea a new store of 
idealism, and the inspiration for a whole new program of practical activities. 319 He 
attempted to render solidarity a doctrine independent of any dogma and any 
attachment to religion and favorable to a totally laique connotation. Furthermore, the 
doctrine of solidarism was said to be anchored in deliberately a laique and scientific 
character.320  In this sense, as a solidarist intellectual argued, 
The most important work of the actual régime, the organization of a laïc 
system of education in the elementary schools, remained compromised 
unless this instruction should prove capable of providing a solid moral 
education. Laïcism had need of a doctrine; it was conceivable that 
Solidarism might furnish it. The idea of solidarity, borrowed from science, 
would perhaps enable men to realize the long-deferred hope of finding a 
scientific basis for ethics, or erecting a passageway, an arch, between 
conscience and science321  
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So, solidarism, as a so-called scientific ideology, was considered as the new 
organizing concept around which the ethical principles were testified. In this way, 
Croiset argued, our modern generations, eager for positive, objective knowledge 
were in need of a word which should express the scientific character of the moral 
law. Thereby, it is contended, the word solidarity, borrowed from biology, 
admirably fulfilled this obscure but profound necessity.322 It is worth mentioning 
that solidarists sought to establish a link between science and ethics. For Bourgeois, 
in those nations capable of reaching a superior degree of evolution we witness a 
combination of two different modes of thinking. These are a scientific method (la 
method scientifique) and a moral idea (idée morale),323 which should also constitute 
the basis of social solidarity. Science has the role of determining the laws of human 
action, and morality or the moral sentiments play the role of activating the will of 
individuals to realize these laws. Having argued this, Bourgeois attempted to settle 
morality with experimental science.324  Such an undertaking went hand in hand with 
the search for an alternative morality independent of any religious domain.  
Actually, this kind of understanding can be traced back to the search of Alfred 
Fouillée for the rational basis of morality,325 which had, now, become dominant for 
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the ruling and intellectual elite of the Third French Republic. Beside Fouillée, Ernest 
Renan had an enormous influence on the scientism of Bourgeois.326 According to 
Renan, society should organize and order itself by way of scientific operation of 
human mind in order to improve itself in need of progress. Having argued that 
science alone would form the creeds, he rendered science a religious position.  The 
question is there, can there be a system of ethics that is purely scientific, capable of 
satisfying both will and intellect?327 or how science will have the moral hegemony 
of humanity?328 is illuminating for this quest of the French Republican elite for a 
secular ethics that would substitute for the religious ones. Emilé Boutroux, a famous 
solidarist university professor of the time, obviously, preferred a marriage of science 
with ethics under the idea of solidarity: In order to put ethics on a truly scientific 
basis, there must be an existing fact which is capable at the same time of being 
observed objectively and of furnishing a norm of human conduct. Now, solidarity 
seems precisely to unite these two conditions.329 The aim of differentiation of the 
notion of solidarité from the traditional Catholic and other Christian doctrines was to 
become central for the solidarist philosophy. In this sense, the attempt of the 
solidarist philosophy to dominate the ethical field began to shape the content of the 
French laicism and republicanism at the fin de siecle.  As indicated by one of the 
prominent representatives of solidarism, one must recognize that the solidarists do 
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all in their power to break the links between their doctrine and religious 
traditions.330 In this sense, their work is evidently part of the task undertaken by 
democracy to laicise ethics themselves.331  
 Beside the scientific and secular conception of ethics, solidarism has another 
important notion, which will be traced also in the context of the Turkish Revolution. 
This was the conception of a social debt which each man owes to society. Having 
inspired by Comte332 and Fouilleé, Bourgeois declared that every man is born as a 
debtor to society: Man is born a debtor of human association (Lhomme nait 
débiteur de lassociation humaine)333 based on a tacit contract (quasi-contract). The 
point of special interest is the effort to give this debt a quasi-legal status. To pay the 
debt of a man to the past ancestors or to his fellows should be regarded as a matter of 
justice rather than charity. Moreover, the conditions crucial to the existence and 
perpetuation of society were to be determined on the basis of recognition of the 
indebtedness of each individual to his ancestors as well as his fellowmen. Because, 
payment of the debt was the charge for the benefits they had received, and it was the 
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price of their liberty of development.334 In this sense, this notion was to be extended 
to legal regulations of right and duty. The law regards all individuals as accepting a 
quasi-contract to pay their social debts with the principle of mutualizing risk and 
advantage. In order to satisfy the moral needs of the people this principle was 
deemed necessary.  
This conception of social debt was furnished by the idea of a quasi-contract 
dassociation which means acceptance by citizens of a state of social obligations 
and duties towards the society as well as to the state which extracts the payment of 
the social debt. What Léon Bourgeois targeted, through this understanding, was to 
transform the de facto (or natural) solidarity in society into the de jure (or 
contractual) solidarity by the regulations of the state.335  It is argued that the duties 
and obligations derived from this contractual law could limit and even restrict the 
individual rights and freedom. However, for Ferdinand Buisson, the minister of 
education of the time, obedience of the people to this contractual law did not mean 
the lessening of freedom, but it was the identification of debt the man could not 
neglect. 336  Léon Bourgeois thought that the idea of solidarity was developed to 
reinforce the unfinished project of the French Revolutionary ideology. The famous 
three-partied motto of the Revolution: equality, freedom and fraternity was 
strengthened by the fourth one: solidarité. Even, he maintained that beside the 
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declaration of rights of the Revolution, now the declaration of duties should also 
be added. 337   Actually, his scientific moral theory of social duty and debt 
substituted for the Christian morality of charity, and for the even more abstract 
republican morality of fraternity; it was a quasi-contractual obligation, source and 
measure of the rigorous duty of social solidarity based on the social debt humans 
owe one another.338    
Solidarists had an authoritarian vision of state-society relations. This can easily 
be seen in their approaches to democracy. Bourgeois argued that democracy was not 
just a form of government but also a form of organization and ordering of the entire 
society. Moreover, solidarism would provide the social and moral conditions 
essential to a true democracy. In order to guarantee these conditions, state 
intervention was considered essential. In this sense, a republican education that 
would teach men the moral commitments necessary to their fraternal vision of 
democracy was seen as the basis of promoting an active citizenry and teaching 
men the mutual respect and habits of cooperation critical to a healthy Republic.339 
So, solidarist conception of social reform was said to assure the moral underpinnings 
of democracy.340   
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In a speech on the relationship between science and sentiment, Bourgeouis 
maintained that successful reform depended, not only on a public that understood the 
scientific rationale of reform, but on a public that felt a strong moral commitment to 
reform.341 He preferred a model based on the good will of the people as much as the 
authority of science. The engagement of the hearts together with the minds of the 
people was deemed necessary for a reform to be successful: It will be necessary to 
find the way to awaken the popular sentiment, it will be necessary to find the means 
best-suited to France for getting past their minds and into their hearts. 342 
Accordingly, the moral support of the people was required to alleviate the tension 
between egoistic and humanistic logic of the theory of solidarism in order to 
overshadow the potential dangers of democracy. For the solidarist theory, a hybrid 
model of social reform was considered essential. It favored state intervention in 
society to prepare a social system based on the private initiative. The representators 
of this theory defended intervention in the name of democracy. As a solidarist 
thinker asserted: 
To remain prudent and fruitful, the state must remain subsidiary and be 
organized so that instead of substituting itself for private initiative, it favors 
and develops [such initiative] until the day when the latter will suffice itself. 
It is only on that condition that the new [social] legislation will be 
educational and fruitful, and thus truly democratic.343   
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By their theory of solidarism, the solidarist thinkers aimed to conceptualize 
democracy in more mutualist terms:   
In organizing democracy, in developing its admirable schools of civicism 
which are our mutualist sections, we will give  [democracy] a national and 
social soul, a social soul because we will furnish it with the means to 
liberate the individual, to snatch him away from the various powers of 
oppression and money that grip him, a national soul, because, having 
liberated individual, we will increase his power tenfold, we will make him a 
free citizen, conscious and strong, and of all these free and strong citizens, 
we will make a more powerful France and a more beautiful Republic.344 
As it is seen, the moral training of people in line with solidarist teachings was 
regarded as vital to make people eligible for the anticipated democratic ideal. For 
Bourgeois, the education of people was important because the state could not 
legislate justice without the consent of society. Education would provide the 
necessary equipment of society with which they would voluntarily consent to the 
social order prescribed by the idea of solidarity. For him, what was needed therefore 
a new development in human consciousness, a recognition of solidarity,345 that 
would assure the consent of the individuals to the laws of natural solidarity. Hence, 
social education was considered to prepare people to the solidarist vision of 
democracy totally based on scientific ethics. This effort was being conducted in the 
context of a newly-established discipline, which was formulated first by Comte and 
later Durkheim. Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim were the prominent figures 
that had considerable impact on the Turkish revolutionary elite of the 1930s. 
Although the Ülkü elite appropriated mostly the authoritarian solidarist assumptions 
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of Comte, they tended to utilize Durkheims relatively pluralist conception of 
solidarism for their authoritarian aims. 
4.1.3. Auguste Comte and Authoritarian Solidarism  
Positivism, developed by Aguste Comte and later Emile Littre346 and Pierre 
Laffitte, became a philosophical base of the solidarist policies of French Radicals in 
the Third Republic. Actually, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the reign of 
positivism dominated both in political and intellectual life of France. The quest for 
infallibility was the major concern for the men of age. It was not in the infallibility 
attributed to science by positivists, but also in the papal infallibility advocated by the 
conservatives like Bonald, Maistre, and Lamennias, or in the infallibility attributed to 
metaphysical or materialist philosophies by Hegelians or Marxists. In fact, from 
Catholics to atheists, from positivist to conservative, there were numerous thinkers 
who had the same affection for the grand projects, and all-inclusive, high-flown 
abstractions  History, the Absolute, Science, the Ideal, the Great All. 
Consequently, any mood of scientific caution yielded to prophetic fervour, and any 
destructive intent stemmed not from our present-day attitudes of skeptical 
interrogation but from a deeply sincere desire to build anew upon cleared 
foundations, to erect new philosophies new religions, indeed to replace the old, 
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pre-scientific creeds of the past.347 In this sense, positivism or scientism was the 
one of the responses to the rising industrialization, social upheaval and intellectual 
confusion that was so obvious after the French Revolution. The disruptions of 
economic, political, social, and industrial change made intellectuals more responsive 
toward the society. The Positivists, primarily, wanted to reconstruct the social system 
philosophically and religiously. They thought, social unity can be founded only 
upon philosophic and religious unity348. The search for unity traced back to the 
Revolutionary idea began to besiege all the philosophical and intellectual concerns of 
the whole nineteenth century. The emergence of positivism and solidarism was 
conditioned by the weakening of religious traditions and the rupture of political 
equilibrium.349 It is, in this sense, meaningful that Auguste Comte made use of the 
new science for the re-establishment of order and the realization of an ideal society. 
The thinking of Comte together with Ernest Renan and Hippolyte Taine was 
described as a transition from true Positivism to Scientism. Comte sought to create 
a scientific social and political system; Renan endeavored to set up a scientific 
religion; Taine aimed to provide a scientific critique and method for metaphysics. 
They all pretended to abolish metaphysics, but in several of their efforts they brought 
back in a peculiar metaphysic of their own. In this sense, they had departed from 
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literal Positivism.350 The Turkish re-constructivist revolutionaries also testify to the 
vital importance of this sort of positivist consideration, aiming to construct a 
revolutionary metaphysics.   
So, the primary effort particularly of Auguste Comte was to be thought as a 
moral concern. He basically attempted to discover some guiding principles to find a 
way out from the apparent chaos of the French society in particular, and the whole 
humanity in general. Science, natural science especially in Western Europe was built 
on a belief that the study of Nature was the one and only source of knowledge. In 
Comtean epistemology, positivism connoted an anti-theological outlook attached 
itself to anticlericalism351 and laicism. Natural science based on facts, observation, 
experimentation and induction are realistic, positive, empirical and experimental. 
These are the methods that should be employed in the pursuit of truth. In this sense, 
religion, whose foundation was tradition and authority, became incompatible with 
these positive methods. Above all, Comte invented a scientific religion that was to 
provide a non-theological form of worship and ritual and to give a higher sanction to 
the findings of social scientists and to their applications.352 In line with Comtes 
                                                
350 See, D. G. Charlton, Secular Religions in France, 1815-1870 
351 Roy Wood Sellars, Positivism in Contemporary Philosophic Thought, American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 4, Is. I (Feb., 1939), 26-42, p. 27 
352 W. M. Simon, The Two Cultures in Nineteenth-Century France: Victor Cousin 
and Auguste Comte, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 26, Is. 1, (Jan.-Mar., 
1965), 45-58, p. 46 
 -150- 
solidarist and positivist thought, Ernest Renan, for instance, considered science as a 
religion that we can attribute to it alone the ability to formulate creeds.353  
While formulating the principles of sociology, Comte set down the 
prescriptions for an ideal society in a somewhat prophetic style. He combined 
scientific knowledge with ideological components. This combination had also been 
apparent in the Turkish version of solidarism. Although various philosophers have 
subsequently claimed that the whole apparatus of his positive doctrine is 
ideological and science never achieves very much autonomy in his doctrinaire and 
totalitarian system354 and that he gave the name sociology to what is known as 
ideology in order to conceal the biased connotation of the latter355, Comte was 
certainly one of the foremost figures in the Solidarist tradition. Comte saw the 
division of labor as the constitutive element in the formation of social solidarity and 
as the basis of societys development. Yet, as the division of labor is expanded, for 
him, it would extinguish the sense of community356 by dispersing and fragmenting 
the society.357 Comte overcome this paradox by means of propounding the role of 
the State as a unifying force which should intervene to prevent the ensuing anarchy 
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and fragmentation in order to sustain continuously the idea of the whole and the 
sentiment of common solidarity358  
In Comtean epistemology, we can see an opposite tenet to the eighteenth 
century philosophys insistence on rights. Having almost ignored rights, Comte 
recognized only mans duties towards humanity. This emphasis on duty rather than 
rights had become an inspiration source for the later representators of solidarité. He 
attributed almost no value to personal rights, for what men need to be instructed in 
is their duties359. This negligence of rights was compatible with his ideas that 
assumed the subordination of the individual to humanity. That is, individuals have 
ethical significance only in so far as they embody the spirit of humanity as a 
whole.360 In this way, the rights and duties of mankind, which had previously 
been distinguished, were in positivism merged into the notion of ones duty as a 
member of humanity.361 This sort of formulation of rights and duties, in general, 
contributed much to the development of solidarist ideology in France and later to the 
Turkish version of solidarism. As Jack Hayward puts, Comte formulated an 
authoritarian solidarism 362  in which there is not much place for individual 
autonomy and liberty and there is greater place for the intervention of and 
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subordination to the State for the sake of social harmony and concord. Comte, in 
general, propounded the role of the State as a unifying force which should intervene 
to prevent the ensuing anarchy and fragmentation in order to sustain continuously 
the idea of the whole and the sentiment of common solidarity363. This Comtean 
understanding of solidarism constituted a great ideational legacy not only for the 
French Third Republic, but also for the Turkish radical revolutionary elite of the 
1930s. 
The intellectual efforts of Comte enabled the concept of solidarism to achieve a 
scientific status and turn into a fundamental component of any extensive 
programme of social reorganization calculated to replace post-Revolutionary 
political, economic, intellectual and moral anarchy by a harmonious, integrated 
society.364 Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, French sociologists 
and philosophers, following the path opened by Comte studied the relationships of 
elements in biological units, the relationships existing among animals, and those of 
men living together in organized societies. Their findings all emphasized the 
interdependence of the parts of a whole and increased the vogue of the idea of 
solidarity. 
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4.1.3. Emile Durkheim and Pluralist Solidarism 
As opposed to Comtes holistic and authoritarian conceptions of solidarity, 
Durkheim maintained a highly dynamic, immanent functional solidarity which 
mainly focused on the countervailing secondary groups in society standing between 
the individual and the State. The States essential function was to liberate 
individual personalities 365  by preventing the suppressive influence of the 
community over individuals. 
At the turn of the century, it was Emilé Durkheim who spent most of his 
energy to prove scientifically the solidarist visionary of morality, democracy and 
education. Accordingly, he was one of the most prominent figures in the solidarist 
tradition that had a direct influence on the Turkish intellectuals as well, as was the 
case with Ziya Gökalp who built his ideas of solidarism on Durkheims solidarist 
theories. Although Durkheim shared most of the ideas in common with Bourgeois 
and other solidarist figures, he had some distinct thoughts that would shed light on 
understanding not only of French solidarism but also of the Turkish version of 
solidarism. With Durkheim, solidarité gained, indeed, a scientific character.  
Actually, the second half of the nineteenth century France marked an era when 
the intellectuals and the philosophers sought to find a solution to the rising anomie 
morale366, a moral and cultural crisis367. However, this so-called moral crisis were 
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in considerable measure be unsettled by the solidarist political leaders. Durkheim 
was the first prominent figure that could develop strong theoretical alternatives 
bespeaking an unadulterated influence over his generation. Durkheim also shared the 
reformist social engineering ideal of Fouillée and Bourgeois, which would provide 
sound prescriptions as a remedy to the existent malaise of the milieu.368    
The problem of social integration was a central issue in Durkheims 
epistemology369. The questions he addressed included how society could continue to 
cohere, what were the nature and modes of social cohesion and what would be the 
main resolution to overcome the discontents of modernity? The main notion 
Durkheim offered in answering these questions was solidarité. He believed in the 
primary and crucial importance of moral beliefs in forming the collective 
conscience of society.370 For him, unless we put an end to the dissolution of the 
moral beliefs, it would be impossible to overcome the social crisis that caused 
disintegration and disorder in society: the present malaise derives essentially from a 
dissolution of our moral beliefs. Accordingly, he argued, The ends to which our 
fathers were attached have lost their authority and their appeal, without our seeing 
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clearly, or at least with the necessary unanimity, where to find those that must be 
pursued in future.371 Durkheim tried to find a way out from this problem through 
secular morality based on an occupational ethic that would impose restraint upon 
special and selfish interests for the sake of the interests of the whole and diminishes 
conflict by enhancing the solidarity of society.372 The Turkish revolutionary elite 
explicitly adopted this formulation via Gökalp. 
Durkheim, as one of the prominent theoreticians of the solidarist ideas, 
accommodated his visionary of integrated and morally well-ordered society in the 
realm of social science. Like Comte and Fouillée, Durkheim also attempted to 
provide a remedy for social problems by utilizing social science.373 Once again, we 
see the conciliation of social moralism with social scientism for the sake of 
constituting a desired social and political system. His theories were easily articulated 
in politics not only in France, but also in Turkey. 
Durkheim preferred a diversified social order based upon functional (organic) 
solidarity, instead of the mechanical solidarity grounded on common homogenized 
consciousness. He claimed that the organic type was progressively eliminating the 
mechanical one in modern civilized society. 374  It is important to note that 
Durkheims main problematic was to overcome the undesired effects of increasing 
differentiation and individuation, namely anomie, by forming a secular morality 
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through solidarist corporatism. He could not and even did not want to touch the 
essential problems of capitalism that was increasingly felt in an industrializing 
France. In this sense, he shared the social pacifism of other solidarists and hoped 
for social solidarity through reconciliation by questioning class warfare, as it was not 
worth the cost: His whole program savors of solidarism more than of a through-
going proletarian program of reconstruction. His aim is to bring about a restoration 
of social and economic morale through a strengthening of the functional organization 
of society, rather than to produce a sweeping reorganization of the whole productive 
and distributive system.375 
One other important contribution of Durkheim to the solidarist current of the 
Third Republic was his theories of education that mainly highlighted the moral 
teaching grounded on secular and rational ethics. Actually, from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the national education in general and the institutionalization of 
the teacher training in particular was taken much more seriously in France than any 
other Western European country. The main impetus behind this seriousness stems 
from the fact that teachers were considered as the representatives of the state in 
disseminating the ideals and principles of the Republic to the wider segments of 
society: It was these instituteurs and institutrices of the Third Republic who, it was 
hoped, would supplant the cure as the moral leader, not only in towns, but in the 
thousands of villages of rural France. 376 Accordingly, the policy was to replace a 
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rigid ecclesiastical morality with a secular one.377 In this sense, the teachers were 
considered as the priests of modern secular France. Especially, in the rural regions of 
France, the instructors were hailed as secular missionaries in the project of national 
unification.378 Hence, lensignement completely separated from ecclesiastical control 
is a sine qua non of national education and the Republican secular morality. This was 
also a guiding principle for the Ülkü elite who deliberately aimed to implement 
secular moral education in the Peoples Houses. 
Consequently, it is clear that Durkheim contributed much to the development 
of the solidarist philosophy particularly by means of locating the idea of solidarity 
within the secure domain of science. The discipline of sociology, with Durkheim, 
gained enormous attraction of the politicians aspiring to build a stable order in 
society. His scholarly effort to depict the nature of the existing moral anomy and the 
ethical void triggered by increasing modernization, turned out to be somewhat the 
guiding principle for political reformers of both contemporary France and later of 
other countries, including Turkey.  
The positivist and solidarist line of republican argumentation took a somewhat 
different but radical shape especially shortly after the famous Dreyfus Affair. 
Although the Dreyfus Affair implied an extreme anti-Semite reaction of nationalist 
and religiously oriented groups of France, this Affair was then exploited by the 
radical republican French elite as a catalyst to assimilate the different ethical and 
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ethnic postures among society in the way to create a uniform secular French identity. 
As Robert Kaplan argues, the Dreyfus Affair was mainly utilized by the Republican 
elite to overcome the fin-de-siécle crisis of democracy in France. That is, in order to 
forestall the potential risks of democracy, the French radical republican elite aimed at 
restructuring French politics so as to ensure their continued control irrespective of 
the electoral results. Kaplan identified this sort of restructuring as the revival of 
Jacobin mentality, which was sympathetic to government intervention in social 
and economic activity for the greater good of society 379  The problem of 
anticlericalism suddenly became of permanent importance, which overshadowed 
every other social and political question.380 In that sense, Durkheims sociology 
based on solidarist assumptions became the most conscious and sophisticated body 
of thought that could play this role: Like many others, Durkheim was preoccupied 
with the need to save the Republic and what it seemed to stand for: that meant, above 
all, establishing a liberal secular, republican ideology, a new civic morality to be 
taught in all the nations schools.381  
This solidarist political style of the Third Republic created a long lasting legacy 
not only for the later generations of France but also for the revolutionary elites of 
several countries in the way of their nation-building processes. Without doubt, 
Turkey was one of the prominent models, which showed evident relevance to the 
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neo-Jacobin reconstruction of politics. It can be maintained that this sort of attempt 
to construct a secular morality for democracy in France was also apparent among the 
Turkish Republican elite, especially after 1930. The French solidarist legacy was 
appropriated and internalized by the Turkish Revolutionary elite in times of crisis. 
Hence, this peculiar phase of republicanism of French Third Republic, with its 
radical, anti-clerical and solidarist tone, became a modus operandi for the Turkish 
Revolutionary elite in the 1930s.  
4.2. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF TURKISH SOLIDARISM  
It should be noted that it is not possible to separate solidarism of the radical 
revolutionaries of the 1930s from the overall modernization attempts of Ottoman-
Turkish history, and also from the traditional Ottoman-Turkish political culture. 
Ignoring the individualist philosophy in favor of the solidarist one at the level of the 
ruling elite is mainly due to political culture. It is commonly argued that the 
Ottoman-Turkish political culture had the legacy of patrimonialism in which the 
center totally subdued the periphery, a situation characterized as a strong state and a 
weak civil society382, and that there was no intermediary structure between the state 
and the subject. The legal notion of subjective rights which was developed within 
feudalism in Europe383 lacked in the Ottoman Turkish tradition. Moreover, while the 
Ottoman state disallowed the formation of the countervailing groups that could 
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operate independently of the central government384, there was strong communitarian 
values in which there was not an autonomous place for the individual. Much 
scholarly energy has been devoted to theories on the Ottoman State, which 
emphasize this strong state-weak civil society link and the communitarian type of 
organization of the society. In fact this high level of stateness in Turkish tradition as 
a deviant case385 among the Muslim states386 can be explained partly because of its 
peculiar state tradition based on the adab tradition.  
Hence, the other aspect of the Ottoman state tradition that would shed light 
onto our problematic is the adab tradition which was a kind of organizational 
socialization based upon a formulation of a particular outlook that provided ideals 
and values for the ruling strata and developed as a consequence of efforts to 
identify the state with established values. Heper argues that this institutionalization 
of the state around certain norms resembles the state institutionalization of France in 
the seventeenth and the eighteenth century around certain values as order, hierarchy, 
secularism and solidarism. He calls this situation moderate transcendentalism 
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similar to the enlightened despotism of France.387. The other important political 
tradition based on state-oriented norms is the circle of justice (daire-i adalet )388, 
which was the important aspect of the Ottoman enlightenment tradition.389  The 
values that the ruler and the bureaucratic center had to conserve were social order 
and security under a norm of justice: a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no 
soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subject, and no 
popular well-being without justice.390 The political philosophy of the Ottomans was 
shaped with these traditions during the classical age.       
After the defeat of the armies of Mahmud II by Ali Pasha of Egypt in 1833 and 
1839, a new generation of reformers emerged to save the state from total 
destruction 391 . These reformers were mostly from the bureaucracy. These 
bureaucratic elites, of whom Mustafa Reşit Pasha was typical, were trained within 
the kul system and had no organic links with social groups. They viewed themselves 
primarily as the servant of the state and dedicated themselves to the secular interests 
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of the state.392 On November 3, 1839, they started the reform movement called 
Tanzimat for the first time in Turkish history. 
With the Tanzimat script, there began important changes in this traditional 
political framework, though the strong state-weak civil society and the 
communitarian type of organization of society persisted. Tanzimat signifies not only 
a beginning of westernization/modernization, but also the emergence of certain set of 
new ideas of which the idea of solidarity could be traced. For the first time in the 
history of the Ottoman Empire, references in order to save the state were explicitly 
deduced from the outside of the traditional political framework. In other words, the 
norms and values around which the state was institutionalized began to transmute in 
conformity with the ideas from the West. The Muslim-Ottoman imaginaire was 
gradually displaced by the Western reformist imaginaire393 From the bureaucratic 
elite itself, a new group of intellectuals emerged. These intellectuals, namely Namõk 
Kemal, Ziya Paşa and Ali Suavi formed a new society called Young Ottomans.  
The Young Ottomans, who were the first intellectuals in the Ottoman-Turkish 
history who made the ideas of the Enlightenment part of their intellectual equipment 
for the Turkish reading public. Furthermore, they were the first intellectuals who 
attempted to decipher a synthesis between the ideas of Enlightenment and Islam.394 
Not unlike Comte, the Young Ottomans utilized science for their utopia, their ideal 
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social order. However, during the Young Ottoman era, Western ideas provided only 
an inspiration for the intellectuals to formulate their prescriptions to the problems 
of the state. The Islamic and traditional values that they saw compatible with the 
Western ideas and techniques still served as the legitimizing creeds for their 
formulations. Actually, they pursued the alternative always within the Ottoman 
frame and in an Ottoman sense.395 
4.2.1. The Making of Turkish Solidarism in the Young Turk Era: 
Utilization of Science for a Social Engineering Project 
Later, towards the end of the 19th century, with the beginning of the Young 
Turk era, especially among the Turkists and Westernist (Garbcõ)396 groups, Western 
models not only continued to supply inspiration, but also increasingly became the 
ground for legitimization and, furthermore, became the self-referential parameters. 
As Mardin pointed, With the Young Turks, legitimacy begins to assume a new 
                                                                                                                                     
394  Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the 
Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962), 
p. 3 
395 Halide Edip Adivar, Turkey Faces West; A Turkish View of Recent Changes and 
their Origin, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 99 
396  Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura were the main representatives of Turkism. 
Abdullah Cevdet, Kõlõçzade Hakkõ and Celal Nuri were the prominent figures of 
Garbcõ group. For a detailed analysis of the Westernist group, see M. Şükrü 
Hanioğlu, Garbcõlar: Their Attitudes Toward Religion and Their Impact on the 
Official Ideology of the Turkish Republic, in Studia Islamica, Vol. 86, 1997/2, pp. 
133-149. Though there were several differences and divergences among these 
groups, their attitude towards science displayed common characteristics.  
 -164- 
cast.397  Western epistemic tradition was accepted as a universal and ahistorical 
category that should be taken for granted while explaining and formulating their 
views on the state and society. The authenticity of local values was revised in 
accordance with universal Western teachings. Western ideas were seen as a 
privileged category, which took its primacy and power from being scientific. In 
some cases, science was celebrated due to the increasing power of the Western states. 
Garbcõlar, for instance, credited science for the perceived supremacy of the 
West.398  
In line with French solidarist legacy, the Turkist and Westernist intellectuals of 
the Young Turk era aimed at conciliating scientific knowledge with that of social 
doctrine as a prescription to establish a well-ordered society. It is accurate to note 
that the chief impetus behind this celebration of science was not only to strengthen 
their power of discourse, but also to lessen the impact of the existent religious and 
traditional belief system. Certain intellectuals of this age began to assimilate Renans 
problematic on science and religion which had hitherto been denied and contested by 
the Young Ottomans. As Mardin puts, the positivist-nationalist generation had no 
instrumental view of Islam as a lever for social mobilization which often disguised, 
as in the case of the Young Turk leader Ahmed Rõza, deistic or atheistic beliefs.399  
Relying on that disenchanting understanding, the intellectuals of the Young 
Turk era, educated in the western secular stream and emerging as the Turkish 
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positivist generation, aimed at conciliating scientific knowledge with that of social 
doctrine as a key to provide a harmonious and ordered society. Their basic endeavor, 
especially after they came to power with the government of the Community of Union 
and Progress (1908-1918), was, first of all, to search for a national Turkish identity 
that was assumed to have been, for a long time submerged underneath the Ottoman 
cosmopolitan identity. They conceived nationalism and secularism as two inevitable 
aspects to modernize their state and society. This led to the strong discussion for the 
replacement of Islam as the basis of the state, and introduced the notion that the 
nation was the source of all authority.400  It might not be wrong to contend that this 
was the first attempt to transform the Empire into a model of nation-state. On 
account of their reformist and secularist structure they put into practice common 
secularizing changes notably in education and law.401  
There were three main competing currents of thought during the period of the 
CUP, namely Turkism, Westernism and Islamism. On the CUPs policies the first 
two gradually gained significance.402 The pioneers of these three currents primarily 
dealt with the question of what would be the focal point of patriotism and the basis of 
identity of the Empires subjects. Put it in another way, all their efforts and 
discussions came to invite a debate on to which civilization they belonged to and 
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whether or not theirs was unique. Islamists proposed the idea that Muslims had an 
authentic character and unique civilization totally opposite of the Western one, 
especially at the cultural level; that was why they had to preserve it as the true 
essence of their identity. Nevertheless, the Westernists defended a project of 
modernity that called for the complete transformation and secularization in every 
domain of social life in conjunction with Western models. The Turkists were 
between two movements: although putting emphasis on Turkish culture exposed 
from primordial history, being part of civilized world was usually accentuated.403  
The prominent figures of the Young Turk era, Ahmet Rõza, Prens Sabahattin, 
Abdullah Cevdet and Ziya Gökalp were at the same time the disciples of one of the 
Western social scientists. They proposed their formulations of an ideal society by 
supporting them with scientific explanations. Ahmet Rõza used the arguments of 
Auguste Comte, Prens Sabahattin accepted the route of Le Play, Abdullah Cevdet 
was mostly inspired by Gustav Le Bon and Ziya Gökalp became the chief 
representative of Emile Durkheim. In order that the prescriptions gain validity, they 
felt themselves obliged to ground them on one of the social science currents.  
Auguste Comtes attempt to construct a stable social order and remedy the 
political unrest inherited by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras404 appealed to the 
Ottoman-Turkish intellectual and state elite who faced similar problems especially 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. The increasing loss of Ottoman territories 
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and decreasing economic prosperity affected the attitudes of the Ottoman elite 
towards the West. It is not the content of the Western science or philosophical 
tradition, but the military power and its prerequisite narrative of capital405 which 
convinced the Ottomans to despise or question their own scientific, economic and 
cultural tradition. The military defeat against the West was the main impetus to 
import Westernization and modernity. The Turkish intellectuals, from conservative 
to Westernist, turned to Comtes positive philosophy which heralded a society 
offering both order and progress as a solution to their domestic difficulties. 
Comtes new system utilized science in its attempt to discover the laws which 
governed mans social and political progress. Once these general laws were 
discovered, man would be able to modify his future,406 and avoid the political, social, 
and economic troubles threatening the states.  
The reason for Comtes impact on young Turkish intellectuals is because of an 
emotional belief in progress corresponding to their high-flown engagement to the 
idea of  science. They were heartened by Comtes idea that all human knowledge 
was moving toward a positive, scientific stage, that each discipline moved from 
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theology through metaphysics to the positive level, and most significantly, that all 
social problems would soon be resolved by means of the last and promising of the 
sciences, the science of society. This sort of idea gave the intellectuals power of 
portraying themselves as agents and movers of the historical process. 
4.2.2.  Populism and Solidarism in the Young Turk Era 
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 marked the beginning of an era when 
much of the theories especially of Ahmet Rõza, Abdullah Cevdet and Ziya Gökalp 
became the official ideology of the Union and Progress Party. As Murat Belge puts, 
Positivism and solidarism, with the emphasis on the supra-class nature of society, 
and with the imposition of inter class solidarity in society, as well as with their 
scientific justifications best fitted the state-savor characteristics of the Union and 
Progress Party.407 Solidarism as a social and political philosophy was explicitly 
formulated during the time of Union and Progress Party (1908-1920). 
Hence, the history of populism and solidarism did not begin with the 
Republican era; a populist discourse emerged already in the late Ottoman Empire. In 
Turkey, as solidarism manifested itself especially in the principles of populism and 
etatism, it is essential that we briefly examine the historical roots of populism. The 
late Ottoman populist movement was mainly influenced by the Russian Narodnik 
Movement. It was fledged around such intellectual clubs as Türk Ocağõ (Turkish 
Hearths), and Milli Talim ve Terbiye Derneği (National Education and Teaching 
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Society), and in such journals as Türk Yurdu (Turkish Land) and Halka Doğru 
(Toward the People). Émigré intellectuals from Russia like Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet 
Ağaoğlu, and Hüseyinzade Ali played substantial roles in the currents of Turkist and 
Populist movements.408 At the heart of the movement to go to the people (halka 
doğru) lay the revolutionist strategy of reaching the masses and making them rebel 
against so-called oppressive and exploitative practices of political authority.409 The 
main aims of the movement to go to the people were to get down to the people, to 
awaken them, to educate and enlighten them. 
Populism was articulated through solidarism (tesanütçülük). The French 
intellectual discourse lent the idea of solidarité to Turkey as supplementary to the 
idea of populism, all converging in the aim of creating a homogenous collectivity of 
people. Moreover, they presupposed the obliteration of all classes and cultural-ethnic 
differences. Also, they justified their etatist views together with the division of labor 
based only on professions. This idea was also adopted in 1931 RPP party program as 
the principle of Populism. This principle was in tune with efforts to establish a 
nation-state with its nation as an amassed entity without any destructive 
divergences within nation. 
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In social and cultural matters, populism became the chief representative of 
solidarism. Paul Dumont410 and Zafer Toprak411 call Populism the Turkish version of 
the solidarist ideas developed by Léon Bourgeois and Emile Durkheim. From the 
beginning of the twentieth century, populism had been the most popular current 
among intelletuals. According to Toprak, this solidarist line of thinking can be traced 
back to the Young Turk era populism and Gökalpian sociology. With the 1908 
Revolution, positivist thought developed as a reaction to scholastic philosophy 
during the second half of the nineteenth century and brought about sociologism 
(sosyolojizm). In other words, a set of viewpoints that based social philosophy on a 
trajectory of ilm-i içtima (social sciences), to the Turkish lands. Afterwards, 
sociologism could appropriate itself to the nationalist objectives of the era. Toprak 
argues that solidarism, as a sub-category of sociologism, was likely to be the 
dominant ideology shortly after 1908 in Turkey. The prominent figures that carried 
solidarism and its state philosophy, populism, to the country were Unionists like 
Ziya Gökalp, Tekin Alp, Necmettin Sadak and Yusuf Kemal.412 There were, for 
Toprak, several facets of populism in the Constitutional period: political, economic 
and social. The last one, social populism or social solidarism is important for the 
aims of this dissertation. Since, it spawned the germs of the Republican solidarist 
idea which revealed itself in the Ülkü circle. Toprak defines social solidarism as the 
idea undertaking solidarity and harmony of interests as opposed to class struggle, and 
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in doing so; it accepts cooperation of occupational groups instead of conflicting 
social classes.413   
There were even certain intellectual attempts to conceptualize populism on the 
basis of class differences. According to Yusuf Akçura, for instance, the people 
meant small landowning or landless peasants of the countryside and the small 
artisans and wage earners of the cities. In a way this definition of the people was 
based on class analysis with which Akçura was not unfamiliar from his intellectual 
experiences in Russia and France. One of the most important issues that differs 
Akçura from the other populists of the time was his considerable emphasis on the 
economic prerequisites of populism and nationalism. He accepted economy and the 
bourgeois revolution as sine qua non material condition of nation states. Unlike 
Gökalp's solidarism and corporatism, he favored the class-based analysis of the 
society, which resembles Marxist approaches.414  
Gökalp, on the other hand, defined the people as part of the nation which did 
not belong to elite groups, differentiated from the rest of society by their educational 
background: What does going to the people mean? Who are to go to them? The 
elite of any nation are its intellectuals and thinkers, those who are set apart from the 
common people by reason of their superior education and learning.415 What Gökalp 
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meant when he emphasized the notion of going to the people was that the elites, who 
had the privileged knowledge of what civilization meant, had to carry this 
knowledge to the people. In turn, halk, as the living museum of culture, would 
teach the cosmoplitan intelligentsia the merits of Turkish culture, which only 
survived among the people: 
They must go among the people, live with them, note the words and phrases 
they use, listen to their proverbs and maxims, grasp their way of thinking 
and feeling, listen to their poetry and music, watch their dances and plays, 
share their religious life and moral feelings, learn to appreciate the beauty in 
the simplicity of their clothing, architecture and furniture. In addition, they 
must learn the peoples folk-tales, anecdotes and epics and the surviving 
doctrines of the ancient töre416 
Unlike Akçura, Gökalp saw Turkish society as a classless entity unified around 
common goals. His distinctions between the elites and the people were at the 
educational rather than the social and economic level. In that respect, he argued, in 
Turkey, a single class cannot monopolize the title of the people. Everybody, either 
rich or poor, is of the people There are no class privileges among the people 
There are no privileged classes among the people.417 Once Turkish society was 
conceived of as classless, contradictions and conflicts in society naturally became 
reconcilable. Gökalp envisioned society as a sum of different mutually dependent 
organs. These ideas originally adopted from French solidarist philosophy developed 
mainly by Alfred Fouillée, Léon Bourgeois and Emile Durkheim. It can be argued 
that Gökalp was the first man who developed the Turkish version of solidarism, 
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tesanütçülük. According to Gökalp, the anticipated results of populist ideology 
would fall within the context of solidarist thought. Similar to the solidarist motto, he 
held that populism grounds its philosophy on the norm that presupposes not class, 
but profession!418 
The particular understanding of populism developed by Gökalp can be 
discerned in several official documents and writings of many intellectuals in the 
single party period. The similarity between Gökalps ideas and the ideas manifested 
in the Fourth Party Congress of the Republican Peoples Party in 1935 is striking. 
Actually, the attempt to prove that Turkey was a classless society was the ideological 
core of populism. The ruling elite denied the existence of social classes. For instance, 
Atatürk told the Russian Ambassador of the time, S. I. Aralov, in Turkey there are 
no classes there is no working class as there is no developed industry.419   
4.2.3.  Ziya Gokalp and Solidarism (Tesanütçülük)  
Ziya Gökalp was the first thinker in Turkey who systematized populism and 
solidarism as an overall ideology. Gökalps genius lies at the very heart of his 
formulation of solidarism as a political philosophy in articulation of Turkish 
nationalism. In that sense Turkish solidarism owed much to the studies of Gökalp. 
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Since this research will attempt to demonstrate that solidarism became the dominant 
ideology in stimulating the reformist elite to shape the political philosophy of the 
Turkish Revolution in the 1930s, and since solidarism of the radical revolutionary 
elite was mainly indebted to the ideas of Gökalp, his endeavors are extremely 
relevant for our problematic. 
Based on the works of Durkheim, Gökalp formulated Turkish nationalism upon 
a solidarist outlook. Gökalps importance stems from his adaptation of Durkheimian 
epistemology to the Ottoman-Turkish political culture. In doing so, he generally 
modified most of Durkheims ideas to fit his own terminology. He used sociology as 
an instrument to provide an ideological basis for the newly emerging Turkish nation-
state. While Dukheim argued that the increasing division of labor, with the effect of 
modernity, especially gave rise to an immediate erosion of common sentiments and 
the appearance of anomie and class struggle, Gökalp saw the division of labor in 
Ottoman-Turkish context as positive in the sense of perpetuating common sentiments. 
While it eroded the only one type of common sentiment (religion), it strengthened 
another (culture and language)420. Gökalp did not see a problem in the increasing 
individuation and the liberation of individuals. His main agenda was to find an 
alternative common sentiment that would provide national solidarity and 
homogeneity.  
Gökalp maintained that unless we strengthen the institutions of solidarity in 
society, it would be impossible to ensure order and peace, welfare and happiness. In 
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that sense, the primary duty of the elite and intellectuals, who aimed at salvation of 
the nation was to develop institutions of relief and solidarity in economic and social 
domains.421 As Ziyaeddin Fahri Fõndõkoğlu puts, Gökalp explicitly maintained the 
solidarist considerations developed and systematized by Léon Bourgeois.422 Through 
solidarism, Gökalp attempted to find a middle way between communism and 
individualism as in the case of Bourgeois: As Turks love freedom and 
independence, they cannot be communists. But as they love equality, they cannot be 
individualists. The system most suited to Turkish culture is solidarism 
(tesanütçülük).423 
In his formula, there was no room for the absolute value of the individual424. 
Individuals could survive in so far as they sacrificed their interests to the national 
one: Do not say I have rights; there is only duty no right. There is no I and 
You, but We We means One.425 Gökalp asserted the states role in adjusting the 
harmony and concord in the individual interests. For him, when the situation 
demanded, even the corporations that represent individual interests in the nation 
should subordinate themselves to the state. In this sense, it is worthwhile to stress 
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that it was the Comtean authoritarian solidarism which was more asserted in his 
formulations.  
For Ziya Gökalp, culture was a harmonious whole of different aspects of life of 
a single nation, whereas civilization is a rational product of mans conscious actions. 
The aim of Turkism, for Gökalp, was to seek for the national culture (milli harsõ 
aramak) in order to bring the light what was hidden in the soul of the nation. Only in 
a homogenous nation and culture, not in a heterogeneous society as the Ottoman 
Empire, a true democracy can be attained. However, he understood democracy not in 
liberal terms, but in solidarist terms. He used populism as a synonym of democracy 
in which the interest of the common people and the equality of all sections of the 
nation is determinant.426  The Revolutionary elite in their nation-building process 
inherited the formulations of Gökalp on culture, civilization and Turkish nationalism. 
His program on solidarism (tesanütçülük) or social populism (içtimai halkçõlõk) later 
became the guiding principles for the Republican elite. 
In the general epistemology of Gökalp, the issue of morality occupied a 
considerable place, which was undertaken in a totally solidarist tone. He generally 
underlined the significance of social as well as secular morality. However, contrary 
to the radical revolutionaries anti-clerical stance granting almost no place to religion 
in the realm of morality, Gökalp considered religion as one of the components of 
morality. Weakening of religion resulted in the rise of crude individualism and only 
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religion could domesticate the evil features of individualism. Individuals relinquish 
all kind of moral values and social ideals and try to satisfy individual needs and 
interest while disregarding communal ones. Immorality was the natural outcome of 
this unbounded individualism and this process endangered social life. In this sense, 
for him, social morality (içtimai ahlak) was the real morality427. Without a set of 
moral values shared in common, a community could not survive, since the moral 
values and love of community constitutes the framework of national solidarity. 
Gökalp claimed that a healthy society was possible in so far as its individuals gave 
priority to common values over their personal interests.  This society would melt 
individuals into the collective conscience and would construct common ideals for all 
its individuals.428 Solidarity was the feature of these kinds of healthy societies that 
succeeded to create a common feeling and consciousness among their members 
while in the decaying societies, individuals were deprived of common values that 
would create a harmony and accord among themselves.429 
Actually, the main peculiarity of Turkish version of solidarism that differs from 
the French case was its utilization of the concept for the nation-state building process. 
The revolutionary elite, as the heirs to the preceding modernization attempts, 
initiated their projects by redefining the bases of political legitimation (nation-state) 
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and the boundaries of the political community (national society).430. Since this was 
not an easy task, they required an organizing political philosophy with its values and 
norms that would provide an objective basis or a justification for their intended 
reforms. They had several eclectic ideational elements, which they inherited from 
their predecessors. This was mainly the idea of progress, laicism, nationalism and 
positivism. By tracing the line to Gökalp, they combined all of these ideas under the 
notion of solidarity. According to İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, the pioneers of the 
Revolution attained to the idea of solidarist (tesanütçü) weltanschauung and society 
that aimed at constituting a social system which will provide a harmony of interests 
without harming each other, and in doing so, procure a social order and solidarity 
(içtimai intizam ve tesanüt) instead of the class struggle.431 Therefore, to enforce the 
national solidarity (milli tesanüd) and to provide harmony of interests became the 
chief motivation of the Turkish reformist elite. The principle of national solidarity 
based on Gökalpian solidarism aimed at presenting a new integrative system for an 
imagined community and to eradicate the outdated system based on the religious 
solidarity i.e. ummah. In this sense, solidarist ideas provided a model for social 
transformation which proposed a replacement of the traditional types of social 
organization with the corporatism of secondary groups and nationhood based on 
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citizenship432 for the newly emerging nation-state. Moreover, it provided a scientific 
ground for social transformation. 
Tracing some contours of Gökalpian idea of solidarism, the Ülkü elite extended 
solidarism to a more radical and re-constructivist intonation, which highlighted the 
notions of secular morality and amassing (kütleleştirme) of people. It is striking that 
there was almost no reference to Gökalp in Ülkü between February 1933 and August 
1936 due to his preoccupation with the idea of culture, involving traditional and 
religious elements. Even Gökalp was criticized by the accusation that his ideas were 
defunct, and not could be tailored to the needs of the time.433 The Ülkü authors did so 
for a pragmatic purpose that the time was of increasing radicalism which would not 
allow for a relatively softer use of Gökalps ideas. 
4.3. SOLIDARISM IN THE ÜLKÜ VERSION OF KEMALISM 
4.3.1. How was the Idea of Solidarity articulated in the Ülkü Journal? 
Solidarist ideas began to occupy a core place with the beginning of the 1930s 
and provided the philosophical justification and basis for the existent regime. Since 
unity and authority were considered fundamental for the dissemination and 
preservation of the revolutionary ideology, the authoritarian solidarist assumptions 
were regarded indispensable. Solidarism served, furthermore, to structure the new 
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legal basis and political power of the Republic, which had sought a new alternative to 
restore itself after an economic as well as political crisis in 1930. Solidarism became 
the instrument of constructing a classless, homogenized, disciplined democratic 
order and establishing a secular morality in a Muslim country. Moreover, it was 
intended to provide stability and scientific power needed to transmute the 
traditional society into a modern nation similar to the Western civilized nations. 
Solidarism developed into a philosophical instrument utilized for justifying practical 
programs of action, and, often, political platforms. The Ülkü journal became the 
chief representative of this ideology particularly between 1933-1936. 
At first, it should be noted that the idea of solidarity as the prominent theme in 
the journal texts was considered as an alternative to liberalism, socialism and even 
fascism. In the first issue of the journal, this was laid in quite an obvious manner:  
As we are distancing from individualism through accepting the idea of unity, 
in such a way we are departing from socialism by approving personality. 
We want to be an amassment within our national entity, and we want to 
walk to the goal in the cleanest air of solidarity (tesanüt). According to us, a 
nation is a social organism (uzuvlanma). Everyone has a role and duty in 
this organism. Today, everyone is debtor to his ancestors or contemporaries 
due to his possessions. 
Though it is formulated in more radical intonation, the portrayed idea of 
solidarity is almost congruent with the one developed in the French context. The 
assertion on social debt and duties, the search for a middle way between 
individualism and socialism, the idea of social organism and the like are all 
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reminiscent of the French solidarist tradition.434 Necip Ali tries to explain the quasi-
contract idea of Léon Bourgeois as follows:  
Today this social solidarity is so necessary and natural for the society that 
even though each side had not comitted to a contract with a ceremony, 
certain deeds and acts have authority and power (hüküm ve kudret) like 
almost a contract. 435 
In general, Ülkü authors underlined the theme of creating a mass 
(kütleleşmek), and they tended to formulate the idea of solidarity within this term. 
This might stem from the fact that the increasing radical ambit of both internal and 
external conditions led them to utilize more militant and authoritarian terminology. 
Even the term solidarity was employed as an equivalent of the term kütleleşmek: 
Kütleleşmek is one of the most apparent features of this century The 
world of individualism has eventually become an old fashion. It is 
impossible for a departed thing to reinvigorate once more. For that 
circumstances and occasions will no longer come back again What is the 
characteristic of this bond that amass individuals, which is entitled 
solidarity? It is the sense of duty that attaches people to each other with a 
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common faith by means of various material and spiritual bonds. Individual 
has several duties towards society. Under the regulation and rule of the will 
of state (devlet iradesi) as the will of all individuals and as the supreme will, 
the duties would be able to come to forefront This is what we understand 
by amalgamation.436   
In conjunction with the idea of kütleleşmek, the extreme emphasis on the role 
of the state in regulating and ordering solidarity was very dominant in the Turkish 
version of solidarism.  In Ülküs terminology, the state was considered as the direct 
expression of the will of society.437 The solidarist assumption of duty and debt were 
also verbalized within the theme of the strong state. Recep Peker, the General 
Secretary of the RPP, argued, for instance, in order to have a national duty and 
harmony, everyone has to pay his/her national debt (milli borç) to the state.438 Peker 
objected to the notion that individuals possessed certain inherent and inalienable 
rights that were independent of and preceded society or the state. Such a conception 
of individual rights would weaken the integrity and solidarity of the nation. Peker 
was convinced that the real personal and individual rights could be attained by means 
of establishing a disciplined order. Outside this order, it would be a mistake to search 
for further liberties. In this sense, for Peker, individual liberty was not sacrosanct, but 
something that must be restricted. Accordingly, Turkish people required organization, 
loyalty, and a disposition to sacrifice themselves for the nation. The same set of ideas 
is easily discernible in the writings of the other authors. They, generally, conceived 
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of society and the state as organic and natural entities serving certain purposes that 
transcended the individual. Any emphasis on individual rights and individual 
liberties would impair national sovereignty, and would be a harbinger of national 
disintegration and dissolution.  
For the authors of Ülkü, in general, class struggle among members of the same 
nation was somehow pathological and even illegitimate, not natural. A society, for 
them, was an organic unity, which had to be composed of functionally integrated and 
mutually supportive parts if it was to survive. When those parts were in conflict, the 
entire organism was threatened with dissolution. The only division in their mind was 
between the münevver (enlightened) class and the halk (people) class. The former 
one denotes a disciplined and enlightened elite who have been allegedly equipped 
with certain mental and personal qualifications for the preparation of the latter to the 
standards of modernization including democracy. Again, the former would create a 
new and perfect democracy which accorded sovereignty to all of the Turkish people, 
rather than to a class, a sect, or a faction. Peker maintained that the liberal state type 
and classical parliamentarianism gave rise to an anarchy that would destroy the 
forces of the nation (ulus kuvvetleri). Furthermore, for him, they brought about some 
artificial fragmentations such as partisanship (particilik) and regionalism/localism 
(memleketcilik) among citizens. In this sense, in the liberal states citizens pursue 
personal and class interests rather than state interest: an idea memleketci outside 
party has appeared in those states. However, in our country, RPP is the single 
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national party. For that reason, we have no such idea as memleketci outside party 
(parti dõşõ memleketçi)439 
Therefore, the imposed and interventionist character of the state is more 
dominant in Turkish solidarism than the French case. This was not only due to the 
dominance of state tradition which ordered and regulated social and political life for 
several hundred years, but also to the preference for the Comtian authoritarian 
solidarism on the reformist elite rather than the Durkheimian pluralist solidarism 
based on the countervailing secondary groups. Although the Republican principles 
embraced the idea of solidarism and corporatism of the secondary groups based on 
the occupational division of labor, their de facto attitudes towards them did not give 
rise to liberation of the individual as in the theories of Durkheim. Nonetheless, the 
high degree of stateness in every aspect of the social and economic life signifies 
Comtian connotations that presuppose the role of the state as the unifying and 
regulating force in constituting the perfect system.  
Whatever similarities are between the Turkish Revolutionary ideology and that 
of the authoritarian or even totalitarian ideologies, in fact, indicative of their common 
preoccupations is with saving their states from the global economic and political 
crisis. They all wanted to renovate and further regenerate the cultural and social 
fabric of the nation through substantial institutional and social changes. They, 
preponderantly, advocated a strong, centralized political apparatus that would 
effectively govern a united community and thereby generate a sense of national 
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solidarity. The sense of solidarity that would provide such political integrity was said 
to arise from the natural affinities of geography, ethnicity, language, art and common 
history. This community of similars constitutes the natural foundation of the nation. 
Only such a union, articulated in a vital and effective state, could reduce the feelings 
of inferiority and humiliation that afflicted Turks as a nation.    
4.3.2 Ülküs Consideration of Rights and Duties: All the citizens were 
born as debtors to society 
In line with the Comtean authoritarian solidarism the notion of rights was 
totally conceptualized as the result of duties and debts one owes to the state as well 
as society. On this account, Mustafa Kemal argued that if the state is demolished 
then the forces and means preserving the rights of the individuals would not exist. 
Therefore, for him, freedom should be considered as a two-sided phenomena. He 
went on saying that the state was a guarantor of rights.440 Likewise, Ülkü authors 
contended that basically, right is a social phenomena like freedom. In this sense, 
any claim opposing the general interests cannot be a right: Populism abolishes the 
classes among society.441 Mehmet Saffet gives a good explanation of their solidarist 
assumption of rights and duties:  
The sum of personal (ferdi) rights and duties of citizens form the moral 
order system which is acknowledged by state and society. For that reason, 
the personal rights of citizens always rely upon the principle of common 
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interest of all and at all times correspond to (mütereffik) duty. In this sense, 
the notion of right is a product of and sponsored by society.442 
Although French solidarism particularly aimed at reorganization of the socio-
structural realm by paying attention to welfare and justice in society, Turkish 
solidarism was mostly inclined to homogenize the different parts and the groups of 
society and unite them under a single national community as well as under a national 
culture by constructing new symbolic values which were directly sponsored by the 
State.  
One of the most relevant points for the purpose of this thesis is the 
inseparability of culture from secularism in the minds of the Ülkü elite. That is, 
culture was employed as the seedbed of secularism. Culture developed as the domain 
of the social engineering by which the Ülkü elite imagined their ideal community in 
terms of modern science and civilization as substitutes for the religious and 
traditional elements. In this sense, culture had begun to function as an organizing 
concept, which played a greater role in compensating the spiritual void. It might be 
argued that culture, in Ülkü, was formulated as inseparable from modern and secular 
ethics. In other words, the radical revolutionary leaders designed culture inherently 
as a secular concept. Hasan Ali Yücel, one of the leading figures of the Republican 
elite, argued that in their point of view, Turkish culture was basically secular (Türk 
kültürü layiktir)443. In fact, they did not deny the spiritual character of culture. But, 
                                                
442 Ibid.  
443 Hasan Ali Yücel, Dil İnklabõmõz, Ülkü, Vol. 4, No. 22, (Dec., 1934): 255-7, p. 
257 
 -187- 
the source of this spirituality was anti-religious.444 At this juncture, it should be noted 
that there was no attempt by the radical revolutionary elite to search for a traditional 
and folk culture in several other nationalisms in the world did. It was, therefore, the 
duty of Kemalist nationalism in the 1930s to eliminate the popular notions of Islam 
and the Ottoman heritage in defining a new cultural identity for the Turks. It, first of 
all, refused the idea of culture to preserve its own particular way as protest against 
modernity. Contrary to the attempts of other non-Western and anti-colonial 
nationalists who put strong emphasis on traditional and local values in determining 
their very identity, the main orientation of the radical Kemalists was to structurally 
and culturally adapt Turkey to the West, and so to exclude a resentful nationalism 
confronting the cultural traits of the West.445 
For the Ülkü elite, to attain social solidarity around certain substantive norms 
and cultural symbols became more important than implementing a solidarist policy 
on procedural issues. Ülküs understanding of solidarism, primarily aimed at 
transforming the identities of the individuals in line with the nationalist visionary of 
the radical revolutionaries: a solidarist (mütesanit) society is a nationalist society as 
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 -188- 
well.446 For this formula, real solidarity and social harmony could only be attained 
by means of cooperation of certain natural factors such as blood unity, the unanimity 
of moral quality and history, unity of language and life-style, and finally a unity of 
ideal and interest447 Hence, the Ülkü elite assumed the idea of social solidarity as 
the basis of their ideology around which other principles of the Revolution are 
interwoven: 
We consider social solidarity as a truth (hakikat) corresponding to todays 
life conditions. In line with this way, we claim that all the citizens were born 
as debtors to society, that they are debtors to society for both their material 
and spiritual identities, and that they are duty-bound in their duties towards 
society with not only their state obligations but also their social 
obligations.448 
4.3.3. A Solidarist Vision of Society: There is no Class  
It is argued that the Turkish Revolution was the result of cooperative study of 
faithful children on the way of common ideal with a mutual sense of obligation. 449 
The idea of common good and mutuality was frequently reiterated. Fragmentation 
and division was regarded as the enemy of national solidarity. In this sense, class 
differences and conflicts were assumed damaging to the harmony of the nation. For 
the Ülkü authors, the Turkish society was not the sum of parts thinking apart. Rather, 
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it is a society that thinks and hears together under the presence of saintly principles 
and sublime interests of the country. Naturally, among people who are walking 
together for the sake of great principles and purposes, there is no class difference and 
a class.450 Necip Ali explains the idea of class in predominantly solidarist terms like 
Léon Bourgeois:   
In our opinion and belief, the class differences are not appropriate to the 
historical tendencies and current objective of the Turkish nation. There has 
never been a class division in Turkey and it wont be [in the future] either. 
The classes of the Turkish society are the sign of a large division of labor 
among society for the performance of the national duties. Among society, 
the occupational groups performing different duties are connected to each 
other based on a debt of duty. All these groups (zümre) constitute a 
balancing harmony under the intervention and direction (nezaret) of state, as 
an expression of the general will. Therefore, we do not regard a group 
superior to others, and a domination of one class over others. We identify 
this performance of mutual duty as social solidarity, as a real attribute of 
physiological and psychological life, instead of the abstract ideas of logic 
and sensation We draw all the moral and judical principles from this truth. 
451  
As opposed to class divisions favored by the socialist systems, Ülkü authors 
argued that the primary aim is to organize and dominate the people force (halk 
kuvveti) in the country: we want neither the individual or the group, nor class 
dictatorship, but we want cooperation, unity of feelings, ideas, and ways.452 Beside 
socialism, liberal political and economic philosophy was also condemned by the 
authors. While introducing the legislation on employment (iş kanunu) in the 
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Assembly, Recep Peker generally underlined the significance of the necessity of 
discarding the liberal option and further undertaking a regulatory soul (tanzimci 
ruh)453 in order to establish a national order and harmony (ahenk) in the field of 
economy:  
Friends, we are injecting the application of the idea of unity and collectivity 
of national Étatism (ulusal Devletçilik) to our life as replacement of the 
liberal state type of which our generation witnessed its fragmenting, 
conflicting and destroying spirit dissolving the national unity.454  
The etatist program of the 1930s was to use both private capital and state 
initiative. Clearly, it was not opposed to the principle of private ownership. 
Accordingly, private capital should be allowed only a relative autonomy in the 
service of not the exclusive interests of the capitalists themselves, but those of the 
entire nation. Simply, this could offset Turkeys economic backwardness. 
Nevertheless, the private economy was said to be under state control and 
management. Recep Peker was particularly in line with this conciliation between 
private economy and state control as opposed to the Kadrocu thesis that highlighted 
state control over the entire economic activity (or that left no room for the private 
entrepreneurship.) This did not imply a relative abolition of private property, but 
rather a relative subordination of private initiative and ownership to the superior 
interests of the nation. These superior interests would find expression in the planned 
organization of the state, for the state should be the fundamental agency of national 
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organization and discipline. This system of private initiative that was subject to 
regular tutelary control and intervention of state might resemble socialist 
understanding of economy. However, Peker and his friends were strongly opposed to 
the socialist arguments. To further enhance that opposition, they contended that any 
form of class warfare was to be rejected: In general, in our society, there is no such 
division between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. 455 
The general policy of Ülkü was in conformity with avoiding class struggle of 
any type. Such a struggle could only impair the unity it considered necessary for 
national survival and national solidarity: We want to achieve social order and 
solidarity instead of class conflict (klas kavgasõ) and we wish to establish harmony 
between different interests to such a degree that they would not ill-treat (hõrpalamak) 
each other. 456  For Peker, this consideration is the cachet (kaşe) of their 
understanding of populism.  
Actually, for the Ülkü authors, the new Republic required a regime of 
discipline, solidarity, and sacrifice if it were to survive and prevail in the face of the 
world economic crisis. For that reason, they mainly deplored class warfare as 
inimical to national solidarity. They regarded classes as organic components of the 
national unity that must collaborate in the development and modernization of the 
nation. In their mind, if the Turkish Republic was to survive it would be necessary to 
evoke a sustained sense of national solidarity among its citizens. This could only be 
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possible by means of eradicating any sort of egoism, factionalism and scholastic 
mentalities. When they spoke of the Turk as a race, their reference was to what the 
French have termed an ethnie, a breeding community that occupies a given territory 
and shares a cultural distinctiveness. That is, they never appealed to some racist 
arguments as in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy that highlighted biological 
homogeneity. An awareness of common descent, shared cultural similarities, and a 
sense of common mission equipped the Turkish nation with a social solidarity was 
more important than blood relationship. Furthermore, as Köymen clearly stated, the 
Kemalist regime aimed at establishing a classless society. However, it does not 
want to set up an artificial alignment among the classes or to establish a domination 
of a class over others. 457  Rather, the purpose is to prevent the defective 
development (sakat inkişaf) of society and to hinder the conditions that lead to class 
formation by means of assuring a healthy development of society within a willful 
(iradeci) order, which finds its way through the light of the social sciences.458     
4.3.4. Halk Terbiyesi (Education of the People) to Create Social Solidarity 
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to stress that the education of the people (halk 
terbiyesi) to prevent the defective development of society and to make people 
cultivate (yetiştirmek) themselves and getting them to fit the revolutionary 
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conditions459 that would provide the solidarity and unanimity of the nation, occupies 
a central position in the journal texts. Unless an individual reach to a desired social 
and moral level by means of identifying his personal good and perfection with the 
common good and perfection (müşterek hayõr ve tekemmül), he cannot realize 
himself. In this sense, a society should be a unit in which its members are attached to 
each other with a sense of voluntary solidarity of moral purpose. By this sense of 
solidarity, every individual should be taught that they could be genuine citizens 
(hakiki vatandaş) in so far as they represent the society and state in themselves and 
as their wills are being moralized and socialized in terms of the principle of 
solidarity. 460  However, the ordinary education techniques were considered 
inadequate to meet the revolutionary need of creating genuine citizens at the time: 
Currently, the civilization ship is in a new vortex (girdap). The humanity is 
left, for a while, with no ideal and light (nur) The social bonds as the 
basis of civilization are dissolved during times of crisis. The end result is 
anarchy and dogmatism. The unique solution is peoples education. 
Nevertheless, the existent schools are not adequate for a sound education 
and training in our country. We have to seek as well as produce the real 
means and ways of education outside schools. We call all these means and 
ways people training (halk terbiyesi). In other countries, they call this 
adult education.461 
The moral education of the people outside the existing school system in line 
with revolutionary ethics was particularly essential. This point also testifies that the 
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Turkish radical revolutionaries concern about secularism was built on a solidarist 
understanding of ethics that was said to replace the traditional and religious moral 
precepts in society. The specificity of the 1930s was also regarded as critical to 
instigate an entire moral training of society: the issue of moral and patriotic 
education proves its worth apparently in times especially when rapid economic and 
social changes occur. 462 In these times, for Mehmet Saffet, it is hard to adapt to the 
new conditions. Since there have never been such great social and economic 
transformations in Turkish history before, moral issues are extremely critical.  
During this critical phase, we are witnessing the impact of materialist philosophy 
among our youth. 463 Such a philosophy, for Saffet, is destructive and separatist. For 
the materialist philosophy inculcates unbridled egoism instead of consciousness of 
duty (vazife şuuru) and responsibility. Furthermore, it prefers immediate interests 
and pleasures against national interests. For that reason, the idealist philosophy of 
revolution should be constructed against materialist philosophy. However, it is worth 
mentioning that this kind of consideration of idealism does not correspond to the 
Western idealist philosophical legacy. It denotes, rather, a solidarist implication that 
was justified in so far as it served the requirements of the Revolutionary elite in line 
with the efforts of the construction of laik morality. The relationship between the 
idea of solidarity and social/non-religious morality was explicitly deduced. In order 
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to live in an ambiance of solidarity (tesanüt havasõ), people have to obey the norms 
of the social morality (içtimai ahlak).464  
Actually, as in the case of the French solidarist philosophers, the Ülkü elite 
attempted to find a middle way between materialism and idealism in favor of the 
revolutionary ideals. For instance, on the one hand, the German romanticist and 
idealist philosophy was appreciated due to its endorsement of national idealism as a 
substitute for religious idealism:  
The collective conscience of the Turkish nation is a divinity (ülûhiyet). 
Therefore, the social conscience should also be subject to this divinity. The 
philosophical basis of the symbol of excellence (ekmeliyet remzi) and a 
divinity of the Turkish nation will be taught in congruence with the national 
idealism represented by Kant, Fichte and Hegel in the nineteenth century465  
On the other hand, the German idealist philosophy was condemned for backing 
of new dogmas that would risk the very foundations of the Revolution: Most of 
us are inclined to a kind of strange spiritualism by the impact of German romantic 
philosophy. 466  This would lead to intemperance (ifrat) of conservatism and 
traditionalism. It is argued that revolution means the collapse of most dogmas. In this 
sense, it should not be allowed that new religions and sects (mezhep) to replace the 
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previous ones.467  Hence, the primary duty of schooling is to instill morality and 
citizenship to the people 468 in conjunction with secular moral values. Thats why 
ensuring a better revolutionary education and bringing up (yetiştirmek) good 
citizens of the republic is of utmost importance.469 For this aim the citizens have to 
be taught courses possessing social and moral values.470  Consequently, Turkish 
solidarism emphasized the individual as part of a moral collectivity. It was the 
individuals duty to find his appropriate place within this collectivity. For the Ülkü 
authors, a sense of collective responsibility (müşterek mesuliyet) has to be 
developed in order to overcome spiritual defects of individuals.471 All deviations 
contrary to the principles of solidarity and justice were also to be eliminated by 
means of rationalizing and cultivating the Turkish mind. Since, a non-cultivated 
Turkish mind (işlenmemiş bir Türk kafasõ) would be damaging ten times more than 
the loss of corps.472 
In fact, rationalization of every means of social relations was respected as part 
and parcel of the moral education of the people based on solidarist assumptions of 
ethics. It is argued, the Turkish Revolution aims at rationalizing every kind of 
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mechanism of national body.473 Furthermore, the Revolution requires citizens who 
feel and think in conformity with the structure and character of the Revolution. 474 
In order to save the people from being captive of ignorance and to harmonize with 
the soul and nature of the revolution economic activities and social relations 
should be rationalized:  
It is required to remove the alienation of people towards the innovations 
the Revolution and the Republic brought about. In this sense, our people 
should be taught the modern meanings of spiritual sanctions (manevi 
müeyyideler), moral inclinations, and relief and participation that would 
occupy the place of old religious dominion.475 
In view of that, to make people accustomed to the fruits of the revolution, 
peoples education should be the inculcation and orderly inculcation (nizamlõ 
işlemek) of the minds of people who have reached a normal level of enlightenment in 
the sense of their psycho-physiological qualities. 476 This inculcation will be the 
work of national organization and management in terms of manifestation of the 
national values. It means, melting (yoğurma) of the separated parts (zümre) in 
regard to their accent, sect (mezhep) and civilization into a social body as well as a 
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nation.477 Furthermore, it denotes bringing up the spirit, thought, hearing and will 
of all individuals through inculcation in conformity with the whole ideal of the 
nation. 478 As it is seen, the high-flown radical agenda of the Ülkü elite manifests 
itself also in their consideration of solidarity. One of the Ülkü authors argued that the 
Turkish Revolution became a pioneer for many nations aiming to adapt these kinds 
of radical principles: Earlier than the Italian fascism and German national 
socialism the Turkish Revolution had established a secular and revolutionary 
republican foundation on the basis of populism, nationalism and revolutionism. 479 
Since, it was concerned about the welfare and freedom of individuals through 
populism and wanted to combine the interests of individual and society through 
the principles of nationalism and étatism.480 
4.3.5. The Peoples Houses as the Embodiments of Social Solidarity 
The radical tone of the Ülkü elite became more intense with the establishment 
of the Peoples Houses. In May 10-18, 1931, during the RPP Congress, it was 
decided to found new education centers with the mission of transforming the masses 
into a more enlightened form. For this aim, the Peoples Houses (Halkevleri) were 
                                                
477 Hamit Zübeyr, Halk Terbiyesi Vasõtalarõ, (The Means of People Education) 
Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 152-9, p. 152 
478 Ibid 
479 Şevket Mehmedali, Hukuk Bakõmõndan Buhran, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 13, (March, 
1934): 20-26, p. 26 
480 Ibid. 
 -199- 
founded on February 19, 1932 in 14 different cities.481 The People Houses as adult 
education (terbiye) centers were expected to propagate the principles of the RPP. 
Their purpose was to bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and people by 
teaching the first of these the national culture which existed among the Anatolian 
masses and, the second, the rudiments of civilization, and an indoctrination of the 
nationalist secular ideas of the Republican regime. 482  In other words, Peoples 
Houses were founded to provide ideological and political education. 483 They are 
the institutional setting for the revolutionary rituals and harbinger of the radical 
Kemalist elite who played profound roles in designing rituals and acting out root 
paradigms of the laic national ideology of the Turkish Revolution.  
In the opening speech of the People Houses, Recep Peker, the general secretary 
of the party and the prominent ideologue of the Houses, argued that the state should 
nourish and train people to transform them into a collective mass (kollektif kütle). 
Moreover, he stated, under the roof of the Houses, we aimed at gathering all our 
citizens and ascending them to national unity by means of an accomplished cultural 
study.484 The leaders of the RPP mainly targeted to establish alternative centers of 
socialization based on the ideology of the Turkish Revolution that were going to 
replace the previous traditional ones. On the first anniversary of the People Houses, 
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Necip Ali, the General Director of Ülkü, wrote that the Houses had been established 
as duty hearts (vazife ocaklarõ), which corresponded to the social debts and social 
solidarity. In his view, as part of his understanding of social solidarity (içtimai 
tesanüt), every citizen is born as a debtor not only to the state but also to society. In 
this sense, for Necip Ali, the Houses were the embodiments of the social obligation 
and solidarity.485 Parallel to this, in 1935, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, the Head of the 
Youth Department of the Peoples Houses, prepared an official report on the Houses 
for the RPP. In this report, Çağlar summarized the functions of the Houses as the 
institutions of social solidarity and obligation aimed at homogenizing Turkish 
people.486  
In short, it can be argued that the People Houses were founded as the chief 
ideological agents of the Republic that performed the task of socialization of people 
in accordance with the principles of the RPP. Actually, this was the state-imposed 
task to mature the people culturally for the requirements of contemporary 
civilization. The establishment of the Peoples Houses was, therefore, part of a 
general effort to civilize the crude masses and to mold the adults to participate in a 
politically and culturally new regime, which stipulated certain duties for them to be 
performed. In this sense, the main task of the instructors in the Houses was one of 
bringing the elements of general culture and modern civilization rather than 
vocational training.     
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The Houses, first and foremost, were regarded as the essential and valuable 
national institutions disseminating the Kemalist ideal (Kemalist Ülkü). 487 
Furthermore, people were invited to the Houses so as to enlighten their brain 
(dimağ) and to nourish their belief more in the ideal of Atatürk. The aim of the 
Houses was to bring the nation up to the good and right. The solidarist idea was 
highlighted particularly with respect to the functions of the Houses: The Houses 
will create a totality of people retaining solidarity on sublime ideals. Moreover, they 
will transform the people into a mass that is single in faith, contemplation and 
excitement.488 In one of the prominent newspapers of the Republic of the time, 
Cumhuriyet, it is contended that the Houses provides the new principles of life 
created by the Turkish Revolution as moral precepts for the citizens. (Türk 
İnklabõnõn yarattõğõ yeni yaşayõş kaidelerini bir ahlak halinde vatandaşlara verir.)489 
The radical revolutionaries of the 1930s sought to guarantee the loyalty of the 
citizens through continued mass education via the Peoples Houses designed to 
appeal of all segments of society. 
For the Ülkü elite, normal schools were not able to assure this kind of 
education that would raise the peoples consciousness commensurate to the new 
conditions. The main factor in education should be teaching of collective culture. 
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Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior of that period, explicitly argued, there is not a 
class difference and class struggle in our culture. 490  Accordingly, the People's 
Houses provided a strong basis for the perpetuation of the new Turkish regime. The 
Houses were established to create the Turkish culture. Only by the impact and power 
of collective culture created by the revolution, an ideal society could be created:   
Distribution (pay vermek) of national culture over the wider segments of the 
people of Turkish nation, and in doing so, making the mindful groups take 
part in political and social life is of utmost importance. So, the primary goal 
of the people education via the Peoples Houses was to make peoples 
become conscious of the desire to progress and be civilized and to have this 
desire remain permanent. Furthermore, it aims at inculcating people to make 
them cultivate (yetiştirmek) themselves and getting people to appropriately 
fit the new conditions.491  
This meant that through mass, adult education, the radical revolutionary elite 
aimed at securing the revolution from potential future disappointments. However, the 
relative heterogeneity and differences among society in religious, ethnic, economic 
and cultural sense was the basic obstacle in front of the revolutionary ideal that 
aimed at unifying all the elements in congruence with the principles of the new state. 
How could a sense of unity be fostered in a country with so many varieties and 
divergences? The revolutionaries aimed at the assimilation of all forms of religious, 
ethnic and class interests and the erection of new arrangements based on solidarity. 
The basic national goal should be the cultivation of the masses until the time came 
when people themselves were so well disciplined that they did not need strict control. 
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The primary objective of the revolutionary elite was to establish the authority and 
discipline needed to organize the people. The Peoples Houses as the national culture 
centers were considered as the safety props (emniyet payandalarõ) of the future of 
the Turks. It is contended that the invigorating charm (ihyakar sihiri) of the 
Atatürk regime will spring up from these institutions which were charged with a 
mission to gather and mobilize the whole nation.492  
By establishing the Peoples Houses, the Republican regime aimed at 
cultivating and traning the people and actually introducing them into a so-called 
civilized world. Moreover, these were the institutions creating conditions for re-
making ourselves (kendimizi yapmak)493 that were to shape the political subject 
required for the Kemalist values to be realised in practice. Hence, the basic agenda 
behind the establishment of such institutions was not only to enable the 
internalization of the values and principles of the new regime, but also to create a 
nation that would learn how to rule themselves in conformity with the directions as 
well as prescriptions given by these institutions. Indoctrination was, therefore, 
accompanied by the creation of institutional practices as in the case of the Peoples 
Houses:  
After saving the country, the Peoples Party (Halk Fõrkasõ) is brought to 
undertake the duty of constructing a strong Turkey. The Party strives to 
make citizens believe its own cause. It will gather and unify the youth 
around the republican, nationalist, populist, etatist and laic principles via the 
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Peoples Houses. Furthermore, it will mobilize the mass around the 
revolutionary cause.494 
At the same time, the justification of such institutions was produced: a 
collection of knowledge that designated the people (halk) as an object of inquiry that 
would enable the state elite to shape their policies in a more concrete manner. That is, 
the information about the people collected through the Houses would provide new 
data for the state elite in their social engineering projects. Orderly society and docile 
bodies could only be possible by means of these institutions which create new 
domains of disciplinary matrix for the state. Politics alone was unable to guarantee 
order. Politics had to be superseded by the new techniques of power that would look 
at the very roots of social behaviour. In this sense, the intellectuals were invited to 
take part in enlightenment of society to construct a harmonious, well-ordered and 
amalgamated nation:  
In Ülkü, there will be issued articles of those who believe the great cause 
(dava), and who make the Turkish society believe this, and who want to 
take part and duty in the way of the service that expects the creation of a 
collective and excited national totality We call the current Turkish 
intellectuals to the Peoples Houses for the service that would enable the 
intellectuals to enlighten, advance, and enforce their society, and amass 
(kütleleştirmek) them by saving from individuality.495 
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For that reason, first of all, the national culture should remove the elements 
incongruent with its character.496 Certainly, it can be argued that the character of the 
national culture was determined by the enlightened imaginaire of the revolutionary 
elite. It was extremely unsafe to leave the realm of national culture to the initiative of 
a nation who was already not ripe for the anticipated ideal conditions of democracy. 
According to Nusret Kemal, the party and state, which aimed at bolstering and 
consolidating democracy in the country, assume the issue of training as the most 
urgent task. 497 Accordingly, the primary target of inculcation (terbiye) is to bestow 
culture in its broadest sense. 498  For the most urgent thing necessary for a 
democratic citizen (demokrasi vatandaşõ) is to have a broad culture by means of the 
principle of populism. In this sense, it is quite interesting that Atatürk defined 
populism as a synonym for democracy. 499  For Kemal Karpat, the Peoples Houses, 
which embody the principle of populism were aimed to bridge the gap between the 
intelligentsia and people by teaching the first of these the national culture which lay 
among the Anatolian masses and, the second, the rudiments of civilization, and an 
indoctrination of the nationalist secular ideas of the Republican regime.500  Along 
these lines, as Necip Ali maintained, The Peoples Houses as National Temples 
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(Milli Tapõnaklar) are donated with such significant duties and obligations, which 
would bring people to the high culture.501  İsmet İnönü put in plain words the 
significance of the role of the Houses in moral and scientific training of the people in 
that world conjuncture: 
The Peoples Houses were devised as the places where notions of morality, 
science and intelligence are being explained, applied, developed, enrooted 
and established in the Turkish fatherland. Particularly, I want to focus on the 
great role the Houses are playing in the realms of morality and 
personality The primary moral stance must be the Turkish citizenship 
Self-sacrifice (fedakarlõk) should be the first and foremost duty of our 
citizens in this quite intricate ambiance surrounding our globe.502 
For the advancement of economic and social life, the existent economic 
(external) conditions were regarded not sufficient. The inner existence (iç varlõk) of 
the individuals and society should also be fed and rised.503 In that sense, the Houses 
were designed to fill the ethical vacuum504 the revolution had hitherto created. For 
that reason, much of the articles in the journal occupy a central place to the 
missionary role of the Houses to convert the hearts of the people who were regarded 
to be in need of secular purification. Dissatisfied with the existing traditional and 
religious moral standings, the ethical assimilation of people was explicitly pursued.  
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The revolutionary education was, in this sense, imparted in a missionary spirit 
of civilizing the uncivilized, as is revealed, for instance, in Koymens invitation of 
the village teachers to act as the village missionary. He argues that the previous 
techniques of missionary including the ones exercised in the savage African tribes 
became outmoded. The contemporary missionary, for Koymen, is aimed to capture 
the souls of uncivilized village populations.505 Therefore, to the mind of the Ülkü 
elite, the peoples education and administration is an apostolic (havarilik) craft. 506 
For that reason, only the person who possesses an apostle spirit moral quality, 
definite principle, and carries humane affection in his heart would be able to achieve 
it.507 This Salvationist myth that aspired to rescue the people from their present 
moral attachments generating spiritual oppression was reminiscent of the Jacobin 
political philosophy descended from Rousseau, which ascribed education a secular 
missionary role. The adherents have looked to education for redress, for the means to 
rectify the failings of past and present generations of adults. The existing society and 
politics are perceived as corrupt. Accordingly, a prime objective must be to distance 
the people as far as is possible from the various forms of socializations provided by 
the traditional authorities.  
The Peoples Houses helped institutionalize several practices that the secular 
morality would leave at least as an unconscious legacy to later generations. The 
intense associations of regeneration and new life came to be invented in the concept 
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of the people, the halk. Having rejected all religious bases for morality, and having 
lost some of their faith in traditional populations, the Ülkü authors came increasingly 
to invoke the name of the people as a deeper source of truth. However, their idea of 
the people had little to do with real people and much to do with their own need for 
some new sanction for their activities. Actually, they found it useful to rebaptize the 
old instruments of power with the sacred name of halk.  
In that sense, their understanding of democracy was totally different from the 
one in the Western sense, but something new which went under the name of peoples 
democracy, or populist democracy (halkçõ demokrasi). The radical revolutionaries 
alternative was mainly grounded on the solidarist and populist assumptions of 
democracy, which they saw as the most appropriate form of democracy for 
Turkey. 508  This kind of perception of democracy generally highlighted the 
unanimity and harmony of society centered on the concepts of duty and obligation 
rather than that of individual rights and responsibilities. For the alleged 
democratization of society, the Peoples Houses were designed to remove all outer 
signs of conflict and the suppression of alternative value systems to preserve the 
harmony and uniformity of society.   
It can be argued that with the beginning of the 1930s, the Kemalist ruling elite 
aimed to succeed not only in entrenching a strong stable system of single party rule, 
but also in launching its own variety of modernizing revolution. A great deal of time 
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and energy was invested in mobilizing society in line with the ideals of the 
Revolution. The realization of such ideals depended on the entrenchment of a 
workable system of recruitment and socialization of the individuals through certain 
effective institutions. The peculiar conditions of 1930 in the history of the Turkish 
Republic led the ruling cadre to restructure and refashion the existing institutions of 
revolution.  
What they required was to rigorously organize recruitment in order to solve the 
contradiction between the need for quantity and quality. Whether those recruited 
from the traditional society would identify themselves with the new political order 
and the current revolutionary goals became a crucial question for the ruling elite. 
Maximization of ideological quality of people was necessary for the perpetuation of 
the new regime. In this sense, the establishment of Peoples Houses was the result of 
an idea of creating an effective institution of recruitment, which would cultivate 
people in line with the solidarist and populist aims of the Republic. Furthermore, 
through these institutions, the radical revolutionaries sought to centralize power to 
control the wayward ethnic and religious populations, to encourage notions of 
national solidarity, and to inculcate collective habits, thereby to resolve the crisis 
of social, political and economic order prevalent at the beginning of the 1930s.  
Hence, the radical revolutionary elite of the 1930s aimed at creating a 
homogenous, ordered and unified national society by means of articulating the 
French solidarist assumptions to the present needs. Turkish nation and culture has 
been characterized only in an abstract and formal sense. We see a populist 
idealization of the Turkish nation as an egalitarian and harmonious community, free 
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from internal dissent and struggle. The Ülkü elite aimed at giving priority to 
constructive planning, regulatory, and imperative role to the state in order to reach 
the contemporary level of civilization and to realize social peace and order without 
giving rise to class struggle.  
The imposed and interventionist character of state is more determinant in 
Turkish solidarism than in the French case. The Ülkü elite preferred Comtian 
authoritarian solidarism rather than Durkheimian pluralist solidarism based on 
countervailing secondary groups. The Republican principles embraced the idea of 
solidarism and corporatism of the secondary groups based on the occupational 
division of labor. However, their de facto attitudes towards these groups did not give 
rise to liberation of the individual as in the theories of Durkheim. In my view, the 
Ülkü elite accepted Durkheims formulations generally on the theoretical level. 
Nonetheless, the high degree of stateness in every aspect of the social and economic 
life signifies a Comtian connotation that presupposes the role of the state as the 
unifying and regulating force in constituting the perfect system.  
To bring the society to an ordered and harmonious entity was the main impetus 
behind the Turkish version of solidarism. It not only had the goal to improve the 
country economically and technically, but also attempted to create a citizen who 
would sacrifice himself in favor of the interest of the whole. Individual life should be 
sacrificed for the society; moreover, it is a duty to put even life in jeopardy in favor 
of society.509 Individuals had certain duties and obligations towards the nation to 
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which he or she was debtor. Because of the interests of the nation are the same and 
single, there was no need to maintain different interests and ideas in society. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FIRST PILLAR OF SOLIDARISM: THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
LAIC MORALITY THROUGH MASS EDUCATION 
The aim of the present chapter is to examine the attitudes of the Ülkü elite 
towards the problem of morality and religion as expressed in their articles. Although 
the most highlighted issue in Ülkü was education (inculcation) of people (halk 
terbiyesi), the reason why this study underlines the problem of morality and religion 
is due to the fact that not only this point constitutes the essence of the issue of 
national education but also it shows the solidarist character of Ülkü. As mentioned 
before, solidarism has two important premises. The first one is to develop a moral 
consensus based on the secular notions of duty and debt with which social order was 
said to be possible. The second one is to establish a classless and undifferentiated 
social entity unified around common goals that was expected to prevent social 
conflicts and disorder in the way to democracy. Given that this study traces the line 
of solidarism in the first decades of the Turkish Republic, this chapter will analyze 
the first characteristic of solidarism in Ülkü: the formation of revolutionary secular 
morality (laik ahlak).  
The main problematic of this thesis is that the Ülkü elites consideration of 
morality, based on solidarist assumptions revealed a tension between secularism and 
democracy. Solidarism is the expression of this tension. The Ülkü elite was actually 
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torn between the competing goals of enlightening (secularism) and emancipating 
(democracy) the people. This tension between secularism and democracy proved to 
be a serious obstacle to achieving a democratic system and society, an issue that was 
addressed by arguing that in a society which was not converted to secular or 
revolutionary morality, democracy was not possible. 
In the minds of Ülkü elite, secularism (laiklik) denotes an alternative morality 
to religious moral teachings. The religious morality, which should be preserved only 
in the individual conscience, was considered as a potential threat to this alternative 
revolutionary morality. In this sense, the religious morality filled with scholastic 
dogmas was seen as an obstacle for preparing people for the ideal democracy. In 
order to establish democratic representation, religious and traditional remnants had to 
be extirpated by means of national education.  Hence, constructing a secular morality 
outside the domain of religious and traditional understanding of ethics, which they 
saw as the ultimate basis of their peculiar vision of democracy became one of the 
chief concerns of the authors of Ülkü.  
This chapter also discusses how the Peoples Houses (Halkevleri) became the 
chief instruments of inculcation of a new secular morality to transform the society. It 
can be argued that the Peoples Houses were established so as to construct and 
further disseminate laik morality to the wider segments of society. By these 
institutions, the re-constructivist revolutionary elite targeted to instill the principles 
of the regime in society through using the secular rites and symbols to supplant the 
social meaning and power of popular religious beliefs. Hence, the principles of the 
RPP had not only become the basic terms of the Turkish constitution, but also 
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guiding codes that determined the goals of ritual performances enacted in the Houses. 
According to the authors of Ülkü, the Peoples Houses that they called Temples of 
Ideal (Ülkü Mabetleri)510 were the centers where the principles of the Republican 
Peoples Party (RPP) were taught and practiced. The analysis of the Ülkü journal as 
an official publication of the Peoples Houses would also show how members from 
society were recruited to the party-state through the Houses in line with solidarist 
ideas. In this sense, the authors of the Ülkü journal, in general, sought to develop an 
alternative moral ground on which the Turkish nation would be able to perpetuate 
their lives independent of any religious moral precept. For this aim, religious control 
of influence over education, marriage, funerals, festivals, holidays and the like were 
to be sharply curtailed. It can be argued that this was the greatest anti-clerical 
struggle in Turkish history, at least at the level of discourse.  
This ideology of anti-clericalism had long roots in eighteenth century 
rationalism and enlightenment developed in France. The various philosophies of the 
nineteenth century, positivism, the cult of science, solidarism etc., contributed to the 
intellectual heritage of the French Republicans who had relatively plausible reasons 
to dislike religion and tradition in their own political battles. In fact, at first sight, it 
may be possible to consider the Ülkü circle as the immediate outcome of the 
domineering impact of Western rationalist, solidarist and positivist philosophy that 
had hitherto constituted a strong consensus among the Revolutionary elite. 
Nevertheless, if it is thoroughly examined, the peculiar conditions of the 1930s also 
paved the way to a novel consideration of morality that would assure the moral order 
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of society through making them exalt the very fruits of the Revolution. In this sense, 
this also signified a new direction in Turkeys path to secularization.   
The formation of the Free Party and in the aftermath, developments led the 
state elite to adopt a strong conviction that politics and culture of the Revolution 
were not successfully disseminated to the people. A considerable segment of the 
population were tempted to support the Free Party in showing their discontent toward 
RPP through several public protests and demonstrations. After the Free Party 
experiment, the secularization policy of the RPP underwent certain modifications in 
terms of attitude to the issue of religion. The control of religion was accompanied by 
more intensive concentration on developing an alternative moral ground quite apart 
from any religious and traditional ethics. It was just after the dissolution of the Free 
Party that a major effort was made to formulate the theoretical basis of the regime 
and that much attention was devoted to the problem of the education of the people 
(halk terbiyesi). The old values and patterns were being seriously revised in order to 
overcome that relative weakness of the regime in charming the popular appeal of the 
nation during the municipality elections in 1930. The radical laicist and positivist 
thoughts of the previous Young Turk intellectuals represented by Garbcõlar were 
gradually able to gain ground during those years. As Adnan Adivar puts, The 
domination of Western thought, or rather of the positivism of the West, was at that 
time so intense that one can hardly call it thought. 511 Adivar identifies Turkey as a 
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positivistic mausoleum where the predominance of the official dogma of 
irreligion is a salient feature that transformed positivistic thought into a kind of 
religion and further assumed much the same position as was formerly occupied by 
the old Islamic dogma.512   
Hence, with attempts at multi-party experience, the Kemalist elite of that 
specific time period felt a strong necessity to handle the problem of national 
education in a totally different way that emphasized the redefinition of morality. This 
kind of perception of morality marked a significant shift from control to the 
displacement perspective with respect to the issue of religion.513 Religion began to be 
no more a constituent part of morality than had been before; rather it was even 
considered as a detrimental factor in establishing revolutionary or national 
morality. It should be noted that before 1930 the Revolutionary leaders aimed at 
eradicating the public visibility of Islam through certain acts and reforms. However, 
there had been several attempts to utilize religion in favor of the modernization of the 
country. The Gökalpian way of modernization that assumed religion as a relatively 
important factor in the nation-building process was not totally discarded by the 
Kemalist ruling elite before 1930. It is true that the highest value and central 
symbol for the ruling cadre became not Islam but Turkism, or nationalism, or 
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Kemalism, or, simply, the Revolution 514  While, on the one hand, the 
Revolutionary rulers aimed at breaking up the existence of Islam in politics via 
several secular reforms, on the other hand, they aspired to control and further 
restructure religion in conformity with the general objectives of the Revolution. It 
can be argued that the pre-1930 Revolutionary politics of religion signifies a 
pendulum swinging between control and disestablishment attitudes concerning 
religion. However, after the Free Party experience, there began a tendency towards 
constructing a secular, revolutionary morality that would not require the resort to 
religion. The disestablishment perspective began to be the most stressed approach as 
state policy.  
5.1. LAICITÉ AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER IN THE FRENCH 
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 
5.1.1. Where Does the Turkish Experience Fit within Different Paths of 
Secularization? 
Drawing on a theory of secularization, David Martin held that there is not a 
particular and unitary pattern of secularization. Each state has its own secularization 
pattern dependent upon the historical events that one experienced. In simple terms, 
secularization is not a unilinear process, but it has different consequences in different 
societies. Martin continues to argue that secularization initially takes place within the 
realm of the Christian societies. That is, for him, a general theory of secularization 
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can only be drawn by means of taking Christianity and the societies with a Christian 
historical period as the unit of analysis. However, secularization was then exported to 
or qualified for other societies with certain modifications. Moreover, each Christian 
state with a different sect and historical background also carries different patterns of 
secularization. He mainly points to six patterns of secularization: (i) The American 
Pattern; (ii) The British Pattern; (iii) The French (Latin) Pattern and The South 
American (extended Latin) Pattern; (iv) The Russian Pattern; (v) The Calvinist 
Pattern and finally (vi) The Lutheran Pattern. Beside these patterns, there are three 
main criteria that Martin defines with which the basic patterns were manifested. 
These are individualism, pluralism and Calvinist salience. For instance, the degree of 
pluralism of a country determines the range of its pattern of secularization. In a 
country with mass religious beliefs based on Catholic monopoly and lesser degree of 
pluralism like France, secularization has resulted in a polarization and a 
radicalization of both the religious and secular sides. On the contrary, in a pluralistic 
country like the United States, religion has never caused such a polarization and 
cleavages.515 
From the standpoint of this general theory of secularization, it can be argued 
that Turkey has also its peculiar way of secularization that has certain idiosyncratic 
characteristics. Actually, in the Turkish context, it is more accurate to talk about 
secularism than secularization. It is a common idea that secularization is not the same 
as secularism. Secularization relates essentially to a process of decline in religious 
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activities, beliefs, ways of thinking, and institutions that occurs primarily in 
association with, or as an unconscious or unintended consequence of, other processes 
of social structural change. On the other hand, secularism is an ideology that aims to 
denounce all forms of supernaturalism and agencies devoted to it, advocate 
nonreligious, antireligious, or anti-clerical principles as the basis for personal 
morality and social organization.516 Secularism, in short, aims to establish a secular 
society. Therefore, for a secularist presumption, the ultimate structure of society will 
be secular. Cox expresses this in his famous book The Secular City. For him, 
whereas secularization implies a continuing and open-ended process in which values 
and world views are continually revised in accordance with evolutionary change in 
history, secularism, like religion, projects a closed world-view and an absolute set of 
values in line with an ultimate historical purpose having a final significance for 
human beings.517  In view of that, the Turkish case can, to a considerable extent, be 
categorized under the banner of secularism. However, the term secularism does 
also not correspond to the complex structure of the Turkish laiklik.    
Along these lines of argumentation, this study argues that Turkish 
secularization has also its own peculiar pattern though its peculiarity is mainly based 
on its appropriation of the French legacy and modification of French secularity 
tradition to the Turkish context. Furthermore, the secular conversion of Turkey in the 
1930s was the artifact of the combination of the French legacy with the political 
religion of a rising totalitarian regime. The French Revolution created a political 
                                                
516 Bryan Wilson, Secularization in The Encyclopedia of Religion, editor in chief 
Mircea Eliade, (New York: Macmillan, 1987), p. 159 
 -220- 
legacy in which the object of worship was shifted from God to nation. As George 
Mosse aptly notes, it was a new politics that sought to express and enhance national 
unity or general will through the creation of a political style which became, in 
reality, a secularized religion.518 This new style, actually, embraced the utilization 
of national myths and symbols and the creation of a liturgy that enabled people to a 
direct participation in national worship. For Mosse, the mass movements and 
revolutions of the twentieth century adopted and appropriated this style with minor 
modification and thus became the heirs of a French revolutionary tradition that had 
long presented an alternative to parliamentary democracy. So, the Turkish 
Revolution was also one of its heirs, which showed this style mostly in the 1930s. In 
this sense, though Laiklik519 could solely be understood within the peculiar historical 
context of Turkey, the Turkish peculiarity could not be deciphered unless the French 
Revolutionary and Republican heritages are covered. For that very reason, this study 
traces the roots of Turkish laiklik within the historical circumstance of France. Like 
the French Revolutionary elite, the Turkish Revolutionary elite imagined their own 
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ancién regime, monarchy, feudality, scholasticism and the like. That is, they began to 
read their history more or less the same as the French Revolutionaries did. Moreover, 
the undertaking of laicité as a central pillar of state; anticlericalism; the creation of 
morale laïque and solidarist foundation of ethics; laicization of education and the 
church-state relations in France became the chief model for the Turkish 
Revolutionary leaders in their nation-building process. In this sense, the French case 
is extremely important in analyzing the Turkish secularization path. 
5.1.2. Laicité and Laic Education in the French Republican History 
Durkheim considered the Revolution of 1789 as having comparable features 
with the most primitive and simple religions. To him, in the Revolution, things 
purely laical by nature were transformed by public opinion into sacred things.520 In 
this sense, the very principles of the Revolution themselves became a religion: In a 
word, they have been a religion which had its martyrs and apostles, which has 
profoundly moved the masses, and which, after all, has given birth to great 
things. 521  The Revolutionary elite was mainly concerned with the problem of 
symbolic legitimation, especially with the Jacobin era. Albert Mathiez argued that 
the Revolution formed a new symbolic system, which had constituted a revolutionary 
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religion in the Durkheimian sense. In this sense, the festivals and federations that 
were convoked to celebrate important revolutionary events were the rituals of the 
new religion.522 Alexis de Tocqueville made also similar argumentations about the 
religious character of the Revolution:  
Thus the French Revolution, though ostensibly political in origin, 
functioned on the lines, and assumed many of the aspects, of a religious 
revolution. Not only did it have repercussions far beyond French territory, 
but like all great religious movements it resorted to propaganda and 
broadcast a gospel. This was something quite unprecedented: a political 
revolution that sought proselytes all the world over and applied itself as 
ardently to converting foreigners as compatriots.523  
Tocqueville was mainly concerned with the messianic quality of revolutionary 
religion. Especially in the recent decades, many scholars have focused on this 
religio-sacred character of the French Revolution. Mona Ozouf is the most popular 
among them. Her famous Festivals and the Revolution contributed much to the 
analysis of the symbolic system of the Revolution. According to her, the 
revolutionary festival, first and foremost, was aimed at accomplishing a 
transference of sacrality. For Mona Ozouf, the festivals of revolution bespeak of a 
transfer of sacrality onto political and social values524 and a definition of a new 
legitimacy through which the new regime instituted and consecrated itself. This 
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attempt of transference of sacrality, spread throughout Europe by the French 
Revolution, put the relationships between politics and religion into a new dimension. 
It can be argued that, this attempt made politics religious and gave an educational 
mission to the state.525  Furthermore, it thus initiated a new era of rivalry and 
conflict between civic and traditional religion526. 
Drawing upon the Durkheimian conception of culture, Ozouf argued that the 
revolutionary festivals should not be viewed as the epiphenomenal superstructure of 
the Revolution, but rather, as its constitutive infrastructure by which the new regime 
ordered and revitalized itself. Festivals were the attempts to satisfy social and 
psychic needs for order, for community and for the sacred. Moreover, the festival 
was the Revolutions utopian vision of itself. The general characteristics of the 
Revolutionary festivals were their utilization for the consecration of the new regime 
through certain rites and symbols that aimed at fulfilling the utopian vision of 
Rousseauian volonté générale. The festival, furthermore, represented the 
revolutionary embodiment of the French Enlightenment thought which foreshadowed 
not only the imposition of a uniform social vision upon a divided nation by a strong 
centralized state, but also a victory of the egalitarian principle over that of individual 
freedom. This thought had been interpreted by the Jacobins as a new political style 
assuming an ultimate unanimity that could only be fully achieved through an order of 
terror. This utopian Rousseauist understanding of politics became also a guiding 
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principle, especially for the Jacobins, in shaping the revolutionary cultural policy. 
Jacobins like Maximilien Robespierre realized that  
The common people need the stimulus of ceremonies if they are to share (in 
Rousseaus words about his civil religion) those sentiments of sociability, 
without which it is impossible to be a good subject and a faithful citizen: 
hence the provision of frequent festivals, with hymns and civic chants, in 
honor of liberty and equality, justice, courage, love, infancy, agriculture, 
posterity, as well as Supreme Being.527  
Jacobins systematically utilized popular societies and meetings, theaters, civic 
games, military institutions and national as well as local festivals for the civic 
indoctrination of the population as a whole. For Robert Palmer, these activities and 
festivals cannot be evaluated as an acute form of the patriotic celebrations once 
more common in democratic societies, but on the contrary they were the signs of a 
compulsive ideology and foretaste of the mass manipulation used recently by 
totalitarian regimes. 528  Moreover, all these would be considered as part of a 
program of adult education as in the case of the Peoples Houses in Turkey. The 
rationale behind this education was to create a world of sights and sounds by which 
grown men and women would be remade for the Revolution. 529  This seeming 
attempt of acculturation had actually less to do with culture than with control. It was 
the social control of the population that aimed to construct a civic vision of classless 
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harmony530.  On February 5, 1794 Robespierre made a public speech in which he 
drew the essential characteristics of the Revolutionary regime opposite of the ancien 
régime: 
In our country, we want to replace egoism with morality, honour with 
honesty, the tyranny of fashion with the rule of reason, contempt for 
misfortune with contempt for vice, insolence with self-respect, vanity with 
greatness of soul, love of money with love of gloire the pettiness of les 
grands with the greatness of man, an amiable, frivolous and wretched 
people with one that is magnanimous, strong and happy, that is to say all the 
vices and stupidities of the monarchy with all the virtues and miracles of the 
republic531  
In a similar fashion with Saint-Just, Robespierre also thought that in order to 
establish the reign of virtue, all the factions and parties had to be annihilated. The 
Revolutionary Government should overcome and subdue the storm of the 
Revolution. 532  Actually, for Rebespierre, politics was nothing more than public 
morality.533 Motherhood; respect for the old; gentleness to the young: all these 
values were held to be a school for citizenship.534  
Though Napoleons Concordat with the Pope in 1882 allowed the restoration 
of religious cults, the search for alternative cults and beliefs continued to gain 
                                                
530  Patrice Higonnet, Goodness beyond Virtue; Jacobins during the French 
Revolution, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998), p. 166  
531  Cited in John Hardman (ed), The French Revolution; Sourcebook, (London: 
Arnold, 1999), pp. 225-226 
532 Jacob L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, p. 138 
533  Simon Schama, Citizens; A Chronicle of the French Revolution, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 153 
 -226- 
currency among the intellectuals. The immediate memory of Revolution that made 
possible various counter-religious cults were still flourishing. The replacement of the 
Gregorian calendar with the Republican one, the conversion of parish churches to the 
Temples of Reason, the discrediting of any other religion than that of Truth and 
Reason and closing the churches of all other sects by the Paris Commune, and 
Robespierres non-deistic creed paved the way to ideas and cults based on anti-
clerical, laic, rational and scientific faith for the later generations. 535  Albeit 
discontinuities, the Revolutionary legacy that stressed the creation of egalitarian, laic 
and civic society continued to inspire the Republican elite throughout the nineteenth 
century.  
5.1.3. Secular Morality (Morale Laique), Secular Education and Social 
Solidarity in the French Third Republic 
The second half of the nineteenth century marked an era when almost every 
Frenchmen felt the necessity to formulate a prescription for the profound anarchy 
in all spheres of social and political life. What could be done to cure the spiritual 
sickness of France? or what kind of edifice should be erected on the site left vacant 
by the disappearance of Monarchy and Feudalism, the Nobility and the Church536 
were the common questions for the intellectuals and rulers from the most 
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conservative to the atheist. It was generally agreed that the nation should obtain 
certain common goals in shaping its destiny. But, its method and means in 
determining the very principles of this commonality varied in accordance with 
different ideological stances. The 1870s were the most outstanding periods when the 
competition as well as struggle over the formulation of these principles reached its 
peak among the intellectual and state elite.  
The first prominent character of the Third Republic that contributed to the 
formation of a solidarist laic ethic was Léon Gambetta. He was very active during the 
formation of the Third Republic. Actually, as the Minister of the Interior, he 
proclaimed the Republic on September 4, 1870. 537  However, it was a de facto 
republic. The peace with Prussia was made in the name of the Republic, the armies 
obeyed and conformed to the Republic. But the republicans were only one third of 
the Assembly. Even, this de facto Republic had not a constitution yet. The first few 
years of the Republic were devoted to the task of constitution building. Due to the 
fact that the number of Monarchists and Royalists in the Assembly was more than 
Republicans and Revolutionaries until 1876, Royalist opinion had dominated in the 
National Assembly during this constitution building process.538  The Republicans 
could take control in 1877, when they put an end to the domination of Monarchists 
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with a coup détat539.  Actually, one of the primary aims of Gambetta was to reduce 
the social division and to establish a unity between classes. Actually, he even denied 
using the term class: Remember, gentlemen, I said couches, not classes: that is a 
distasteful word I never use. 540  His social policy was, mainly, based on the 
promotion of the socially integrative concept of solidarité. 541  Having aimed at 
regenerating the nation, he wanted every strata of the nation to assemble around the 
principles of the Republic. In the election campaign of 1871, he said that only the 
Republic can effect the harmonious reconciliation between the legitimate demands of 
workers and the respect for the sacred rights of property.542 For him, unless this 
reconciliation is established, order cannot be attainable. 
Gambetta was, at the same time, one of the chief spokesmen of anticlericalism. 
His famous motto: La cléricalisme  voilà lennemi! (clericalism  theres the 
enemy) was an outcome of his strong antagonism towards religion. There had been a 
marked correspondence between anti-clericalism and the secular education in 
Gambettas polity. For him, ecole laïque was necessary in order for Frenchmen to be 
confident of their nations superiority in law, civilization and republican institutions. 
Education should be in line with dominant social values, and, in this sense, eliminate 
social, political as well as economic conflicts and promote unity of the classes. 
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Moreover, a new moral unity from a unified education that would teach civic 
morality based on the principles of natural reason had to be forged.543 
The process of secularization in education and the exclusion of religious 
teaching were not very effective until the so-called Ferry Laws. Before these Laws, 
the adventure of the secular education was actually in fluctuation. That is, there had 
never been coherent and consistent policies of the governments on this issue. It 
depended on the initiatives of the leaders. With Jules Ferry544, the Minister of Public 
Instruction between 1879-1885 and the architect of the modern secular education of 
France, schooling had become compulsory from the age of six to thirteen and fees 
were abolished for the primary education. While the religious and ecclesiastical 
instruction was also abolished from State schools, the teaching of morale et civic was 
enacted.545 It can be argued that the Ferry Laws was not merely a political issue. That 
is, this legislative program was not merely an effort to contain, and even to 
neutralize the power of anti-republican interests in the French educational system, 
but an attempt to alter French culture itself.546 These Laws can be evaluated as the 
expression of a republican spirit, which aimed to substitute for the Catholic soul of 
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the old institutions a spirit which was free of all confessional attachments, and even 
of all religious and metaphysical ties. 547  Jules Ferry, emphasized two essential 
objectives of the law of March 28, 1882 on education that are interrelated with each 
other: On the one hand it [the law] excludes the teaching of any particular dogma; 
on the other it gives first place among required subjects to moral and civic 
teaching.548 Moreover, the 1882 program for the teaching of morale made many 
demands and stipulated obedience to authority549. For instance, certain moral values 
as respect for duty, patience and devotion were highlighted: Obedience, respect, 
help and concern for others, hard work courage, cleanliness, truthfulness, and 
modesty were desirable for all children and were woven into most texts on morale by 
authors wishing to conform to the official program so that their books would qualify 
for adoption by the cantonal meetings of teachers to select books.550 
Moral education independent of any religiosity was one of the foremost goals 
of Ferry. He held that the religious instruction was about the realm of the family, but 
the moral education belonged to the realm of public schooling. Furthermore, he 
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proclaimed in the Chamber of Deputies in June 1889 that It is to the State and not to 
the Church that the control of the school belongs. That is why we hold so firmly the 
idea of lecole laique.551 Ferry asked the teachers to be relieved from religious 
teaching while never relieving from the teaching of moral education. The primary 
duty and mission of the teachers, to Ferry, had to instruct children in ethics and 
citizenship in order to make them honest citizens. In this context, each teacher is a 
natural aid to moral and social progress:552  
The teachers should instruct better habits, respectful manners, more 
uprightness, more obedience, greater submission to duty to the children and 
they should prepare a generation of good citizens of the Republic in order to 
win the cause of the secular school and to contribute to the rebuilding and 
the greatness of the nation.553  
Teachers as possessor of knowledge, now gradually came to be seen as 
wielding a small portion of power of the State. Along with the extension of the 
content of elementary education, Jules Ferrys aim was the secularization and 
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republicanization of the school.554 In conjunction with solidarism, Positivism was the 
chief inspiration source that influenced most of his political behavior.555   
Thanks to the efforts of Auguste Comte and other positivist thinkers, Ferrys 
generation lived in an era when science became a prefiguration that represented 
the positive age of humanity which must replace both the clergys preaching of the 
theological spirit and the revolutionary utopias of the metaphysical age.556 However, 
the problem was to reconcile the Rights of Man and liberty with a historicist, 
positivist vision of the march of reason. For, in this positivist vision, there was no 
room for the sovereignty of individuals. The solution was found in shifting from the 
idea of the natural rights of individuals to the value of educating citizens, whereby 
each member of the social contract would, in the long run, find his universality: 
pedagogy of reason. 557 This signified the birth of new republican creed with which 
a syncretic philosophy of will and reason could be possible. This counterbalance of 
religion with science enabled the enlightened elites to formulate a realistic answer 
to the Rousseauian question of how it would be possible to transform the modern 
man into a citizen. This was only achievable by means of the schools of the 
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Republic. 558  That is, the dilemma, for Rousseau, that how could corrupted men 
generate virtuous society or how could the effect become the cause could be resolved 
by means of civic education, which appeared to offer the way out.559 Accordingly, it 
might be feasible to teach men an entirely new conception of social and political life. 
The advocates of solidarism whose purpose was to eradicate the traditional religious 
ideas from society often assimilated the positivist doctrine for their ideological aims. 
This understanding is important, because it shows that French intellectuals had a 
dilemma between secularism and democracy, and tried to solve it through radical 
projects of converting the whole population to the religion of science.  
Jules Ferry was the first man who carried positivism into his political struggle. 
For instance, in his electoral committee, all the general staff of positivism can be 
seen. Emile Littré, J. F. E. Robinet and the like.560 Having mainly been inspired by 
the naturalist and positivist thinkers of his time namely Littré, Wyrouboff, Robinet 
and Laffitte561, Jules Ferry wanted to base moral action on positive philosophy that 
would transform ideas and customs of the society. Ferry declared, for Positivism, 
morality is an essentially human fact, distinct from every belief concerning the 
beginning and end of things. Morality is a social fact, which bears within itself its 
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beginning and end.562 By means of a scientific instruction of the masses, he hoped 
to form a new positivist and secular morality that would make disestablishment of 
the Church inevitable. He argued that the Republic has only one dreadful enemy: the 
clergy. This decomposing body will never triumph over a living society, whose 
entire progress is absolutely laic. 563 For him, the school must be purged of all 
religious prejudices. It must teach a morality that is wholly human. It must be made 
an institution that will mold a society without any religious prejudices.  
The positivist line of republican argumentation on education and morality took 
a somewhat different shape towards the end of the nineteenth century, especially 
shortly after the famous Dreyfus Affair. Although the Dreyfus Affair bespoke of a 
high-flown anti-Semite reaction of nationalist and religiously oriented groups of 
France, this Affair was then utilized by the radical republican French elite as a 
catalyst to assimilate the different ethical and ethnic postures among the society to 
create a uniform secular French identity. Actually, this assimilationist character of 
French Republican politics in the wake of the fin de siecle was a reconstruction of the 
Jacobin political style. The neo-Jacobin political philosophy of the Third Republic 
revealed itself particularly in the efforts to construct a secular morality (morale 
laique) as a substitute of a religious or traditional moral idea.  
Having had this Republican legacy of laicité, the solidarist thinkers of the late 
nineteenth century like Léon Bourgeois and Émile Durkheim founded their 
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assumptions of solidarité basically on a peculiar conception of morale laique. Their 
initial concern was to reach a moral unity among society that would assure a safe 
atmosphere for a democracy to nourish in an increasingly modernizing French 
society. It might be argued that the idea of solidarité signified a secular 
reconsideration of morality within a disenchanted boundary of modernity. This 
reconsideration at the same time provided a safety belt for the regime to persuade 
people about the dangers of conflict and struggle that was mostly manifested in 
economic terms. Certainly, for the solidarist thinkers as well, the role of national 
education in disseminating the new moral precepts of the Republic was of utmost 
importance. Considering the efforts of the famous solidarist pedagogue of the time, 
Ferdinand Buisson, in the realm of teaching Republican morality, secular education 
occupied a central place among the representators of the solidarist ideology in the 
wake of the fin de siecle:       
The public primary schools were emancipated beyond a doubt by the laws 
of 1882. It was decided that not only the elements of knowledge should be 
taught, but also the elements of ordinary morality with the omission of 
confessional questions which might divide the children. But for a long time 
the adherents of religious beliefs denied that a school neutralized in this 
fashion could have an effective influence on the conscience. Neutrality, they 
said, is nullity. And the partisans of the lay school, headed by Ferdinand 
Buisson, strove to find in moral education some kind of substitute for 
morality on a religious basis.564 
So, the rationalist-materialist philosophy that sprang from the eighteenth-
century Enlightenment, reinforced by the philosophical efforts of the nineteenth-
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century positivism by utilizing science, had produced among the educated elite of 
France at the turn of the century an attitude of profound skepticism and doubt with 
regard to traditional religious doctrines: Whatever the masses may have felt, the 
dominant social and political groups were infected with this spirit of skepticism, and 
their outlook was distinctly secular.565  
The rapid growth of socialism and the labor movements, however, further 
increased a sense of disorder and chaos. Solidarists saw moral anomie as the main 
reason of this chaos. However, due to the profound influence of the rationalist and 
positivist ideas over this generation, the religious option never had a chance to be of 
remedy. Even moral matters were explicitly undertaken outside the domain of 
religion and tradition. The sort of apprehension of the issue of morality greatly 
gained support with the Dreyfus affair. At this juncture, as Robert Bellah contends, 
There was a conscious effort by liberal and left republicans, politicians and 
intellectuals, to replace the conservative moral teachings of Catholicism with a 
secular ethic of a modern democracy. In that sense, for Bellah, Durkheims 
sociology based on secular and solidarist moral assumptions became the most 
conscious and important body of thought which could play this role. With its element 
of rational autonomy, secular morality does not only change the conception of the 
rules which are the essence of moral discipline, it also changes the meaning of 
attachment to social groups.566  
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Teaching of morals was the predominant issue among all of his writings on 
education. In fact, Durkheims studies coincided with the anti-clerical aims of the 
Third Republic. Moreover, he was a strong supporter of the Third Republic.567 His 
writings on social solidarity and secular morality became substantial sources of 
inspiration for the leaders of the Third Republic of his time. Durkheim held that the 
modern cult of individual actually began to appear in a new form of secular religion. 
Furthermore, Durkheims principle preoccupation was to construct a morality which 
would be absolutely independent of all theological or metaphysical conceptions.568 
A society equipped with the system of secular morality had to curb a persons 
natural instincts and give to everyone a sense of responsibility and duty, and a set of 
common values. 569  In that sense, it called for obedience, self-discipline and 
sacrifice. One of the problematical issues in moral teaching, for Durkheim, was that 
of authority. Religions could overcome this problem of authority by influencing 
the pupils through making references to God and divine revelations. However, this 
cannot be possible in a laique, humanistic system of morality. Durkheim saw society 
itself as the source of this moral authority. Society would provide the moral codes for 
the individuals within secular and rational integument. This, then becomes not only 
the ultimate source of religious experience, but also a superior force on which 
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everyone depends. 570  What is more important was the task of rationalizing 
morality by means of emancipating moral realities from the monopoly of religious 
conceptions: 
Consequently, if, in rationalising morality in moral education, one confines 
himself to withdraw from moral discipline everything that is religious 
without replacing it, one must inevitably runs the danger of withdrawing at 
the same time all elements that are properly moral. Under the name of 
rational morality, we would be left only with an impoverished and 
colourless morality... We must seek, in the very heart of religious 
conceptions, those moral realities that are, as it were, lost and dissimulated 
in it. We must disengage them, find out what they consist of, determine their 
proper nature, and express them in rational language. In a word, we must 
discover the rational substitutes for those religious notions that for a long 
time have served as the vehicle for the most essential moral ideas.571  
This effort of discovering the moral forces that human beings have conceived 
of only under the form of religious allegories,572 coincided with the attempt of 
disengaging those moral precepts from their religious symbols, and present them in 
their rational nakedness.573 By tracing the philosophical lines of Durkheim and the 
other solidarist thinkers, the radical revolutionaries of Turkey in the 1930s conform 
to the central value of this understanding of morality that had been underscored by 
the solidarist and rationalist foundation of ethics. 
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For Durkheim, this was the first order of business in which moral education 
would become rational and at the same time produce all the results that should be 
expected from it. 574 Through this novel reconsideration of the issue of morality, 
Durkheim attempted to form a new republican ideology that was both scientifically 
grounded and pedagogically effective; what he produced amounted to a distinctive 
form of liberal and reformist socialism framed in solidarist terms.575 In short, at the 
center of the Durkheimian solidarist epistemology, there was a necessity to set up an 
alternative moral foundation to the existing Catholic (religious) one. With its element 
of rational autonomy, this secular morality does not only change the conception of 
the rules which are the essence of moral discipline, it also changes the meaning of 
attachment to social groups.576 
This neo-Jacobin political style of the Third Republic created a long lasting 
legacy not only for the later generations of France but also for the revolutionary 
elites of several countries in the way of their nation-building processes. Doubtlessly 
speaking, Turkey was one of the prominent models, which showed evident relevance 
to the neo-Jacobin reconstruction of politics. It can be maintained that this sort of 
attempt to construct a secular morality in France was also apparent among the 
Turkish Republican elite, especially after 1930. This whole French legacy had been 
appropriated and internalized by the Turkish Revolutionary elite in times of a crisis.   
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5.2. The Turkish Revolution and the Problem of Laiklik 
When Turkish revolutionaries headed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk assumed the 
leadership of Turkey in the early 1920s, they immediately inaugurated a broad 
program of reform which attempted to diminish the influence of traditional and 
religious institutions, almost in all spheres of social and political life, including 
religion, education, dress, calendar, voting, etc. These laic reforms were considered 
as measures of the revolutionary system against tradition, which seemed to be 
identified with the anti-republican forces. As in the French Republican case, these 
reform attempts not only had political purposes. That is, the Turkish revolutionary 
leaders did not merely aim at neutralizing and even devastating the power of anti-
republican groups in politics, but more importantly altering Turkish culture and 
morality itself: 
They were concerned primarily with the highest problems of moral 
transformation. They were moralists who had noted the failure of the 
traditional values, religious and ethical, to exercise effective control over the 
behavior of the Faithful under the new social, economic, and political 
conditions. For them, new and secular conceptions of the Good, the True, 
and the Beautiful would be the guides to action; the only valid criterion of 
those would be individual Reason.577 
Given that the Turkish Republic developed a new value system different from 
the value universe of the periphery578, Mardin held that the Turkish Revolutionary 
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leaders took the symbolic system of society; culture as a target than the social 
structure itself579 He explained the origins of the Turkish Revolution by stressing 
the importance of values:  
The Turkish Revolution was not the instrument of a discontented 
bourgeoisie, it did not ride on a wave of peasant dissatisfaction with the 
social order, and it did not have as target the sweeping away of feudal 
privileges, but it did take as a target the values of the Ottoman ancien 
régime.580  
Within culture, religion seems to have been singled out as the core of the 
system.581 A new culture in its Kemalist sense was manufactured as the domain of 
social engineering via state agencies.582 Thus, the ideal culture became the outcome 
of a constant process of state production583 and projected a vision of a well-ordered 
and harmonious social life promoted by the doctrines of the elite. 584  Cultural 
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production gave rise to a populist idealization of the Turkish nation as an egalitarian 
and harmonious community, free from internal dissent and struggle. Therefore, the 
modernizing rulers saw the mores of traditional power centers as the fossilized traces 
of social and cultural archaism. Not only their worldview was seen as wrong, but 
also their intention was described as evil and harmful.585 Thus, the basic aspect of the 
rulers civilizing mission was to free people from tight traditional ties, and then to 
symbolically pattern the people into a collective union made up of civilized 
individuals. They, in turn, began to be educated and trained into becoming patriotic 
citizens of a secular republic rather than pious members of a Muslim community.586 
In short, attempts were made to assimilate the heterogeneous elements (or 
differences), be it religious, ethnic or ideological, within the public realm and to 
enumerate those differences under a uniform culture, which was particularly 
identified in secular terms. 
The Turkish Revolution was intended to be a political, social, and economic 
revolution, as well as a cultural one. The leaders of the Revolution, known as 
Kemalists, intended to make a clean break with the past and to adopt Western 
institutions and values in place of traditional Ottoman-Islamic ones. In a few short 
decades, the country was transformed from an autocratic-religious state to a 
republican regime, and from strong militarism to vigorous nationalism and 
westernization. Secularism was accepted as one of the fundamental principles of the 
new regime. Accordingly, there were attempts to eliminate certain religious, social, 
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cultural, and legal institutions of Islam; the official language of Turkey was changed, 
history rewritten, and social customs, such as dress, reformed. The purpose of all 
these reforms was nothing less than a wide-ranging transformation of Turkish values 
and ideals. Kemalist leaders conceived of education as a powerful force to be 
employed to achieve these purposes. Under the new government, the educational 
system was reconstructed and used as a vehicle to transform Turkish society. First, 
the entire system of education was unified and brought under the control of the 
Ministry of Education. Religious schools were closed, and religious instruction was 
dropped from the curriculum. Moreover, the study of Arabic and Persian, which was 
associated with the Islamic tradition, was discontinued. In addition, concerted efforts 
were made to reshape the values and attitudes of the Turkish school youth in terms of 
rationalist and secular principles. 
During this secularization period of the early Republic, the dominant role of 
religion was diminished within the political domain with a high consensus among the 
elite. While the political role of religion was undermined in agreement, the moral 
role of it became a source of never-ending dispute, which has an effect even on the 
current debates related to the role of religion in Turkish society.  
However, before the 1930s, the ruling cadre did not opt for a disposal of 
religion totally from moral matters. What they aimed was at eradicating the public 
visibility of Islam through certain acts and reforms. Previously, there had been 
several attempts to utilize religion in favor of the modernization of the country. The 
                                                                                                                                     
586  Metin Heper, Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?, 
Middle East Journal, 51/1 (1997), p. 34. 
 -244- 
Gökalpian way of modernization that assumed religion as a relatively important 
factor in the nation-building process was not totally discarded by the Kemalist ruling 
elite until 1930. It is true that the highest value and central symbol for the ruling 
cadre became not Islam but Turkism, or nationalism, or Kemalism, or, simply, the 
Revolution587 On the one hand, the Revolutionary rulers aimed at breaking up the 
existence of Islam in politics via several anti-clerical reforms. On the other hand, 
they aspired to control and further restructure religion in conformity with the general 
objectives of the Revolution. Islam was accorded a relatively influential role only 
insofar as it endorsed the principles of the new regime. It can be argued that the pre-
1930 Revolutionary politics of official religion signifies an ambiguous character, a 
pendulum swinging between control and disestablishment attitudes towards religion: 
The most important function of official religion was that it provided a 
legitimating framework for the religion of the lower classes. By replacing 
the official religion with the principle of laicisme, Atatürk erased the 
possibilities of legitimation offered by the framework. The little mans 
religion was thus placed in an ambiguous situation: tolerated but not secure. 
It was this tension which Atatürk hoped would work in favor of 
secularization in the long run.588 
However, after 1930, there began a tendency towards constructing a secular, 
revolutionary morality that would not require resort to religion at all. The 1930s 
marked a significant shift in the mentality of the ruling leaders towards the essential 
issues of social and political life. The 1930 municipal elections were in a sense the 
trial through which the ruling cadre could measure the internal contractual 
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commitment of the populace. When the result made the elite understand that the 
peoples alignment with tradition had not been supplanted by the revolutionary 
affiliation yet, a new idea of reform mostly in the realm of education came to the fore. 
It was just after the dissolution of the Free Party that the control of religion was 
accompanied by more intensive concentration on developing an alternative moral 
ground quite apart from any religious and traditional morality. Elites made education 
a primary field of interest, because they believed that only the medicine of 
enlightenment could cure the spiritual malady the Turkish nation inherited from the 
traditional Ottoman way of life. The creation of a national system of adult education 
alongside the other schooling methods was said to constitute a means for creating not 
merely an enlightened and civilized electorate, but also an electorate imbued with 
republican faith, which would guarantee the perpetuation of the Republic at least in 
the sense of procedural democracy. The people had to be persuaded about the 
intrinsic merits of the revolutionary ideology.  
The radical laicist and positivist thoughts of the previous Young Turk 
intellectuals were gradually able to gain ground during those years. Although the 
deliberate effort to forget and erase tradition was never fully realized, conscious 
rejection of traditional symbols and values became pervasive among the most 
influential figures of the Turkish ruling strata after 1930. Throughout the 1930s, the 
Turkish ruling elite opted for more authoritarian alternatives to make social and 
political conditions ripe for the future democratic days. 
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5.3. The Ülkü Elite and the Construction of Secular Morality  
Radical Kemalism of the 1930s, particularly the Kemalism of Ülkü, proposed 
essentially a secular project to transmute society into deracinated replicas589 of the 
revolutionary elite: We are destined to remake people and to get them to speak, 
dress and live like us.590  It was a process of deracination because the existing belief 
index of the populace was aimed to be uprooted and further supplanted with the 
secularly sacrosanct index of the revolutionary ethics. This secular morality was to 
take the place of and serve as a substitute for the religious one especially by reason 
of superior excellence and power of the new revolutionary faith: The most 
prominent feature of the Turkish Revolution is that it is not based on a prophet that 
was born by hidden mystic diseases. Rather, it grounds on a perfect human 
intelligence and a real genius.591 
The Ülkü elite was also the prominent architect of the idea of the Peoples 
Houses that were designed as sites of converting people into the values of the 
Turkish revolution so as to redress them with revolutionary morality. As İsmet İnönü 
noted, The Peoples Houses are the places where the notions of morality, science 
and intelligence are being explained, applied, developed, enrooted and established in 
the Turkish fatherland. Moreover, he emphasized the great role the Houses are 
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playing in the realms of morality and personality. 592  This process meant a 
conversion of previous morality into secular identification with a new type of 
morality, laic morality (laik ahlak)593.  
One of the main questions in the journal was if  religion should be given a 
place in the inculcation of moral principles or ideals, or will all morality and ideals 
be based on secular foundations?594 The Ülkü authors responded to this question by 
defining morality completely outside religious and traditional realms. This signified a 
turning point with respect to the secularist policies of the revolution, since the old 
principles conformed neither to the contemporary time nor to our [new] morality 
consideration.595 Therefore, they could not apply those fossilized principles boiling 
and springing (fõşkõran) life. 596 In order to uproot the previous moral considerations 
the rescuer hand of the revolution seized the social body. It collected the old 
decayed and dead principles together and threw them into the endless depth of the 
past.597 The Ülkü elite considered the emancipation of morality from religion as 
the chief factor for the laicization of state and society. 
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It is noted that the Western states had been secularized by means of ideas as 
well as institutions. That is, it was the secularization of intellectual life, science and 
institutions that brought about the secularization of their states. However, for 
Necmettin Sadõk, in countries like Turkey in which the influence of old, archaic and 
religious teachings still persist, the laic state became necessary for the laicization of 
other institutions and intellectual life.598 In this sense, the laic state became the 
propagator, the apostle and guardian of social progress and evolution.599 The old 
morality incongruent with the modern conditions was to be discarded by the laic state, 
and replaced with modern culture:  
Previously religion was the only morality... Now, because modern society 
has other source for unity and solidarity, its conceptions of morality also 
originate from the social consciousness.... Morality is not decided by the 
unchangeable judgments of this or that religion, but by the changing society. 
That morality has now no relation to religion, is a matter not even worth 
discussing... That means that the basis of morality is not religion anymore, 
but culture.600  
Mehmet Saffet, one of the prominent figures of Ülkü, stated that divinity 
should be handed down from God to the society through teachings of laic sources: 
True religion is to believe that divinity is expressed in society.601 The authors of 
Ülkü saw inseparable links between their politico-social revolution and the religious 
transformation of Turkish society. However, they faced the difficult task of 
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expressing their imagined community to the masses who had hitherto only identified 
themselves according to faith or place of origin. So, they aimed at creating a secular 
Turkish identity and eclipsing the influence and presence of Islam in the public 
sphere: The boundary of religious consideration in Turkey should not exceed the 
skin of body of a citizen (Türkiyede din telakkisinin hududu yurttaş vücudunun 
cildini aşamaz.) In this sense, religion should have no place in society, administration, 
and politics.602   
In doing so, the leaders of the Revolution attempted to constitute a new 
morality which they also called inkõlap ahlakiyatõ (revolutionary morality) 603 with 
certain appropriate apparatus and institutions of rituals to educate the people about 
modern civilization, the new Turkish culture, principles of the state, love of the 
country and unity of national sensitivity. The very establishment of the People 
Houses in 1932 should notably be considered as the reflection of such efforts. 
So why did the necessity of replacement arise? The answer to this question has 
to do with the basic ideological suppositions of the Ülkü version of Kemalism, a 
primary reference to the efforts paid by the elites to secure a legitimate ground for 
their reforms and nation-building strategies. Due to the secularist and rationalist 
character of these strategies, the source of their legitimacy should also be derived 
from anti-religious origins. Religious mentality was regarded as the primary 
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impediment on the road to civilization and emancipation of people. Kemalism was 
said to promise to provide complete liberation of personality and to contribute to the 
creation of preconditions for its development on a much larger scale. The population 
was to be liberated from damaging reactionary teachings and credos and to be 
indoctrinated continuously with the scientific view of the world: 
Furthermore, the revolutionary elite had an uneasy relationship from the 
beginning with Islam seen as indistinguishable from the old, archaic one. Islam was 
considered to be the reason for the socio-economic, political and cultural 
backwardness of the Ottoman society. According to them, the way to become 
integral part of civilized world (West) could only be possible through a total break 
off from the world-views of the past (Ottoman-Islamic civilization) and from those 
manners contradicting progress and science, particularly positivism604. The radical 
revolutionary elite of the 1930s, in general, avoided utilizing religion, even 
pragmatically and selectively, to justify new practices, and new allegiances. The 
traditional cultural baggage was often the first item to be discarded along the path of 
modernization. Moreover, the revolutionary way of modernization attributed hostile 
images towards the very beliefs and rituals crucial to the definition of Anatolian 
                                                                                                                                     
603 Ali Sami, Güzel Sanatlarõ İnkõlaba Nasõl Maledebiliriz, (How Can We Ascribe 
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604  Such concepts and doctrines as progress, laicism, nationalism, Comtean 
positivism and solidarism have nourished Kemalism. In this sense, it owes a lot to 
the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and nineteenth-century scienticism. Ali 
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Muslim identities.605 Instead, they attempted to describe new principles for the state 
and society, which in large part were inspired from the French model. This was the 
basis of Kemalist laicism that prearranged a process of secularization covering all 
spheres of life: science and reason instead of religious thought would provide the 
legitimate ground for power: The scholastic mentality such as fatalism and tevekkül 
is dominant among our society.606 For that reason, this should be demolished and 
be replaced by the scientific mentality.607 In this sense, the emphasis was on secular, 
national rather than religious affiliation as a legitimizing force. 
Another motive for constructing an alternative morality lay in the authoritarian 
aspirations of the leadership that sought to subject all segments of society to the 
control of the Party and to attempt to transform them into devotees of the regime. 
That was the hardest part of the job, because religion in itself was obviously anti-
revolutionary oriented, and the results of the attempts to integrate it into an 
institutionalized party framework remained unsuccessful. The system could not, nor 
did it wish to, tolerate authority outside itself. From the all above-cited motives 
originated three basic objectives of the party and state policies toward religion: 
restricting the influence of religion in society, controlling the activities of religious 
communities, and putting pressure on any religious initiative in the public realm. 
Between party and state objectives there were no real differences. There existed a 
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symbiosis of state and party apparatus in all spheres of social life. However, this 
symbiosis was not public. In theory, the state was striving for individual believers to 
be treated as full-fledged citizens, but in practice there were many deviations, 
especially at the local level.608 In order to overcome this problem, the revolutionary 
elite considered the Peoples Houses as centers of cultural conversion, which would 
provide a symbiosis between ideals of state and society. 
Like the revolutionary leaders of the French Revolution who had utilized 
public rituals as singing, marching, and rallying in the public address to the people in 
order to construct a strong ritual consensus between them and the crowds609, the 
Turkish radical revolutionary elite employed the People Houses as centers of public 
rituals where the new regimes rites and symbols were produced. Hence, these 
centers were not only the institutions of adult education, but also places where the 
secular codes of collective identity were disseminated. It might be argued that the 
imagination of the Turkish nation was institutionalized through these public centers. 
Moreover, by the help of these centers, they aimed at amassing the population into a 
homogenous whole. In this sense, the Ülkü journal as the prominent publication of 
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policies during the single party period see, Gavin D. Brockett, Collective Action 
and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the 
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the People Houses played a greater role in transmitting the root paradigms610 of the 
rituals exercised in the Houses. Furthermore, the Ülkü authors believed that a strong 
nation needed a foundation in a common secular-religious practice based on shared 
political symbols, rituals, and language. Several ideological views, examples and 
models  French solidarism, positivism, and étatism were sometimes cited, and 
interpolated with domestic views. Furthermore, fascism and communism were also 
added to the roster of international models suitable for citation and emulation in the 
anti-liberal climate of opinion of the 1930s.611 All the efforts were spent to enlighten 
and secularly purify the people in that critical historical episode. This could be 
achieved in so far as people was acquainted with the supreme ideals of the 
revolution: The unique way is to let the new generations know and to make them 
approve supreme ideals. Moreover, 
We have to advance the new generations by means of the real principles 
of social morality. Furthermore, we should enlighten the individuals with 
the most scientific as well as practical proofs and examples that insofar as 
they come close to those supreme ideals based on reality they will be 
assumed as beneficial and honorable citizens retaining social and national 
qualities.612 
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The great irony of their thought is that, while they strictly opposed the quest for 
spiritual and religious life, they absolutized the ideology of the revolution and 
insisted upon a razor sharp opposition between the revolutionary spirit  which they 
affirmed enthusiastically  and all other spirits. For them, democracy was not 
primarily a form of governing and being governed, but a comprehensive perspective 
on the human condition, an idea whose realization must affect all modes of human 
life. In accordance with this, all-encompassing idea of the good, they claimed that the 
cure for the ailments of existent conditions is to be found in the ideological and 
spiritual institutionalization (fikri ve ruhi teşkilatlanma)613 of society grounded on 
the principles of the revolution in order to make people genuine democratic citizen 
(hakiki demokrasi vatandaşõ).614   
Secular conversion was to go hand in hand with a justification that the 
Republic would bring civilization and prosperity to those who had hitherto lagged 
behind by the scholastic mentalities of dark ages. The fundamental contradictions 
became visible at the time when the Free Party was able to gain the popular support 
of the nation during municipal elections in 1930. This was the first significant mark 
bespeaking the confrontation of the civilizing mission of the Republic with the will 
and aspirations of the people. Instead of taking into consideration the peoples own 
aspirations, the radical revolutionaries thought that restrictive mechanisms of the 
state had to be enlarged to realize contemporary civilization and hence 
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democratization of the society in a relatively short period of time: our people 
should be taught the modern meanings of spiritual sanctions (manevi müeyyideler), 
moral inclinations, and relief and participation that would occupy the place of old 
religious dominion.615 
The radical revolutionary elite of the 1930s discovered that the influence of 
tradition in society required that a transition to democracy could only be done by 
imposed from above. In order to emancipate people from the bondage of tradition 
and religion, they felt responsible to enlighten the people via certain non-democratic 
means. In that sense, for instance, Necip Ali held that the revolutionary formulas 
should be injected into the people even by force to emancipate and create order 
(nizam vermek) in society: Revolution is a set of efforts that bring about new 
formulas to order society, and, if it is necessary, to get society to accept these 
formulas by force, at a time when the current life is unable to satisfy the material and 
spiritual vitality (hayatiyet) of society.616 This authoritarian way of transforming 
society was justified by the following terms: So many defects are natural and 
necessary in the formative stage of a revolution that tore down and remade the whole 
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country, and that got the clock, which had been late for six centuries, accustomed to 
work correctly. 617 
 Unless the tyranny of tradition and customs are swept away, emancipation 
and hence democratization of society appeared to the Ülkü authors to be difficult: 
Among people (halk), there is tyranny of tradition, customs and rooted ideas. It is 
not less than a tyranny of governments.618 Therefore, in opposition to this tyranny, 
peoples education should constitute one of the fundamental principles of the 
revolution. Because, the rule of freedom means the predominance of an educated 
reason.619  In order to smother the spiritual domination (ruhi tahakküm)620  of 
tradition, the authors of Ülkü, in general, sought to instigate a kind of crusading zeal 
among enlightened members of the society. They portrayed themselves as the 
apostles (havariler) and missionaries in their saintly and sacred ideal (aziz ve 
kutsi ülkümüz)621  to spiritually illuminate (nurlandõrmak) the Turkish population. 
They called all the intellectuals missionary guides of the society, to disseminate the 
sacred ideals of the Revolution:  The success is dependent only upon increasing 
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361, p. 356  
618 Mehmet Saffet, İnklap Terbiyesi Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): pp. 105-
114, p. 107 
619 Ibid. 
620 Nusret Kemal, İnkõlap İdeolojisinde Halkçõlõk, p. 42 
621  Necip Ali (Küçüka), Halkevleri Yõldönümü Nutku, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 13, 
(March, 1934), pp. 5-15, p. 5 
 -257- 
the number of the man of mission (dava). If the intellectuals carry out their duties of 
revealing the truth (hakikat) to people, the essential task would be achieved.622 
The radical revolutionary elite aimed at conversion of the society in line with 
revolutionary religion. For this aim, they even appropriated religious terminology to 
embark on a revolutionary mission to democratize society. This is indicative of 
how the Ülkü elite utilized symbolic discourse by appropriating pre-revolutionary 
symbolic resources. It used religious terms and notions interchangeably with the 
Revolutionary symbols. The Peoples Houses were identified as the Temples of 
Ideal (Ülkü Mabetleri)623; the apostles (havari)624 of revolution were called to be 
recruited for a village mission (köy misyonerliği)625; the spiritual revolution 
(manevi inkõlap) 626  was said to be disseminated by the zealous efforts of the 
resplendent (nurlu)627 devotees of Kemalism in the way to reach to the Heaven of 
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Atatürk (Atatürk Cenneti)628 . The following quotation is particularly striking to 
show the extent of secular conversion: 
One of the most significant tasks we should perform is undoubtedly a 
peasantism mission (köycülük misyonerliği). We should infuse this sacred 
work and believe in it with the cognizance and faith of a Jesuit priest 
With the perseverance, and penetrating style of a Protestant missionary, we 
should inculcate (sindirmek) this most auspicious principle of populism in 
all souls.629 
There was a great effort to envisage the leader of the Republic as a sacred and 
holy being. For instance, Mustafa Kemal was envisaged as a genius superior the 
prophets, 630  a secular preacher, a Great savior (Büyük kurtarõcõ), a Genius 
Commander-in Chief (Dahi Başbuğ) 631   a highly exalted being (pek yüce 
varlõk)632, and a sacred altar (kutsal mihrab)633 of this secular religion. Moreover, 
he should be the fundamental source of the feelings of people. He was also 
considered as a genius who made a synthesis of science and prophecy:  
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In social matters, the first genius is Kemal Atatürk who could be able to 
bring together the spirit of guidance with scientific mind in his personality 
(nefsinde). Kemal Atatürk is the first great guide who saw the defects of the 
existent social order, who mobilized a social mass against those defects, but 
at the same time who did not seek solutions to these social problems in the 
charms (muska) or one-sided programs of the sacred books. Ataturk has the 
great power of perception and belief (seziş ve inan kudreti) more than any 
other genius. Moreover, apart from the prophets, he has a quick and 
unfailing (yanõlmaz) objective viewpoint, a sound positive scientific mind 
and a non-deceivable (aldanmaz) critical intelligence. The spirit of guidance, 
intuition, and faith is common among all men of revolution; however, the 
outstanding peculiarity of Kamal Atatürk and Kemalism should be sought in 
their objective observationism (müşahedecilik) and positive scienticism 
(ilimcilik). 634  
The Ülkü authors considered Nutuk as the new holy book (mukaddes kitap) of 
the Turks.635 They looked at revolutionary ideology as the true, secular faith. The 
education for the ideals of the Revolution they prescribed was a sacred task. By 
adopting a religious idiom to reinforce their secular undertaking and achievement, 
the Ülkü elites devotion to the principles of the state was a kind of religious 
enthusiasm or a missionary self-sacrifice (bir misyoner özverisi)636.  
The commemoration activities of the Menemen incident at its peak, the killing 
of an army officer, Kubilay, easily turned out to be a memorial to a revolutionary 
martyr. For instance, the fourth anniversary of the assassination of Kubilay afforded 
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ample scope for anticlerical rhetoric. 637  Beside Kubilay, the other revolutionary 
heroes were also commemorated, especially those who were Martyrs to Reaction. 
Martyr Kubilay became the sign of anti-clericalism of the Republic, which was 
recurrently employed to suppress and denounce irtica (reactionism), the ideology of 
immoral (ahlaksõz) and imprudent (akõlsõz) people.638 Because, these people were 
trying to make the nation swerve from the true path, and make them fall into the old 
dark slumber again. 639 For that reason, against this black disaster (kara felaket) 
that seeks to destroy the sacrality (kudsiyet) of the revolution, every member of the 
nation should resist in a mood of a Conqueror (Fatih).640 Furthermore, the debris of 
the religious orders (tarikat döküntüleri) 641  and the sheikhs as the carriers of 
reactionism should be exterminated as soon as possible. It is argued that the 
religious robes and dervish coats of the sheikhs were opened like the owl wings 
(baykuş kanatlarõ) against the great enlightenment of the revolution.642 Hence, the 
luminosity of the revolutionary ideal would shed light on that murky hearts 
(kararmõş gönüller). Against reactionism, which was considered as the most 
formidable enemy of the state, the salvation was explicitly sought in the new 
Turkish culture. As the guardians and guides of the Turkish culture, the Ülkü 
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authors also invited the enlightened youths (õşõklanan gençlikler) to preserve it 
from the reactionists abusing (simsarlõk) religion everywhere. 643  Ironically, the 
existent religious orders and communities were considered as harmful to the morality 
of people:  
Certain religious orders (tarikat) assumed a spoiling character for the spirit 
and moral purity of our peasants. The scholastic mentality such as fatalism 
and resignation (tevekkül) is dominant among our people. This mentality 
should be destroyed trough supplanting it with the scientific mentality (ilmi 
zihniyet). The scientific mentality ensures freedom of thought, correct mode 
of thinking, and the way to have recourse to the causes and solutions of 
every matter. Furthermore, it rescues people from being captive of 
superstitions (hurafeler).  
Though the author grounds his alternative on so-called scientific mentality, his 
final resolution seems that this idea of science, however, has strong metaphysical 
connotations, substituting the religious tarikat with the secular-religious order: 
These thirsty souls hope for true spiritual guides (mürşit), true instructors (mürebbi) 
and true means of illumination (tenvir vasõtalarõ).644 The true guidance potential of 
the revolution was said to eradicate all the reactionary microbes from the social 
organism. For Recep Peker, the social body was like a physiological organism. Even, 
in the healthiest bodies, it is normal that there are various microbes. However, for 
him, a healthier body had the positive elements of struggle to prevent the emergent 
dangerous microbes. So, a minority group of men with black thoughts and wrong 
ideas could not destroy the forces of majority with a clean and progressive life style. 
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For Peker, the social body of the Turks had enough power to eliminate those 
reactionary microbes contrary to the new revolutionary way of life.645  
Though less fanatical and sectarian than Abdullah Cevdet and the İçtihad circle, 
the Ülkü elite wished to establish a totally secular institutionalization of the state, so 
that the nation could be indoctrinated in the virtues of Republic. They had recourse to 
an anticlerical onslaught as a maneuver both to tame religion and its political 
adherents and to divert the peoples attention from the relative crisis of the 
Republican politics to the artificial enemies of society. That is, they used 
anticlerical discourse as a device to consolidate their hold upon power. In fact, it is 
quite hard to discern clerical power and an institutional Church in Turkey, 
particularly in the inter-war period. Turkish clericalism was a fabricated idea, with 
which the radical revolutionary elite could generate a suitable motive for their 
imagined anticlericalism.  In that sense, Turkish revolutionary anticlericalism had 
nothing to do with a direct political response to clericalism as in France, but rather 
was used as an instrument to constitute a faith, a system of thought, in its own right. 
It can be argued that the Ülkü elite considered any moral threat to the ideals, values 
and social order consecrated by the Revolution as anticlerical as well as reactionary. 
This was above all the myth of anticlericalism postulating a polarity between the 
anticlerical and clerical; progressive and reactionary; modern and traditional; 
civilized and ignorant etc. that essentially sided with the revolutionary worldview 
always on the formers part. This sort of revolutionary political demonizing created 
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dualistic politics, irremediably divided between those for and those against its 
principles.  Their anticlerical thinking was particularly at the highest degree hostile to 
tarikat, which they considered unwilling to subordinate itself to the principles of the 
state. The remedy was to get rid of all religious tarikats and their morality, and not 
only to make the revolutionary morality supreme, but also to set up a revolutionary 
religion, a sanctifying authority that would fill the existent ethical vacuum. They 
were trying to place morality on a wholly different basis from that of the present 
religion.     
Actually, the Ülkü elite was the new radical generation, which was searching 
for a new religion in the face of what they perceived as the moral and religious 
vacuum of their time. They thought Kemalism was able to offer a firm belief system 
and to devise a new morality that they had failed to find elsewhere. With a 
proselytizing mission, they aimed at converting people from their traditional 
religious ties to the new revolutionary faith. They even considered themselves as the 
apostles of the new faith, to rehabilitate people. 
In fact, to make up a religion out of the revolution was not an easy task, 
especially for the radical revolutionaries such as Ülkü who undertook to banish all 
religious activities and to discredit traditional religion once and for all. Even, the 
mention religion and Islam was considered harmful to the new secularizing policy of 
the regime: To not mention religion at all is to present the best education of 
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secularism (laiklik). 646  Nevertheless, despite their explicit warning against 
clericalism because of what they thought it shared with "reactionary and 
scholastic mentality, the radical anti-clericalism of Ülkü group turned out to be a 
new reactionary stance against all forms of ethical postures.  
With the beginning of the 1930s, radical changes came about in the official 
ruling ideology. The Revolutionary ideology, by denying traditional and religious 
establishments, began to function as a surrogate for religion. It determined a new 
marker of identity for the Turks grounded mostly on non-religious connotations. This 
new secular creed was supposed to substitute for religion in satisfying the 
psychological and spiritual needs of the people to free themselves from any kind of 
religious and traditional ethical creeds.  The revolutionary elite tried to offer answers 
to spiritual longings of the people and to give purpose to their life. This was a sort of 
divinization and sacralization of current politics, and demonization of the previous 
ones. Furthermore, this sacralization of politics became components or 
accompanying features of the political life and activities. The new regime set itself 
primarily in the idea of the realization of a just order on earth and in the salvation of 
the savage and ignorant people. The revolutionary sacralization implies a 
messianic pretension postulating that the only correct standpoint leading to salvation 
is exactly the one promoted by the Revolution, and that all other beliefs are wrong 
leading to false conclusions. Moreover, all those who profess other beliefs should be 
liberated from their misconceptions, of which they are not aware. This Salvationist 
                                                
646 Mehmet Saffet, İnkõlap Terbiyesi, (Revolutionary Education) Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 
8, (Sept., 1933): pp. 105-114, p. 114 
 -265- 
motive was one of the main reasons for the attempts at Turkish secularism in the 
1930s. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE SECOND PILLAR OF SOLIDARISM: THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF A CLASSLESS HOMOGENOUS SOCIETY AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY 
This chapter mainly argues that the second premise of solidarism appropriated 
by the Ülkü group was a classless and undifferentiated society. The authors of Ülkü 
generally emphasized social order and uniformity rather than individual freedom and 
pluriformity. Moreover, the RPP and the Peoples Houses were perceived as a semi-
sacred institution aimed at removal of all outer signs of conflict and the suppression 
of alternative value systems to preserve harmony and uniformity in society. The 
1930s marked an era in Turkey when all the countervailing forces had been 
eliminated for the sake of social order. The ruling cadre maintained that the RPP 
represented all the interests among society. Since, the party included within it the 
whole nation, and not just a section, there was no need to carry out separate interests 
outside the party. By purging any intermediary bodies between the party and 
people, they wanted to reach direct democracy in which people and their 
representation were to coincide. Any attempt to mediate this relation was considered 
to be harmful to the unity of the nation. As for the Ülkü elite, the existing structure of 
society was not conductive to reforms, so the state should teach the people how to 
cope with the new life style. 
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The cultural and political de-legitimization of liberal democracy in the minds 
of the revolutionary elite paved the way for a search of new alternatives. The radical 
revolutionaries alternative was mainly grounded on the solidarist and populist 
assumptions of democracy, populist democracy (halkçõ demokrasi), which they 
saw as the most appropriate form of democracy for Turkey.647 This understanding 
of democracy generally highlighted the unanimity and harmony of society centered 
on the concepts of duty and obligation rather than that on individual rights and 
responsibilities. 
Actually, the European Enlightenment tradition implanted in the Turkish 
Revolutionary elite a profound commitment to the concept of democracy  the ideas 
of freedom, equality, representation, and above all, the rule of the people. Most of 
them had retained those commitments, but their philosophical and practical 
expression of the concepts had taken considerably different forms. They, consciously 
or unconsciously, often misconstrued ideas concerning democracy and representation. 
Nonetheless, they had the tendency to retain their commitment to the broad and 
theoretical values of democracy  as a utopian and irresistible ideal  while freeing 
themselves from the traditional democratic forms and practices. Ideal democracy 
was based upon tutelage of the masses by the Ülkü elite who felt themselves obliged 
to cultivate the people. Theoretically, people continued to be the source of supreme 
authority (hakimiyet kayõtsõz şartsõz milletindir). In practice, however, they became 
the subjects of intensive indoctrination, and had to have total commitment to the 
purposes of state as defined by their vanguards. It can be maintained that the 
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radical revolutionaries of the 1930s were not interested in the representation of the 
existing structure of society, but in the representation of an imaginary people, which 
they intended to construct in the future.  
This kind of understanding of democracy led the Ülkü elite to consider politics 
in a messianic fashion. This political Messianism based on secular, social morality 
postulated an enlightened, civilized and prosperous tomorrow, to which humanity 
are irresistibly driven, and at which they are bound to arrive.648 This postponed 
representation of society, or to put it another way, this sense of understanding of 
belated democracy constituted a great problematic for later generations. As a 
consequence, based on a kind of Jacobin utopianism, the Turkish radical 
Revolutionary elite, generally, felt themselves responsible for maturing and 
ascending the spiritual quality649 of people that would elevate them to a position at 
which they can be represented.   
In a sense, the newly established cultural institutions such as the Peoples 
Houses became centers of political messianism to prepare the people for the belated 
democracy. As a matter of fact, they were sites of apostolic (havarilik) craft650 to 
disseminate the Truth, which would be captured only through the realization of 
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revolutionary ideals. In other words, their goals of consolidation of power and social 
restructuring were intertwined with a peculiar conception of democracy: every 
country has its own peculiar way to democracy651; the way to attain it should rely on 
forming collective habits (birleşik alõşkanlõklar) 652 , and amalgamated 
(kütleleşmiş) social structure653. Of course, this understanding refracted the elites 
march to democracy in such a way that it turned out to be serious obstacle to 
democracy; it was redressed with their view that in a society without laic 
revolutionary culture, democracy is not possible.   
The most essential element introduced by the Revolution to the political culture 
of society in the Turkish Republic was the modernization and laicization of political 
life which was generally argued to be equivalent to democratization of political life 
at the same time. The Revolution was said to bring about the active inclusion of the 
Turkish nation in the creation of institutions and political organizations. Political 
culture was indeed becoming more inclusive and participatory as the Turkish 
Revolution became established, and mass politics did come to the fore during those 
years. But these developments were accompanied by a transformation in political 
rhetoric toward the ordering and disciplining of the people. More importantly, new 
forms of discipline and new ways of organizing the masses were arising from within 
the very forces that were working to democratize the country. As Foucault argues, 
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the democratization of sovereignty was fundamentally determined by and grounded 
in mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.654 
It is worth mentioning that Kemalism of Ülkü often appropriated religious 
terminology to embark on a revolutionary mission to democratize society. It 
generally borrowed from religious forms and built on traditional rituals. It would 
probably not be wrong to contend that, in their attempts at secular proselytization, the 
radical Revolutionary elite of the 1930s utilized the Peoples Houses as surrogate 
mosques of the Republic: The Kemalists thought of these institutions as 
replacements for the local mosque as a place for social gathering and forums to 
propagate their view of the Turkish national project.655 Anõl Çeçen also argued that 
the Houses were established as substitutes for the local mosques on the way of 
democracy: 
During the times of the Empire, the mosque functioned as the center of 
society. Mustafa Kemal, in a sense, founded a new center substituting for 
the mosque. The Peoples Houses, in the young state of the Republic, 
emerged as the center of society on the way of democracy. Those masses 
that were accustomed to meeting in mosques, eventually would gather as a 
nation instead of ummah (religious community). As secularism became the 
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basic principle of the Republic and state, the new centers were needed for 
bringing together the masses outside the mosque.656 
Hence, revolutionary acculturation of society entailed a barrage of secular 
rituals, some practiced through the Houses. Actually, the Peoples Houses became a 
mechanism for overt social engineering (cemiyet mühendisliği) 657  and secular 
indoctrination than a means to impart skills that were increasingly necessary in an 
urbanizing and industrializing Turkey: In this specific time of revolution, every 
Turkish intellectual, the peoples guide (halk rehberi), should undertake the duty 
of building revolution (inkõlap yapõcõsõ).658 The underlying myths of the activities of 
the Houses were unanimity and unity, the idea that all the people would be united 
and harmonious if there were not traitors among them. Accordingly, division and 
conflict were deemed unnatural as well as dangerous. There was the view of 
prosperous tomorrow, which is strongly expressed by the authors of Ülkü in many of 
the articles. Turkey is in the state of difficult passage now: the passage of hard and 
intricate times. But tomorrow, after this passage has been passed through, there will 
finally be time for getting at the state of blissful happiness namely the Heaven of 
Atatürk (Atatürk Cenneti) 659. In other words, when this goal is reached, the final 
beatitude will be accomplished, which transcends the previous state of suffering the 
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Turkish society had to endure. It would be the case that this line of argumentation 
hints a revolutionary vision of Nirvana. The obstacles that debar this visionary of 
Kemalist Nirvana should be removed from an entanglement of traditional and 
religious mentality. 
6.1.  The Tension Between Democracy and Secularism 
The Turkish version of solidarism revealed a tension between democracy and 
secularism. Members of the Ülkü group believed that democracy could only flourish 
in a laic and republican system, coupled with the enlightenment of society. For them, 
democracy was an idea that can be traded for the enlightenment of society. In fact, 
they were mainly torn between the competing goals of enlightening and 
emancipating the people: the first seemed to require strict control and inculcation; the 
second implied trust. The term inculcation is used to denote the elites will to 
penetrate down into subjects hearts deeply enough to conquer their innermost 
affective and emotional drives so that they can produce subjects who accept without 
question the will of the ruling elite in whatever form they are:  
We aimed at inculcating (sindirmek) our revolutions to the peoples soul. 
However, we did not allow people to believe all the reforms as passive 
recipients. Throwing a spark of each reforms blaze to the heart of people 
and creating the fever of the revolution for every Turk is a necessary task. 
660 
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The justification of this inculcation that aimed at conversion of society into a 
granite mass (granit kütle)661 is sought in verbal addresses to democracy. That is, 
the Ülkü authors frequently pronounced democracy as if it is the ultimate goal, while 
they paradoxically longed for the submission of people to the artifacts of revolution. 
Actually, they were well aware of the fact that the principles of revolution were in 
sharp contrast with liberal democratic way of life. However, they used some excuses 
that under the influence of the inter-war, totalitarian aura, these liberal democratic 
principles were in a practical bankruptcy. 662  The source of bankruptcy was 
deciphered as chaos, which would emerge if the emancipatory drives were freed. 
They overtly yearned for the disciplined freedom (disiplinli hürriyet)663. These 
excuses were used to justify the attempt to postpone democracy to the moment when 
the conditions are ripe for the shunning of the presumed chaos. Subjects, or citizens, 
were considered as not mature enough to experience democracy at that time. They 
thought that absolute obedience to elites, who were named prophets and apostles of 
revolution, was necessary. Democracy, for them, is not the product, but the goal 
of the revolution.664 Revolution is to be made to clear away those barriers blocking 
the democratic goal, and certainly to elevate the collective consciousness to a level at 
which this goal is understandable to all. They required an absolute obedience from 
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their followers.665 Revolutionaries were said to engineer appropriate proclivities and 
capabilities for the people: Every normal human has some natural proclivities and 
capabilities realized in principal emotions and ideas. These proclivities can only be 
actualized under certain principles: Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Étatism, 
and Laicism.666 As the main principles of the Turkish Revolution are so obvious 
truths just as the truth two plus two equals four. So, a plausible mind cannot find 
any contradiction in them.667 Only after the people are mature enough by digesting 
these principles, democracy would dawn.         
The authors of Ülkü were generally engaged in a kind of democratic rhetoric, 
but to sustain their revolutionary ideals they had felt themselves obliged to make the 
people fit into a narrative of unity. They tended to see all diversity and dissent as a 
threat to national unity. The only way to talk about democracy in this sense was to 
presume, and eventually demand, that the people identify with their nation and 
subordinate their particularistic demands to the common good. In the first issue of 
Ülkü, Recep Peker declared that the leading principle and general idea of the journal 
is the subordination of any particular interest to the interest of the whole and further 
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amalgamation (kütleleştirmek) of the nation.668 Moreover, the articles in the Ülkü 
journal in common criticized individualism and the liberal economic systems: 
Individualism is basically an erroneous ideology... It could not implement 
and apply its principles anywhere in the world... A social life with anarchy 
cannot be approved... Liberalism as the reflection of individualism in the 
economic realm goes backward everyday. This is not only a regression, but 
also a general bankruptcy.669 
6.2. Ülkü Elites Conception of Anti-Liberal Democracy 
The Ülkü elite produced an extensive critique of liberalism in general and of 
liberal economy in particular in conjunction with their solidarist presumptions, which 
reflected an understanding of a classless homogenous society. While introducing the 
Labor Law (iş kanunu) in the Assembly, Recep Peker particularly underlined the 
significance of the necessity of discarding the liberal option and further undertaking 
a regulatory soul (tanzimci ruh) in order to establish national order and harmony 
(ahenk) in the field of economy: Friends, we are injecting the application of the idea 
of unity and collectivity of national Étatism (ulusal Devletçilik) to our life as 
replacement of the liberal state type of which our generation witnessed its 
fragmenting, conflicting and destroying spirit dissolving the national unity. 670 As 
Donald Webster aptly notes, Recep Peker dwelt not only on the necessity for 
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youthfully energetic and concerted action but also for avoiding the wastes of laissez-
faire individualism, the class struggle, and the agony of liberalism associated 
therewith.671 
Furthermore, it is generally emphasized that democracy has different facets in 
different countries. One dominant argument was that democracy is only a form of 
organization of the state that can have different social contents and can be used by all 
political currents to achieve their own ends.  This conclusion was formulated perhaps 
most cogently by Recep Peker and  Necip Ali Küçüka. They demonstrated that a 
populist society is the highest form of democracy that can be attained in the Turkish 
context. As for democracy itself, it is nothing but one form of state organization that 
can vary in its social content depending on the conditions:  
Democracy is not a dogma (nas) and a verse. It is a soul, a spirit (espiri) and 
an essence. If any matter is applied after it is filtered through reason and 
adjusted to the existent context cleverly, then it will take root and give 
benefit Every country has its own way of democracy. Turkey has certain 
idiosyncratic characteristics by which we should apply a different 
democracy.672  
In principle this thesis is invariably one of the weapons used by all anti-liberal 
arguments. They actually utilized this discourse to ground their conception of an 
authoritarian state. It is worthwhile to stress that even if they argued that democracy 
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is only a form in which power is organized, they nonetheless did not ground their 
ideas on Fascist and Communist forms. They generally favored direct democracy 
that was formulated by the preceding Western political thinkers from Montesquieu 
and Rousseau. According to this formulation, "the people" cannot be broken down 
sociologically into different social, economic, and ethnic groups or represented as an 
aggregate of differentiated individuals with differing capabilities and noncoinciding 
political rights, duties, and thus interests in society. Democracy, from this point of 
view, is a metaphysical abstraction that in fact leads to the domination of a group or 
of one ruler in the name of the people and consequently to the establishment of a 
regime of absolute authority. In this regard, Rousseau's metaphysical theory of the 
general will justified the systematic delegation of the powers of the majority to a 
ruling minority and in practice was transformed into a political formula legitimizing 
the power of extremist revolutionary elites from the Jacobins to the Bolshevik: each 
of us puts all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general 
will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole673.  
The authors of Ülkü generally favored the current totalitarian regimes of the 
world. The models of these regimes in organizing and structuring the society have 
been welcomed. It is commonly argued that these models should be adapted to the 
Turkish conditions. Although, they were committed to the democratic ideals, at least 
discursively, the authors admired the totalitarian type of state organizations:  
                                                                                                                                     
672 Partinin Yeni Programõ İçin Kurultayda R. Pekerin Söylevi, Ülkü, Vol. 5, No. 
28, (June, 1935): 247-259, pp. 258-9 
673  Jean Jacque Rousseau, On the Social Contract, Roger Masters, ed., Judith 
Masters, trans. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 53 
 -278- 
... The tasks the fascists [in Italy] accomplished and the works they created 
deserve admiration. The source of the perfection of that great monument 
should be sought in patriotism and unity of national sentiments.674 
Particularly, the methods of education and training by the totalitarian regimes 
were the most attractive issues for the authors.  They were in search for new 
techniques of mass socialization that would transform the society in conformity with 
the principles of the state. What would be the efficient formula of the peoples 
education (halk terbiyesi) was their primary concern. Though the USSR was 
criticized for its communist direction, its technique of the political education 
methods were appreciated: Although its regime does not appeal to us, the power of 
the Russian socialization methods are admired by all intellectuals who are anti-
capitalist.675 Furthermore, the belief in the necessity of the anti-democratic means to 
prepare people toward democratic ends can be observed in the entire journal. For 
instance, in his article Kõşla ve Köy Terbiyesi (Army and Village Education), Hilmi 
A. Halik argues that the military institutions would be important places of educating 
and civilizing people from the villages: The military can do great and positive 
services in creating the Turkish village world. Our youths, who come to the army as 
raw materials, would return to their homes and villages as very important and 
valuable persons.676   
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When the Kemalist ruling cadre had come to the idea after the Free Party 
experiment that the principles of the new regime had not been fully disseminated to 
the wider parts of the society, they began to seek a model with which they would 
accomplish this ideal. Atatürk sent Selim Sõrrõ and Vildan Aşir to visit several 
European countries for the search of models on peoples education. Selim Sõrrõ was 
sent to Italy, and Vildan Aşir to Czechoslovakia and Rumenia. Both returned to 
Turkey with certain reports on these countries. Selim Sõrrõ asserted that there were 
several institutions of peoples education in Italy including Dopo-lavoro (leisure 
time organisations), Ballila (a military education for the six-year-old boys)677 and 
Piccole (education centres for the girls after 5 years old), which played important 
roles in disseminating Fascist values.678 Selim Sõrrõ generally favoured the military 
techniques, while Vildan Aşir talked about Sokol organisations in Czechoslovakia. 
Sokol served the construction of the idea of nation-state and national identity through 
adult education centers. Furthermore, amalgamation at the societal level was 
achieved through these institutions. Aşir stressed the significance of the Rumanian 
youth organization, Strasa Tail, which prepared teachers cadres for the adult 
education system. 679  Along with these reports, several other countries including 
Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Denmark, Austria, Belgium and most notably USSR, 
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were also compared680. Hence, the Peoples Houses were modelled in line with the 
parallel institutions of countries cited above: 
Russia, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have been among the 
nations where parties or ruling regimes  totalitarian as a rule  established 
networks of cultural clubs designed to educate the people and to carry their 
ideology to them. Turkeys Republican Party, the instrument of the 
Kemalist regime, studied those foreign experiments, found them successful, 
and decided to emulate them.681 
6.2.1. One-Party Rule as the Expression of a Classless Homogeneous 
Society 
The Ülkü elite, generally, considered the existing one-party rule as an essential 
mechanism to sustain solidarity among society. They thought that this idea was the 
expression of Turkish democracy underpinned by the science of Kemalism. In fact, 
it is very problematic to label Turkish one-party rule in general and the Peoples 
Houses experience in particular as totalitarian at least at the conceptual level. 
Furthermore, the description of Kemalism of 1930s as totalitarian would present 
considerable problems at the methodological level. The typical totalitarian ideologies 
of this century  Stalinism, Fascism and Nazism  have been worked out by educated 
minds for largely educated people. The limited intellectual development in Turkey 
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did not permit the evolution of highly developed ideologies with strong international 
consistency and integration. Rather, the Turkish revolutionary ideology was an 
amalgam of certain ideas that would pragmatically be a response to the existing 
social and political problems: Turkey and its powerful national party incorporated 
its ideological dogmas (nas) to its program, and, as far as possible, it aimed to apply 
these ideological dogmas to the real phases of social life. 682 For this reason, it is 
best to avoid referring to Turkish Revolutionary ideology as totalitarian. It is true 
that some components of Kemalism had certain affinities with Italian fascism or 
Stalinism. What matters to the Revolutionary elite above everything else was the 
function that Kemalism serves: 
The willful hand, immense perspectives, and accurate inventions of Atatürk, 
a great genius of politics, leads the Turkish nation to the most modern and 
progressive political order of the world, who had remained behind and lost 
their ways in their political development due to the Ottoman state.  This 
event is the outcome of the willful (iradeci) guidance of a genius that 
corresponds well to the spirit of the Turks. In the wake of these political 
developments, the Turkish intellectuals should undertake a very significant 
duty: They should grasp Kemalism as the most beautiful, powerful 
(kudretli) socio-political expression of the Turkish spirit, with all its 
profundity, sophistication and peculiarities that distinguishes it from other 
types of regimes. Furthermore, they should understand the role of Kemalism 
in the global political development, and preserve, nourish, and implement it 
with a profound knowledge of politics and with a high degree of 
intelligence.683 
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Furthermore, Kemalism set the fundamentals of both the most appropriate 
form of politics and the enlightened as well as pure vision of society. 684 For the 
Ülkü elite, the most outstanding task of the Turkish intellectuals was to build the 
science of Kemalism, in line with scientific methods. It seems plausible to argue 
that the Turkish one-party system and its policies especially in the 1930s were the 
outcome of ideological politics in the Kedourien sense. While differentiating 
ideological politics from constitutional politics at the theoretical level, Elie Kedourie 
argues that the representatives of ideological politics look upon state and society as 
a canvas which has to be wiped clean, so that... [their] vision of justice, virtue and 
happiness can be painted on this tabula rasa685 He goes on to say that ideological 
politics is essentially a European phenomenon and an outcome of the French 
Revolution. For Kedourie, the very attempt to wipe the canvas clean entailed 
arbitrariness, lawlessness and violence on a stupendous scale and could not bring 
about happiness or spiritual fulfillment. Furthermore, having delayed the visions of a 
democratic and just society, the representatives of ideological politics create a 
considerable tension between the means and ends of their projects. That is, they 
justify the present undemocratic and authoritarian techniques and means in terms of 
their forecasted ideological vision. Kedourie maintains that nationalism as the 
prominent type of ideological politics.  
Although Kedouries account appears to be directed against nationalism, his 
analysis gives some fresh insights to the understanding of Turkish nationalism and 
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the nation-building process. Likewise, the Ülkü elite sought to create a new modern 
Turkish nation, by discarding the previous cultural and political elements in the state 
and society so that their vision of a perfect system could be portrayed on this tabula 
rasa. The ends of Turkish nationalist project was to catch up with the Western 
civilization and democratic vision. Yet, the means was a systematic shaping of 
society to prepare the ground for the nationalist purpose through mass education. 
There is a mismatch in the sense that democratic ideal was always thrown back into 
an unattainable point. The following quote reflects the abovementioned arguments 
very well:  
Democracy is not an outcome of a revolution, but its purpose. Revolution is 
attained in order to destroy the barriers in front of this goal... and to form a 
consciousness of the society through carrying them to this goal. In this sense, 
the revolutionaries of democracy are the prophets and apostles of this task. 
With these adjectives, the revolutionaries of democracy are likened to be 
prophets of even the most liberalist religions, who should necessarily be 
dictator at the beginning. They expect an absolute obedience from their 
followers. 686      
One of the outstanding arguments in the statements of Köymen is the ideal of 
the state to prepare the people for democracy. Accordingly, the existing structure of 
society was considered as unavailable to construe the reforms and the intentions 
behind these reforms. As Heper aptly notes, the state did not have the role of 
expressing the unconsidered thoughts of the crowd, rather to add to them more 
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mature thoughts687. For instance, the fourth article of the first part of the 1931 
Republican Peoples Party Program stated that the people were not ready to evaluate 
candidates; until the conditions and qualities of the people became mature enough; 
then, only known and trusted people should be elected.688 As Clement Dodd argued,  
Ataturk wanted radical change first, and democracy only after Turks had 
come to realize, through his partys leadership and education, their true role 
as patriotic citizens. Ataturks idea of democracy was essentially idealist, 
and required acceptance of the need for revolution first. Political opposition 
would then be properly principled and one could then expect leaders of 
opposing parties to debate in a civilized way.689  
In that sense, for the Ülkü elite, elections were far from representing the free 
will of the people. The single party was considered as the best solution for the 
existing conditions of the country and for constructing an undifferentiated 
homogenous society. Furthermore, Ülkü authors justified the Kemalist one party 
system as it was based on scientific tenets: 
Kemalism is not a unique one party in the world; however, the basis of 
Kemalisms understanding of one party differs from the other regimes one 
party. That is, Kemalism does not consider politics as a struggle for 
application, at whatever cost, of a subjective program based on egoism. 
Rather, it assumes politics as the discipline of social laws, in other words, as 
a science (fen). Before developing into science, medicine had not been a 
discipline on which the doctors compromised. But, after it became science, 
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the matters of disagreement and difference had disappeared. Just like the 
body doctors (vücud doktorlarõ) who work in cooperation to find a medicine, 
the politicians as the doctors of society (sosyete doktorlarõ) should also be in 
agreement so that politics would be a science of neutrality, and it would be 
emancipated from the one-sided ideas and private interests.  It is state as 
the political organization of nation, which would apply the outcomes of 
political science, or it would ensure and regulate that application. In this 
sense, Kemalism distinguishes itself from other regimes also by means of its 
apprehension of state. 690  
Central to this agenda was a conception of the nation as a collectivity marked 
by social solidarity and cohesion. Ülküs solidarism aimed to close the cultural and 
conceptual gap that existed between the enlightened segment of society and the 
seemingly savage universe of the peasantry. This could only be achieved by means 
of converting peasants:  
We have fourteen or seventeen million citizens of whom %90 are alien to 
civilization. In a territory stretching over almost eight hundred km square 
(murabbaõ) there are forty thousand villages dispersed; and in order to 
enlighten (nurlandõrmak) them, the devout citizens that would bestow their 
resplendence (nur) over the people do not perhaps amount to much than 
forty thousand. Being hopefully the best prediction, it means, per one citizen 
who is supposed to guide people there is one village; twenty km area; and 
four hundred citizens.691 
According to the Ülkü elite, the existent Turkish population was an ignorant 
and reactionary block, a product of Ottoman Empires politics of monstrosity 
(politika ucubesi). They had to be civilized by means of a new idea of progress 
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mostly grounded on positivist, solidarist, and scientific assumptions. 692  These 
revolutionary leaders were prominently influenced by the French Revolution and the 
French Republican tradition. They believed in the power of reason as a guide for 
human conduct, and in the Enlightenment ideas, which linked material progress to 
science and rationality. At the same time, they were also inspired by the rising 
totalitarian regimes attitudes towards state-society relations based on anti-liberal 
tenets. It might be maintained that the Turkish radical revolutionaries of the 1930s 
began to interpret the French Republican ideas in line with the rising anti-liberal and 
authoritarian assumptions particularly in Europe. In effect, since the radical 
revolutionaries conceived society as an integrated, organic and undifferentiated block, 
they saw themselves as representing the whole of the nation. As such, they rejected 
the class-based analysis of socialists which they considered hazardous to the integrity 
of the nation. In their view, both the liberal and the socialist trends contributed to the 
disintegration and further fragmentation of Turkey.693 In other words, similar to the 
Radicals of the French Third Republic, the radical revolutionaries of Turkey 
advocated a new moral stance based on solidarity of the nation opposing liberal 
individualism, Marxist communalism and religious conservatism. 
It can be argued that as opposed to the individualistic, laissez-faire freedom of 
the Anglo-American tradition, the French tradition has tended to stress collective 
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involvement in pursuit of the general will that would liberate everyone.694 The 
prominent figure that formed this tradition is Rousseau. This tradition was utilized by 
the radical revolutionaries as an integrating force and instrument for mobilizing the 
masses under conditions of rapid social transformations. In this sense, common 
people were regarded as unable to appreciate the intentions of the elite immediately 
and follow them. Consequently, the creation of a myth or a special civil religion was 
necessary. This myth was necessary for religious sanctification or the legitimating of 
the power of the regime and to create for it a special semi-divine status in society so 
that people obey and submissively bear the burden of social happiness. In a society 
of this type, politics and religion had one purpose. It was to realize the designs of the 
supreme legislator. Hence religion and politics served as each other's instruments. 
When Robespierre created the cult of the Supreme Being, he was consequently only 
acting as the true pupil and follower of Rousseau and at the same time as a 
predecessor of those many ideological and political cults with which the twentieth 
century has proved so replete.695  
As it is mentioned before, cultural and political delegitimization of liberal 
democracy all over the world in the 1930s paved the way for a search of new 
alternatives among the Turkish revolutionary elite. The radical revolutionaries 
alternative was mainly grounded on the solidarist and populist assumptions of 
democracy, populist democracy (halkçõ demokrasi), which they saw it as the most 
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appropriate form of democracy for Turkey,696 and which generally highlighted the 
unanimity and harmony of society centered on the concepts of duty and obligation 
rather than that of individual rights and responsibilities: 
Democracy aimed at growing superior and sovereign selves. In every state, 
democracy pursued to establish a national unity and brotherhood based on 
the ideas of duty and responsibility against selfish emotions. Further, it 
seeks to construct a just and self-sacrificing (feragatli) morality.697 
Democracy was perceived more in ethical terms rather than political ones: It 
can be seen that in a democratic state, the more urgent principle is a moral matter 
than that of the political control (murakebe) or legislative and administrative 
mechanism. Namely, the utmost important thing is the moral roles and peculiarities 
of institutions.698 For the alleged democratization of society, the Peoples Houses, 
as moral education centers, were designed to remove all outer signs of conflict to 
preserve the harmony and uniformity of the society. In this sense, the ruling cadre 
decided to abolish all the existing civil organisations including the Turkish Hearths 
(Türk Ocaklarõ), the Turkish Womens Association (Türk Kadõnlar Birliği) and the 
Masonry lodges. In fact, the Turkish Womens Association decided to dissolve itself 
in 1935 by declaring that there was no need to represent women outside the domain 
of the party. İffet H. Oruz, the general secretary of the Association explains the main 
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reason of this dissolution was the establishment of the Peoples Houses: Here (in the 
Houses), we as men and women together were undertaking the social and cultural 
issues and again we men and women hand in hand were walking together in our 
Atas way.699 Instead of all these organizations, they decreed the establishment of 
the Peoples Houses as an organ of the party with which the entire interests of the 
Turkish society were said to be represented. By purging intermediary bodies between 
the party and people, they wanted to reach direct democracy. Since, the party, 
for Atatürk, includes within it the whole nation, and not just a section.700 Mahmut 
Esat Bozkurt, Minister of Justice of the time, summarizes the role of the party very 
well: 
No party in the civilized world has ever represented the whole nation as 
completely and as sincerely as the Republican Peoples Party. Other parties 
defend the interests of various social classes and strata. For our part, we do 
not recognize the existence of these classes and strata. For us, all are united. 
There are no gentlemen, no masters, no slaves. There is but one whole set 
and this set is the Turkish nation.701 
Any attempt to mediate this relation was considered as harmful to the 
undifferentiated and classless structure of the nation. For the Ülkü authors idea of 
solidarism, the Peoples Houses would function to unite and homogenize society so 
as to destroy the barriers in front of democratization of the country. There was an 
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obvious affirmation of democracy in the journal texts: Today, Turkey is one of the 
distinct countries that is sincere in the idea and spirit of democracy, and it will, no 
doubt, always walk in the way to democracy. 702  However, the radical 
revolutionaries perceptions of democracy are but totally different than contemporary 
visions. 
The Ülkü authors peculiar conceptualization of democracy and secularism, 
emphasizing social solidarity, homogeneity and secular morality, in fact aimed to 
incorporate different ethnic and moral postures among the society into a unified and 
secular block. That is, having mainly adopted the French notion of citizenship, 
highlighting the incorporation of different ethnic and cultural entities into a uniform 
Turkish identity, the radical revolutionaries. Further, they came to the point that the 
incorporation of the ethical domain of society was also essential into a classless, 
undifferentiated harmony and solidarity of the nation: 
The Kemalist regime aims at establishing a classless society. However, it 
does not want to set up an artificial alignment among the classes or to 
establish a domination of a class over others. Rather, the purpose is to 
prevent the defective development (sakat inkişaf) of society and to hinder 
the conditions that lead to class formation by means of assuring a healthy 
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development of society within a willful (iradeci) order, which finds its way 
through the light of social sciences.703 
Unless the society will be risen to a desired ethical stance, unity and solidarity 
is impossible. As Peker argued, a revolutionary mentality demands conformity 
(ayak uyduruş) with each step on the way to progress.704 Unanimity on a desired 
moral portrait was deemed necessary to establish real solidarity among society:  
Real solidarity and social harmony could only be attained by means of 
cooperation of certain natural factors such as blood unity, the unanimity of 
moral quality and history, unity of language and life-style, and finally a 
unity of ideal and interest Moral ties of any society are composed of those 
factors.705   
For Nusret Kemal, during times of crisis, there are two patterns of social 
change. The first one is that an enlightened society adopts changing and developing 
conditions in a considerably short period of time with a high degree of consciousness. 
On the other hand, the latter pattern is that a guide or a vanguard group (rehber 
zümre) tries to better backward people from ignorance by getting them to meet the 
new requirements by revolutionary efforts. For Koymen, Turkey fit the second 
pattern of development: 
It should be noted that people would cooperate with the state on their own 
will only in so far as they come to a desired moral and cultural level; in 
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countries where this level is absent, it is the most sacred duty of state to try 
to bring the people up to this level at the soonest time possible with its own 
intervention and directive.706 
The mass socialization centers were aimed specifically to bring people to the 
desired ethical and cultural level and the revolutionary elite, as the vanguard group, 
would like to authorize: The aim of the Peoples Houses is to establish a conscious 
national unity. The Houses afford the new principles of life produced by the Turkish 
Revolution as moral precepts to the citizens. (Türk İnkõlabõnõn yarattõğõ yeni yaşayõş 
kaidelerini bir ahlak halinde vatandaşlara verir.)707 Moreover, the Houses were 
designed as the civilizing medium through which the traditional masses would have 
the necessary qualifications to be carried to the prosperous future. 
6.2.2. Schools as Instruments for Ülküs Ideal of Democracy 
The moral education of the people in line with the revolutionary ethics was 
particularly deemed essential. This point also shows the Turkish radical 
revolutionaries concern about a solidarist understanding of ethics that was said to 
replace the traditional and religious moral precepts among society. The specificity of 
the 1930s was also regarded as critical to instigate an entire moral training of society: 
the issue of moral and patriotic education proves its worth apparently in times 
especially when rapid economic and social conditions occur.708 In these times, for 
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Mehmet Saffet, it is hard to adapt to the new conditions, since, there have never been 
such great social and economic transformations in Turkish history before. In this 
sense, it is likely to be extremely critical of the moral issue.  During this critical 
phase, we are witnessing the impact of materialist philosophy among our youth.709 
Such a philosophy, for Saffet, is destructive and separatist. For the materialist 
philosophy inculcates unbridled egoism instead of consciousness of duty (vazife 
şuuru) and responsibility. Furthermore, it prefers immediate interests and pleasures 
to national interests. For that reason, as against the materialist philosophy, the idealist 
philosophy of revolution should be constructed. However, it is worth mentioning that 
this kind of consideration of idealism does not correspond to the Western idealist 
philosophical legacy. It denotes, rather, a solidarist implication that was justified in 
so far as it served the requirements of the Revolutionary elite in line with the efforts 
of the construction of laik morality. The relationship between the idea of solidarity 
and social/non-religious morality was explicitly deduced. In order to live in an 
ambiance of solidarity (tesanüt havasõ), he has to obey the norms of social 
morality (içtimai ahlak).710  
Actually, as in the case of the French solidarist philosophers, they attempted to 
find a middle way between materialism and idealism in favor of the revolutionary 
idealist. For instance, on the one hand, the German romanticist and idealist 
philosophy was appreciated due to its endorsement of national idealism as a 
substitute to religious idealism: The collective conscience of the Turkish nation is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a divinity.711 Therefore, the social conscience should also be subject to this divinity. 
The philosophical basis of the symbol of excellence (ekmeliyet remzi) and a divinity 
(ülûhiyet)712 of the Turkish nation will be taught in congruence with the national 
idealism represented by Kant, Fichte and Hegel in the nineteenth century713 On the 
other hand, the German idealist philosophy was condemned for backing new dogmas 
that would risk the very foundations of the Revolution: Most of us are inclined to 
a kind of strange spiritualism by the impact of German romantic philosophy.714 This 
would lead to the intemperance (ifrat) of conservatism and traditionalism.715 It is 
argued that revolution means the collapse of most dogmas. In this sense, new 
religions and sects (mezhep) replacing the previous ones716 should be not allowed 
Hence, for the Ülkü authors, the primary duty of schooling is to instill morality and 
sense of citizenship to the people in conjunction with secular moral values. That is 
why ensuring a better revolutionary education and bringing up (yetiştirmek) good 
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citizens of republic is of utmost importance.717 For this aim the citizens have to be 
taught courses possessing social and moral values. Consequently, Turkish solidarism 
emphasized the individual as part of a moral collectivity. It was the individuals duty 
to find his appropriate place within this collectivity. 
In fact, rationalization of every means of social relations was respected as part 
and parcel of the moral education of the people based on solidarist assumptions of 
ethics. It is argued that the Turkish Revolution aims at rationalizing every kind of 
mechanism of the national body. Furthermore, the Revolution requires citizens who 
feel and think in conformity with the structure and character of the Revolution.718 In 
order to save the people from being captive to ignorance and to make them to 
harmonize with the soul and nature of revolution economic activities and social 
relations should be rationalized.719 
Therefore, to make people accustomed to the fruits of the revolution peoples 
education should be the inculcation and orderly inculcation (nizamlõ işlemek) of the 
minds of people who have reached normal level of enlightenment in the sense of 
their psycho-physiological qualities.720 This inculcation will be the work of national 
organization and management in terms of manifestation of our national values. It 
means, melting (yoğurma) of the separated parts (zümre) in regard to their accent, 
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sect (mezhep) and civilization into a social body as well as a nation.721 Furthermore, 
it denotes bringing up the spirit, thought, hearing and will of all individuals through 
inculcation in conformity with the whole ideal of the nation.722  
Nusret Kemal made an analogy between a nation and an electricity network. 
For him, history is the dynamo, the individuals are the accumulators and language is 
the wire. Since the network has not yet been designed perfectly, Nusret Kemal argues, 
electricity could not pass all the hearts to the same degree. There are still unfaithful 
persons. He tried to prove a link between liberalism (individualism) and materialism. 
He denoted individualism in an extremely pejorative connotation. For him, Turks are 
communitarian (cemiyetçi), zealous and idealist by nature. Mass education through 
the Peoples Houses was aimed to transmute society into this anticipated nature. In 
their attempt to convert the whole Turkish people the Peoples Houses utilized 
secular myths, symbols and rituals created for the new regime.  Thus, the Peoples 
Houses became the new sites for the institutionalization of secular revolutionary 
politics: 
History is heart, language is vein, and the Peoples Houses are the thin vein 
centers where the dirty blood is replaced with the clean blood. The primary 
aim is to organize and dominate the people force (halk kuvveti) in the 
whole country. We want neither individual and group, nor class dictatorship. 
But we want cooperation, unity of feelings, ideas, and ways The 
                                                
721 Hamit Zübeyr, Halk Terbiyesi Vasõtalarõ, (The Means of People Education) 
Vol. 1, No. 2, (March, 1933): 152-9, p. 152 
722 Ibid 
 -297- 
fundamental role of the Houses is to institutionalize the people force and 
further disseminate the revolutionary ideals (Ülkü) to the whole country.723 
As it is seen, the radical agenda of the Ülkü elite manifests itself also in their 
consideration of solidarity. One of the Ülkü authors argued that the Turkish 
Revolution became a pioneer for many nations aiming to adapt these kinds of radical 
principles: Before Italian fascism and German national socialism the Turkish 
Revolution had established a secular and revolutionary republican foundation on the 
basis of populism, nationalism and revolutionism. 724  For they were concerned 
about the welfare and freedom of individuals by populism and wanted to combine 
the interests of individual and society through the principles of nationalism and 
étatism.725 
Revolutionary education of the people in the Houses made a great effort to 
discontinue the traditional system of beliefs and substitute it with a set of views that 
the regime regarded as suitable for the new age. Still, the most powerful weapon was 
the school system. Religion was separated from the school, and curricula were 
revised. New holidays were substituted for religious ones, accompanied by 
manifestations, meetings, speeches, slogans, posters, exhibitions, and photographs of 
the revolutionary leaders. Party congresses and conferences, as well as similar 
manifestations of mass organizations were accompanied by identical iconography  
busts, flags, slogans, photographs, choirs, and the like. Through these techniques, the 
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Party embarked on creating a new political culture and the "new person," whose 
character, behavior, and understanding had to match the requirements of modern 
civilization. The transformation and hence elimination of the traditional mentality 
called for application of a broad spectrum of propaganda techniques. The press, radio, 
theater, educational courses, film, literature and museums had the task of unmasking 
the old way of life. In the new cultural life there was no room for the traditional 
activities. The obstacles that debar the visionary of modern civilization had to be 
removed from an entanglement of traditional and religious mentality. 
6.3. Cultural Conversion of the Peasants 
There are a number of mechanisms and targets through which the Ülkü elite 
tried to convert peasants culturally. They were village schools, families, an emphasis 
on public sphere and war against superstition. These were all aimed to incorporate 
peasants, the majority of the Turkish population at that time, into a unified mass and 
provide social solidarity among society. Cultural production gave rise to a populist 
idealization of the Turkish nation as an egalitarian and harmonious community, free 
from internal dissent and struggle. Therefore, the modernizing rulers saw the mores 
of traditional power centers as fossilized traces of social and cultural archaism. Not 
only because their worldview was wrong, but also their intention was evil and 
harmful.726 Thus, the basic aspect of the rulers civilizing mission was to free people 
from tight traditional ties by ending the autonomous status of local power centers, 
and then to symbolically pattern the people into a collective union made up of 
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civilized individuals. Given that the Turkish villages were considered more 
traditional than the cities, this mission was carried out especially for the peasants. 
Numerous articles were published to discuss how to transform the villages in 
conformity with the principles of the new regime. The Branch for Aid to the Village 
(Köycülük Kolu) of the Peoples Houses worked not only to advance the condition of 
the peasants, but also to elevate them to a civilized position.  
The primary issue that bothered the elites was the ignorance and backwardness 
of the peasants that were said to be under the influence of superstitious and scholastic 
mentalities. How to inject the knowledge of modern principles to the villages was of 
utmost importance for the radical Kemalist elite. In Turkey, as in revolutionary 
France, the revolutionaries sought to create a new man and a new woman. Most 
important of all, they had to create a new child.  They saw the future of nation at the 
very heart of managing to make children of revolution. In this sense, the task of 
teachers were said to mold and model the youthful material, purifying it by way of 
eliminating the dangers and blemishes that affect it:  
The primary duty of school is to instill morality and citizenship to the 
people. Ensuring a better revolutionary education and bringing up 
(yetiştirmek) good citizens of the republic is of utmost importance. The 
children have to be taught courses possessing social and moral values.727  
The first focus was on children via their families: For the children of the 
villages, there should be a school and a teacher that would inject them the Turkish 
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culture, the Turkish Existence and the Turkish language.728 In one of the articles, it 
is argued that the children should escape from the influence of their parents. Hitherto, 
home had been the preserve of archaic notions and practices characteristics of 
peasant society and of clerical domination. The child was generally in touch with his 
or her parent outside the school life. For that reason, in order to be successful in 
educating the children, especially their mothers should also be trained by especially 
female teachers: To advance our culture in a secure and sound way, before anything 
else, we should struggle with these mothers.729 For, the women were conceived as 
ignorant and more inclined to believe superstitions.730 Fathers are praised for their 
roles in the public arena. That is, it is maintained that the males of the villages were 
more enlightened than the females. Because, they were trained in the army, they 
always went to the bazaar, performed government tasks, and talked to the teachers. 
In this sense, they were more vigilant and civilized.731 Existing society and politics 
were perceived as corrupt, and to be transformed by means of re-educating the 
children. Accordingly, a prime objective was to distance the children as far as 
possible from the various forms of education that were remnants of the traditional 
authorities. Since parents were part of the corrupt generation and were sequentially 
the first teachers, it was also to be necessary to remove the child from their influence. 
Revolutionary leaders aimed to create a new form of family that would perpetuate 
                                                
728 Aptullah Ziya Köy Mimarisi, Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 7, (August 1933), p. 38 
729 Sabri Gültekin Melez Terbiye, Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 7, (August 1933), p. 61 
730  Osman Nuri, Haymananõn Ahõrlõkuyu Köyü, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 
1934), pp. 394-400   
731 Sabri Gültekin Melez Terbiye in Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 7, (August 1933), p. 61 
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the norms of new regime: By admitting the civil law, we set out to have a new type 
of society and family i.e., a European family. We are now far away from the 
countries of binbir gece masallari (thousand and one night tales).732 By disciplining, 
educating, and moralizing particularly the rural family, the revolutionaries wanted to 
overcome major impediments to modern civilization. Like their French counterparts, 
the Turkish revolutionaries tried to fill a tabula rasa: 
The village teachers not only instruct the village kids, but also enlightens the 
whole village dwellers. Their quality of guidance is not less important than 
their task of teaching. The idealist (ülkücü) character of the village teachers 
gives the power of overcoming most of the problems they encounter in the 
villages. The primary feature of this ülkücü teacher, before everything else, 
is being a good Turk. Such a teacher should make the people hear and live 
the national consciousness. He will learn his Turkness not from books, but 
by the help of his spirit.733 
Secondly, it can be argued that the Republican elite wanted everyone to be 
acquainted with the public realm.  The Public realm was their locus of the state. On 
the other hand, the private sphere represented the traditional, archaic and the 
superstitious. In order to mobilize the masses in conformity with the values of the 
Republic, the public sphere was the unique arena. The Peoples Houses were the 
primary gates for the masses to enter the public realm. In short, attempts were made 
to assimilate the heterogeneous elements (or differences), be it religious, ethnic or 
ideological, within the public realm and to melt those differences under a focal point 
of culture.  
                                                
732 Necip Ali, İnkõlap ve Türk Kanunu Medenisi, (Revolution and the Turkish Civil 
Law) Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 9, (Oct., 1933): 178-185, p. 183 
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The authors of Ülkü saw education as the primary means of secular conversion 
of the masses with a revolutionary nationalistic spirit and as an active agent for the 
formation of a modern nation. The Ülkü elite, in that sense, endeavored to infect the 
new teachers with their apostolic zeal. They made a conscious effort to lead the 
traditional peoples from their religious ties and worldview to revolutionary culture as 
taught in the schools. Thus, education was seen as a means of forming a homogenous 
secular and national culture out of the many diverse traditional and ethnic groups. 
Moreover, this was a project of transformation of Ottoman traditional personality 
into a new secular one:  
The Ottoman personality is just about to die, and the new Turkish 
personality is rising. In this sense, the duty of the Peoples Houses is to kill 
the old residues inherited from cells of the old sick man (the Ottoman 
mentality, morality, pleasure and the like), which still remains in the spirit 
of this new personality. In order to rescue the Turkish youth from the 
Ottoman mentality, we have to show them the models of democratic and 
honest (namuslu) man. For this aim, the members of the Houses should bear 
idealistic, virtuous and artistic soul734 
The dichotomization between the old/traditional/religious and 
new/modern/national morality was deliberately pursued by means of relegating the 
former always to the backward and corrupt realm and praising the latter. This 
dichotomy implied for the authors substitution of the old moral stance by the new 
one. The following quotation gives enough obvious evidence about this replacement: 
                                                                                                                                     
733  Hõfzõrrahman Raşit Öymen, Köy Mektebi ve Köy Muallimi, (The Village 
School and the Village Teacher) Ülkü, Vol. 4, No. 24, (Feb., 1935): 414-7, p. 414 
734 Cumhuriyet, (25 February 1933), p. 3 
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Among the Baraks (a Turkmen clan) morality and personality is very strong. 
They are tied to the Turkish creeds rather then their religion Islam. The 
religious currents were not successful in entering their lives. Like the other 
Türkmens, Baraks also were committed to Turkishness instead of religion... 
It is impossible to find any mosque and minaret in their village. However, 
one can see a school building. They are more interested in schools. 
The Barak clans relationship with the Arabs is very weak. It is hard to find 
a person speaking Arabic, though there are many Arab villages surrounding 
them. From the beginning, it is truth that they never had even sexual 
intercourse with the Arabs. They do not hesitate to say that they are 
suspicious about the morality of Arabs.735 
The postulation of Turkishness as a new creed as opposed to the Islamic one is 
quite striking. The author also attributes pejorative meanings to Islamic morality by 
equating it with Arabness. This can be considered as an Orientalist outlook that 
attempts to occidentalize Turkishness by creating its own realm of orient. 
Perception of school as a substitute for the mosque is obvious.  
Another instrument for the Ulku authors which constituted the heart of the 
revolutionary program of education was the rural school. The basic premise of these 
schools genuinely was to educate and convert the rural masses. The efforts of the 
village guides aimed at constituting a significant impact on society. The main 
problem was that there was a scarcity of professional teachers endowed with certain 
qualifications necessary to conduct revolutionary schools the authors of Ülkü desired. 
Therefore, it was proposed sending the candidates to the teacher training centers to 
be equipped with the necessary qualifications. For instance, Nusret Kemal 
determined the program of the courses that the village guides would be taught:  
                                                
735 A. Rõza Akça Köy in Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 1933, p. 65 
 -304- 
Theoretical issues: The First Group: Physical sciences, Health and the 
selection of generation (neslin õstõfasõ), The Philosophy of Civilization; The 
Second Group: General Geography, Turkish Geography; The Third Group: 
The History of General Civilization, Turkish History (a detailed account of 
the Turkish civilizations and an inquiry of the Revolution), The Peoples 
History in Turkey, The Peoples Literature, The Lives of the Great Men (the 
men of ideals); The Fourth Group: The Theory of Agriculture, The Village 
Economy and the Village Shops (dükkan), Accounting; The Fifth Group: 
Psychology and Education (the psychology of individual and society in the 
respect of education), The History of Moral and Religious Philosophy, 
Secular Morality (Laik Ahlak), Sociology, The Philosophy of State (Turkish 
populist democracy is the most appropriate form of democracy for Turkey. 
By explaining the foundations of the Turkish Revolution in detail, the 
comparison of the Turkish populist democracy with fascism, sovietism, 
racism, democracy with kingdom, federal democracy and the like will be 
instructed; the issues of nationalism and humanism, and the necessity of 
nationalism will be taught.); The Sixth Group: The Philosophy of the 
Village Education, The Activities of Village Education in other Countries, 
The Village Law and other Information.736   
It is indicative that the majority of the course schedule was set to fit the 
ideological inculcation of the pupils. It was proposed that Secular Morality (Laik 
Ahlak) should be included in the curricula as a separate course. This is also striking 
since it shows how the revolutionary elites were to a considerable extent engaged to 
the problem of morality independent of religious considerations. Nusret Kemal 
referred to the village teachers as modern missionaries and conceived of their task as 
comparable to that of Christian missionary activities in the savage African tribes.737 
For him, it was a great necessity to launch village mobilization. Since, the 
cracked lips of those arid villages require much the water of sacred light (nurun 
                                                
736 Nusret Kemal, Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi, (A Village Project Experience), 
Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 8, (Sept., 1933): 118-125, p. 123 
737 Nusret Kemal, Köy Misyonerliği, (Village Missionary), Ülkü, Vol. 2, No. 7, 
(Sept., 1933), p. 150 
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suyu). In this sense, the Peoples Houses are the headquarters gathering vanguard 
forces (hazirlõk kõtasõ) for the village mobilization to launch a war against 
primitiveness. All the volunteers were called to prepare their hearts and minds for 
this great war. 738  
Finally, this was a war against superstitions and bigotry. Due to the fact that 
üfürükçülük (bigotry) is the most dangerous issue in the villages, it was the 
primary duty of the village teachers to bury this problem in the cemetery. 739 The 
efforts of the village teachers to fight the üfürük and superstitions were even 
compared with the martyrs of Gallipoli war. This is a deliberate effort to transfer 
sacrality of the people:  
In order to suffocate the superstitious creeds, ignorance, and fanaticism 
(taassup) and to lift our villages up cultural, social and economic domains, 
thousands of enlightened minds (nurlu kafa) should toil, become worn out, 
and even they should be buried (in the villages they are charged) just as we 
buried our martyrs in Galipoli, just as we shed much blood in Sakarya, just 
as there are many Turkish bones in Dumlupõnar.740      
Thus, it can be contended that the Ülkü elite had great eagerness to spend most 
of their energy to uproot the vestiges of traditional authority which was considered as 
inhibiting Turkish societys adaptation to the requirements of the modern, civilized 
way of life. This preoccupation had generally led to an overestimation of a number of 
                                                
738 Nusret Köymen, Köy Seferberliğine Doğru, Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 5, (June,1933): 
355-361, p. 361  
739  Osman Nuri, Haymananõn Ahõrlõkuyu Köyü, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 17, (July, 
1934), pp. 394-400   
740 Ibid., p. 480 
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domestic problems of the country. These economic and political problems were 
either ignored or relegated to a subsidiary position in the Republics policies of 
priorities. In this sense, the extreme anticlerical views of the Ülkü elite represented 
the Jacobin republican tradition of France, which regarded teaching of the 
substantive issues of the Republic as the highest priority. Even, this sort of Jacobin 
politics tended to justify the infringement of the democratic principle of freedom of 
conscience as a necessary precondition to eradicate the reactionary forces, which 
were perceived as inimical to the security of the democratic Republic. For the Ülkü 
authors, all forms of primitiveness represented mostly by superstition and bigotry 
implied the primary menace to democratic rule in Turkey. 
6.4. Utilization of Arts and Rituals for the Cultural Regeneration of People 
This war against primitiveness involved almost all spheres of social and 
cultural life. The conversion of fine arts, in particular, was deemed necessary in order 
to provide a total lifting of society up to the level of modern civilization. Necip Ali 
mainly argues that the old religious considerations caused the fine arts to remain 
backward. In order to escape the negative effects of old considerations of art, he tried 
to find a solution outside the religious and traditional domain:  
 we want to express the feeling of our national personality and our 
national songs within the ambit of international musical technique. We 
would like to put an end to the oriental music such as saz and fasõl produced 
by the mixture of Byzantium, Iranian and Arabic songs as if they are 
national. So, in this modern age while we are claiming to walk shoulder to 
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shoulder with the most advanced nations, the music performing (terennüm) 
the spirit of the past life has nothing to do with our modern life.741 
The idea above found some particular expressions in playing instruments and 
singing music to make people accustomed to self-sacrifice and discipline.742 In this 
sense, art was one of the primary instruments of subjugating individuals to the sacred 
ideals of the state. For instance, the function of the choruses was considered to be 
preparing people to the requirements of their preconceived idea of community 
predominantly based on non-democratic tenets: Being subject to the will of a guide 
without exhibiting himself or herself, and merely rendering service to the target puts 
a profound idea of discipline and renunciation (feragat) as a requisite. For that 
reason, in collective performance of music, the individual melts as well as 
disappears completely within a totality 743  It can be argued that this sort of 
instrumentalization of the art was for the aims of the revolution. For the Ülkü authors, 
even art was to be shaped in line with the content of revolution. Only by this way, art 
would have meaning in relation to the Ülkü elites perception of the revolutionary 
morality: The revolutionary ideal can solely be created within a milieu of art that 
digests (hazmetmek) the revolutionary morality and the revolutionary ideal. 744 
Hence, the ideal is above all placed at the center:  
                                                
741  Necip Ali Halkevleri Yõldönümünde Necip Ali Beyin Nutku, (A Speech 
Delivered by Necip Ali Bey in an Annual of the People Houses), Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
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743 Ibid. 
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What is the reality of our revolution? In my opinion, revolutionary ideal is a 
whole (kül), a universe (alem). Just as any universe, it also lives with certain 
satellites (peyk) surrounding it. The fine arts is also one of the prominent 
satellites of the revolutionary universe. The progress of our revolution will 
be secured in so far as these satellites experience their own revolution 
separately. In accordance with the great order we had, the time has come. 
Our chief commands us: The army of art, take the lead (Sanat Ordusu İş 
Başõna).745 
Just like music, theatre was considered by the Revolutionary elite as the 
incomparable power of conviction (eşsiz telkin kudreti). 746  Moreover, it was 
utilized to conquer the hearts of people747 It was seen as aiming to struggle against 
the old, primitive, and the outmoded. Intrinsically, revolutionary theatre was 
considered as one of the major passages of ritual that would instill revolutionary 
morality. It was argued that the essential role of the drama performed in the Peoples 
Houses was to make the deepest impact on the convictions of people. Even this 
purpose was mathematized: if we guess that a theoretical play with a single 
quintessential thesis is staged in 136 Peoples Houses and each play is attended by 
1000 persons, then more than 136000 citizens are acquainted and convicted with one 
idea in a few days.748 
In general, the content of the plays were to be designed by certain 
characteristics that would be in conformity with the general purposes of the regime. 
The essential characteristics of theater were categorized under five conditions: 
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1. It has to complement the modern life of the new Turkish society 
2. It has to nourish the national sentiments. 
3. It has to deal with the national problems along the lines of the 
revolutionary principles. 
4. It has to touch upon the themes about the changes and progress in social 
life corresponding to the revolutionary worldview. 
5. And finally the plays should be cultivating ones that would address to all 
segments of society.749 
The traditional performance arts were transmuted into modern Revolutionary 
performances. One of the prominent traditional Ottoman shadowplay characters, 
Hacivat and Karagoz was modified in line with the Revolutionary goal. In its 
traditional form, Hacivat has wisdom, open-minded character and he teaches 
Karagoz who is ignorant and coarse. But, in the new form, Hacivat signifyied a 
modern, progressive and Kemalist character, while Karagoz was labeled traditional, 
archaic, reactionary and primitive one. For instance, in one of the Hacivat and 
Karagoz play staged in the Peoples Houses, such binary oppositions were inscribed:  
Hacivat says: 
Oh my dear Karagoz, everything is changing from the dark old to the 
enlightened present 
From serfdom to master life 
From oil-lamp to electric light 
From theological schools to Modern Schools 
From workshop to factory 
From ox-cart to automobile   
                                                                                                                                     
748 Ibid. 
749  Nurhan Karadağ, Halkevleri Tiyatro Çalõşmalarõ: 1932-1951, (Ankara: T. C. 
Kültür Bakanlõğõ Yayõnlarõ, 1998), p. 125 
 -310- 
From rowing boat to motorboat 
From plough to tractor 
And to the plane 
Karagoz replies: stop it, I feel dizzy. 
An invisible third persons voice ushers with sobriety: Its because of the 
speed. Be accustomed to it. There is no right to live if you are not accustomed. 
Hacivat continues: the revolution has lessened the years to months, months to 
weeks, and weeks to days, and days to hours.  
Go ahead in knowledge, in mind, in technique, in arts750 
 
This theatrical drama play is part of larger system of structure of stage plays 
which consisted of the following rituals: 1- Turkish National Anthem, 2- speech 
about the fruits of the Revolution delivered by the general director of the particular 
House, 3- staging the play.  
Of course there were also non-verbal symbolic organization of objects that 
strengthened the ritual messages in collaboration with verbal symbols. According to 
the official publication of the Peoples Houses, which documented activities in the 
Houses751, the theatre hall is pictured as follows: within the hall where the theatrical 
plays are staged, there is a raised platform built in framed-stage architectural style. 
The frame signifies the importance of what is staged and engages audience in the 
message given through the play. Atop the frame again there are the Turkish and the 
party flag with six arrows. In between these two, there is an Ataturk picture. There is 
a system of lining up the organization of the seats in the auditorium. As part of the 
general system of the ritual, architectural organization of the Houses contains some 
physical objects that are used as ritual symbols:  
                                                
750 Cited in Ibid, p. 139. 
751 Halkevleri 1932-1935, 103 Halkevi Geçen Yõllarda Nasõl Çalõştõ, pp. 50-64 
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1. A maxim posted above the main door. Usually, the maxim so happy is 
one who says I am Turk, or Turk, take pride in yourself, be diligent, 
and trust, and other Ataturks maxims used decisively according the 
logic of situation. 
2. A tower signifying the new temples of the Revolution, which is 
analogous to mosques with its physical appearance. Some of these towers 
are built taller than minaret of a mosque.  
3. Placard, put on walls emphasizing the old to disfavor and disfigure it, 
and the new praising the fruits of the reforms. 
4. A balcony to deliver speeches to the people gathered in the courtyard of 
the main building. 
5. Two flags, one of the Turkish Republic and the other the Party (RPP) 
flag, which symbolize the principles of the Revolution, Republicanism, 
Nationalism, Populism, Laicism, Étatism and Revolutionism. These flags 
are posited side by side. 
6. Ataturk bust or statue.752 
Ritual became a significant means to structure and maintain power relations, 
because the revolutionary elite deliberately used new state rituals to increase social 
solidarity and thus further the construction of a secular society. The ruling elite 
regarded traditional rituals and customs as the primary components of superstition 
and scholastic way of life. Actually, they considered its cultural inheritance as 
problematic, in general. Inherited ritual was to be ruled out in terms of replacement 
of existing rites by new, secularized substitutes. The new ritual engineers hoped that 
                                                
752 For a detailed account of symbols and architectural styles of the Peoples Houses 
see especially Neşe G. Yeşilkaya, Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlõk (İstanbul: İletişim 
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the new Revolutionary liturgy would stamp out not only religious superstitions and 
rites but also generally rid peoples consciousness of all spoiled residues of the 
ancien regime.  
Just like music and theatre, in the Ülkü journal, the revolutionary elites wanted 
to highlight the significance of the ceremonies in inculcating the revolutionary values 
to the people. For instance, it was stated that the Language Day Ceremony was to be 
celebrated with a significant ritual. It was argued that the Peoples Houses valued the 
Language Day as it has almost equal significance with the Victory Day, which 
celebrated the termination of the war of independence on 30 August 1922. In one of 
the Language Day Ceremonies, after the National Anthem, the head of the Ankara 
Peoples House, Ferid Celal Guven opened the ceremony with an enthusiastic speech. 
Especially, his expressions signifying the trust in the revolutionary values made a 
very good impact on the audience.753  Then, the head of the Turkish Language 
Institution, Besim Atalay, made a speech. He stressed the importance of Turks in 
world history, and particularly made a distinction between the old and new 
approaches. Afterwards, many poems written and read in Atatürks Turkish by 
Ishak Rafet Işõkmen were listened to with pleasure. During all these speeches and 
poems the instances revitalizing the cause were much applauded.754 
According to the journal, in Istanbul Eminönü Peoples House, the Language 
Day was also celebrated with enthusiasm. A crowd belonging to an enlightened 
strata (münevver zümre) come together at six oclock, listened to the conference 
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speeches broadcasted from Ankara radio, and then the ceremony was opened with 
the National Independence Anthem. Following the anthem, the Assembly Anthem 
was chanted. Afterwards, a prominent member of the House, Sabri Esat Ander 
delivered a speech denoting the importance of the Day: 
This is a ceremony of a nation who had been forced to forget its existence, 
and to be deluded by the ceremonies of the Palace and Medrese (Ottoman 
educational institutions). However, this national ceremony announces the 
unification of the nation with its own personality and vitality. Recent history 
is the history of Turkish miracle. Turks who have been seeking their way in 
the darkness attained the celebrated days by way of the emergence of their 
ATA as the rising sun from an Anatolian district on May 19. And finally 26 
September; the surrounding of this sun all over the universe as a national 
faith. 
In times past, our whole knowledge was nothing but medrese bigotry. Our 
literature was a mere imitation. Since, we did not know ourselves; and we 
doubted our language There was an unconscious, hidden, unexpressed 
consideration that we are a great nation. Today, by the help of the language 
and history research, we see that this consideration has come true. We are 
now not only an amalgamation clenching to each other instinctively, but 
also a nation who melts into each other with faith, love and knowledge. The 
consciousness of our personality is enlightened by the sun of the ceremonies 
such as 19 May, 30 August and 29 December. The ceremony that we 
celebrate together today is the ceremony of our enlightened consciousness 
and the manifestation of our everlasting gratitude to our Sacred Sun 
(Atatürk).755 
After the speeches, a classical music concert started and the orchestra of the 
Peoples House was much applauded. The concert was followed by various stage 
plays signifying the fruits of the Revolution. All these activities were aimed to 
strengthen and fortify the revolutionary transformation of society. In this respect, one 
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Ülkü author argued, in order to fortify our revolution and reinforce the national 
consciousness, we have to spend maximum energy to employ every instrument such 
as speech, text, cinema, poster and theatre This task could only be entrusted to 
idealist and faithful (imanlõ) persons.756 
For the Ülkü elite, fine arts should reflect the spirit of communality and 
homogeneity of the nation. For them, there was no such thing as individual art as art 
was a social phenomenon and for the society and for the common good of the nation: 
We have to develop a revolutionary literature in order to reflect the essence of 
Revolutionary Turks. Our revolution is volcano, sun, fire, and earthquake. It 
destroyed, overthrow and demolished. But at the same time, it remade, recreated, and 
restored. Our literature should also be like our revolution. We are disgusted with 
centuries long love stories, personal passions and lifeless joy. We want revolutionary 
poetry that would teach us ourselves, and direct us to our ideal.757 The aim was to 
nullify everything produced before the Revolution. 
In sum, it can be argued that culture, for the Ülkü elite, was manufactured as 
the domain of social engineering via state agencies.758 Thus, Ülküs conception of 
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culture became the outcome of a constant process of cultural production759 and 
projected a vision of an ideal, well-ordered and harmonious socio-cultural life 
promoted by the cultural doctrine of the elite.760 Cultural production gave rise to a 
populist idealization of the Turkish nation as an egalitarian and harmonious 
community, free from internal dissent and struggle. Utilization of culture for the 
common good of the nation was of utmost importance to establish a harmonious 
order and social solidarity among society. 
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 -316- 
 
CONCLUSION 
In Turkey, the 1930s marked an era when the state elite attempted to alter state 
power in line with new ideas, institutions and techniques that were significantly 
different from the ones before 1930. This specific historical episode bespeaks certain 
characteristics that shaped the very direction of the Turkish politics. Three major 
characteristics came to the fore. First, the idea of a secular morality was seriously 
considered as a substitute for the religious one. With this idea, the problem of laiklik 
was reduced to a search for constituting a laic morality. Second, the vision of a 
Jacobin-like democracy was internalized, which presumed an equivalence between 
representation and the people. Any intermediary body that would disrupt this 
equality was eradicated as the enemy of the general/national will. Third, the idea of 
solidarism and social solidarity were employed to highlight a classless, amalgamated 
and amassed society free from internal dissent. Actually, this idea of solidarity 
embraced both secular morality and Jacobin democracy. This dissertation claims that 
the Ülkü elites representation of Kemalism was generally undertaken through 
employing these three characteristics. This version of Kemalism became particularly 
dominant between 1933-36. When Atatürk dismissed Recep Peker from the post of 
the Secretary-General of the party on June 1936, the Ülkü group was also dismissed 
from Çankaya, and their ideas ceased to be the official formulation of Turkish 
revolutionary ideology. 
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The dissertation draws a number of conclusions from the analysis of the Ülkü 
version of Kemalism which also describes a stage in the Turkish Revolution, namely 
Kemalism of the 1930s. First of all, the dissertation reveals that chronologically there 
was no single revolutionary style. Furthermore, even during the 1930s, there were 
competing projects and programs and multiple interpretations of Kemalism on how 
to secularize and modernize Turkish society and how to form the ideology of 
revolution. The Ülkü variant of Kemalism represents one of the most powerful 
attempts to provide substance to the Turkish revolutionary ideology carried out by a 
pioneering elite group within the RPP in the 1930s. Ülkü met the historical-temporal 
needs of Kemalism in a particular historical situation that had arisen especially after 
the World Economic Depression and the Free Party experiment. 
Although the radical projects of the Ülkü group were implemented during the 
mid-1930s, this was only possible due to a coincidence of an international and 
domestic crisis. Yet, once it was implemented for a short period of time, this specific 
version of Kemalism remained as a model for later generations even after the 
transition to multi-party politics. If Kemalism carries certain permanent politico-
cultural meanings that still provide inputs to shape Turkish politics, it partly owes it 
to the historical heritage descending from the intricate encounters between differing 
versions of Kemalism of the 1930s, including that of Ülkü. Since Kemalism might be 
re-interpreted in different political contexts to meet different contingencies, the 
semiotic struggle over the definition of it is a continuous process. In short, the 
analysis of Ülkü demonstrates that Kemalism is an amalgam composed of lots of 
variations in it. All the competing meta-narratives subsumed under Kemalism 
generated the politico-jural order of contemporary Turkish politics, and its internal 
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contradictions. A scientific exploration of these differing attempts is highly valuable 
to understand not only the specificities of Kemalism but also its general stance in 
terms of its transformative character, and also its permanence throughout time. In 
this sense, the Ülkü version of Kemalism represents a specific hue in the spectrum of 
the Turkish Revolutionary ideology, which is meaningful in understanding not only 
the political dynamics of Turkey in the 1930s, but also the current dynamics, 
structures, problems and challenges in Turkish politics. 
Secondly, the dissertation shows that the ideas conveyed in the texts of Ülkü 
also provided guiding codes for the Peoples Houses. The authors of Ülkü were able 
to find a suitable place in Peoples Houses to disseminate and further test their 
thoughts. In this sense, the analysis of the Peoples Houses and Ülkü unravels the 
solidarist tenets of Kemalism of the 1930s, which considered secular morality and 
Jacobin democracy as the ultimate ways of modernizing the country. The relevance 
of this analysis extends beyond the 1930s Turkey in terms of providing insights for 
understanding the contemporary problems of Turkish politics. The features of 
Turkish politics originally formulated in the 1930s should be seriously taken into 
account while assessing todays problems of Turkish democracy. In this sense, the 
study of the Ülkü group of Kemalism provides a key that would be instructive to 
understand major predilections of Turkish politics today while focusing on the 
peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary ideology in the 1930s.  
Prompted by their profound belief in the superiority of revolutionary secular 
culture and the possibility of progress through the displacement of scholastic 
mentality by the scientific one, the re-constructivist revolutionaries of the 1930s 
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set out to improve the material and moral conditions of the ignorant, illiterate 
traditional masses. Their rule of conduct of the Turkish Republican enlightenment 
project rested on a set of coercive practices that violated their own democratic ideals. 
The establishment of the Peoples Houses can be evaluated as part and parcel 
of the institutionalization of the radical Kemalist meta-paradigm as a secular morality 
aspiring to convert the whole Turkish people by means of the myths, symbols and 
rituals of the new regime.  Thus, they became the new sites for the sacralization of 
secular politics. The Houses defined as National Temples (Milli Tapõnaklar)761 
were the cultic sites that the radical Kemalists expropriated in their first step toward 
constructing a complex politico-cultural liturgy connecting the supposedly 
uneducable masses to the Kemalist principles.  The rites, symbols, and myths of 
the Kemalist revolutionary project were designed to mold the population into an 
amalgamated block. Radical Kemalism found so much of traditional Turkish culture 
and religion to be convertible and adaptable to its own purposes. 
The third major argument that this dissertation makes is about the historical 
ideological seeds of the tension between Ülküs project of democracy and 
secular/modern transformation. New forms of discipline or to put it another way, 
new ways of organizing the masses arose from within the very forces that were 
working to democratize the people. Actually, the rhetoric of democracy affords the 
                                                
761 Necip Ali, İsmet Paşa ve Halkevleri, Ülkü, Vol. 3, No. 18, (Aug., 1934): 402-404, p. 
404 
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possibility for the colonization of the people762 by the revolutionary elite. The 
revolutionary Ülkü elite aimed at creating narratives of the national past, present, and 
future, which were at the same time constructed to give shape to the existing social 
structure. Their initial concern with terms like freedom and revolution were 
paired with words like obedience and discipline. Even the content of freedom 
and revolution was filled by obedience and discipline.763  
Revolutionary quest for enlightening and secularly purifying the people was to 
go hand in hand with promises that the Republic would bring civilization and 
prosperity to those who had lagged behind due to the scholastic mentalities of 
dark ages. The authoritarian nature of social control and the emancipatory, 
democratic ideals of official ideology were not contradictory in the minds of the 
revolutionary Ülkü elite, for authoritarian measures were deemed essential to make 
the traditional and backward segments of the population capable of participating in 
the Republican way of life.764  The fundamental contradictions became visible in 
time when the Free Party was able to appeal to the nation during the municipal 
elections in 1930. This was the first significant mark bespeaking the confrontation 
between the civilizing mission of the Republic with the wills and aspirations of the 
people. Instead of taking into consideration peoples own aspirations, the radical 
                                                
762 Katherine Verdery, The Production and Defense of the Romanian Nation, in 
Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures, ed. Richard G. Fox, 
(Washington, D. C., 1990), p. 96 
763  See, for instance, Recep Peker, Disiplinli Hürriyet, (Disciplined Freedom), 
Ülkü, (1933) 
764 See for instance Hilmi A. Halik, Kõşla ve Köy Terbiyesi in Ülkü, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
(April, 1933) 
 -321- 
Ülkü group thought that the restrictive mechanisms of state had to be enlarged to 
realize the revolutions goal of civilizing and hence democratizing society in a 
relatively short period of time. In his famous İnkõlap Dersleri (Revolutionary 
Courses), Recep Peker, under the subtitle Using Force in Revolution (İnkõlapta Zor 
Kullanmak), argued that among all the revolutions of the world, the Turkish 
Revolution is the one that had to use more force and violence against especially 
irtica (reactionism)765 so as to pave the way for the progress and prosperity of the 
country.  
The radical revolutionary ideology of the Ülkü elite implied that democracy 
could only flourish in a laic and republican system underpinned by an enlightened 
society. In fact, they were torn between the competing goals of enlightening 
(secularism) and emancipating (democracy) the people. The tension between 
secularism and democracy refracted the elites march to democracy in such a way 
that in the end this turned out to be a serious obstacle to democracy; it was redressed 
with their view that without a society which is not converted to secular or 
revolutionary morality, democracy is not possible. Thus, the elitist passion for the 
mass conversion of Turkish society to modernity and secularism used the will to 
democracy as a justifiable end of the overall project. In this sense, conversion 
implies an ultimate means of negotiation of the tension between secularism and 
democracy in Turkey in the 1930s. 
The final focus of analysis of the dissertation is on the relatively distinctive 
philosophy which the Ülkü circle nurtured. It was solidarism, which was anticlerical, 
                                                
765 Recep Peker, İnkõlap Tarihi Ders Notlarõ, (Ankara, Ulus Basõmevi, 1936), p.8 
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anti-liberal, patriotic, and nationalist. It maintained a positivistic faith in objective 
science and contempt for the religious value system.  The solidarist perception of the 
radical revolutionaries was that the maintenance of discipline and social unity in 
Turkey would make the country better equipped than any in the world to transform 
society suddenly and in accord with rational revolutionary morality. 
Ülküs peculiar conceptualization of solidarism, emphasizing national 
uniformity and secular morality, in fact assimilated both politics and ethics of various 
kinds on condition that they were committed to secular revolutionary ideals. Having 
mainly adopted the French notion of citizenship highlighting the assimilation of 
different ethnic and cultural entities under a uniform Turkish identity, the Ülkü elite, 
further, came to the conclusion that different ethical postures would have to be 
unified to provide a classless, undifferentiated harmony and solidarity of the nation. 
In their mind, unless the society was raised to a desired ethical stance, democracy 
was impossible. Unanimity on desired moral standards was deemed necessary to 
establish real solidarity among society. The Peoples Houses were established 
specifically to bring people to the desired ethical and cultural level as envisaged by 
the revolutionary elite, as the vanguard group. Moreover, the Houses were designed 
as the civilizing vehicles through which the traditional masses would have the 
necessary qualifications to be carried to the prosperous future. 
In sum, the dissertation elaborates a specific version of the Turkish 
revolutionary ideology in the 1930s when dramatic developments in institutions and 
beliefs of a new value system in Turkey began to crystallize, with implications for 
the course of development of the Turkish democratic experience. The analysis of the 
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Ülkü group provides some scholarly insights to interpret the Turkish Revolution in 
more realistic terms. 
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